

Uncertainty and vagueness give rise to different kinds of degrees of belief. Though the literature on formal models of uncertainty based degrees of belief and on degrees of truth abounds, the question how they interact has largely been ignored. There are rare exceptions. Smith (2010, 2014) provides an elaborated combined account of these types of degrees of belief as expected truth values. He argues that a unified theory of the different kinds of degrees of belief is mandatory if we want to keep Ramsey's interpretation of degrees of beliefs of tendencies to act. As there can only be one tendency to act, so Smith argues, there can only be one 'all things considered' degree of belief.

The paper discusses, and rejects, both Smith's combined model of degrees of beliefs as expected truth values, and Smith's argument for the necessity of a unified account. It presents a sample case showing that two persons with identical expected truth values (and, of course, the same preferences and the same background beliefs), may diverge in their rational tendencies to act. Thus, Smith's model of degrees of belief as expected truth values cannot fulfill its job, i.e., expected truth values cannot serve as the basis of predicting the actions of rational agents. Degrees of beliefs are not expected truth values. Furthermore, I will argue that the motivation of the search for a unified model of 'all things considered' degrees of belief to save Ramsey's credo is based on wrong assumptions: there may be more than one tendency to act, as there are different dimensions of an action. I submit that uncertainty based degrees of belief determine our willingness to act at all, while vagueness based degrees of belief determine the content of the action.