

In "Epistemic Injustice" Miranda Fricker defines hermeneutical injustice as "the injustice of having some significant area of one's social experience obscured from collective understanding" (Fricker 2007, 158). Fricker claims that hermeneutical injustice occurs when the members of a social group are *hermeneutically marginalized*, i.e. when they are not allowed to contribute to the collective hermeneutical resource of their society (cf. Fricker 2007, 153). But as other authors have already pointed out (cf. Jenkins 2016 and Crerar 2016), this understanding of the cause of hermeneutical injustice is too narrow.

In the first part of our paper, we systematize the possible causes of hermeneutical injustice. We argue that we should distinguish between two ways in which hermeneutical injustice can occur: Hermeneutical injustice can come about either (1) because the collective hermeneutical resource of a society is *compromised* or (2) because it is *rendered difficult for the members of a society to correctly apply the concepts* provided by their otherwise adequate collective hermeneutical resource.

In the second part of our paper, we discuss another cause of hermeneutical injustice that falls within category (2). The example we draw on is that of the concept of *workplace discrimination*. We contend that in European societies, hermeneutical injustice occurs concerning this concept because there is a pervasive social narrative (i.e. that of merit and equality of opportunity) that suggests that the concept of workplace discrimination is not applicable in European societies. To us, this case of hermeneutical injustice is of particular interest for members of underrepresented groups working in European academia (for instance for women working in philosophy). If what we say is correct, there is the possibility that some members of underrepresented groups are affected by hermeneutical injustice concerning workplace discrimination because they accept these false social narratives.