

The relation between arguments and reasons has been a topic of debate in theory of argumentation. The dominant view is to take "reason" as the primary and "argument" as a derivative concept:

(R>A) Arguments are the things used in interpersonal argumentation to provide reasons to someone (S) for something (p).

Thereby, reasons ä+

are often taken as primitive undefinable concept. However, problems and worries have been raised against this approach and against the concept of "reason" involved in it.

Looking at Ancient philosophy one can find the opposite view. There "argument" is take as a primary and "reason" as a derivative concept.

(A>R) Reasons are arguments used for the acquisition of knowledge or justified belief

This view is apparent in Plato and in Isocrates, who describe reasoning as arguing oneself with oneself and reasons as arguments:¹

For we use the same arguments, with which we persuade others when we speak, as when we deliberate.² (Isocrates, *Antidosis* 255)

In this paper, I develop systematically and with reference to Plato and Isocrates this approach to reasons and arguments. Thereby, I concentrate on two versions of such a view – the *rhetorical view of arguments and reasons* seen in Isocrates and the *dialectical view of arguments and reasons* seen in Plato. Furthermore, I consider its strength and some problems connected to it. In particular, I argue that this account has the advantage to not take "reasons" as undefinable primitive concept. Instead it can illuminate the concept of reasons and thereby avoid many problems connected to the concept of reasons.