

Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways often yields startling, sometimes spectacular, conclusions. One of the weirdest is that in some cases agents appear to be rationally entitled to reason as if they had “anomalous causal powers” (Bostrom 2001). Bostrom proposes some scenarios where this happens – the three “Adam and Eve” experiments and the “UN++ -Gedanken” experiment. Incidentally, this appearance of “anomalous causal powers” has not been systematically investigated in the literature and the scenarios by Bostrom just mentioned are not among the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief.

In response to this finding, the present contribution has three aims: the first is to derive recommendations analogous to those derived by Bostrom for two especially famous problems of self-locating belief for which, curiously, this has not yet been done: the Doomsday Argument (Gott 1993, Leslie 1996) and the Sleeping Beauty (SB) problem (Elga 2000). I introduce versions of these problems for which reasoning along the lines of David Lewis’ halfer view of SB (Lewis 2001) recommends credences that are as if someone had anomalous causal powers. Choosing Beauty (CB), introduced here, is a novel version of SB that exhibits this feature.

The second aim of the contribution is to highlight the implausibility of any such recommendation and to turn this into an argument against Lewisian halfer-style reasoning as applied to these problems.

Finally, my third aim is to show that the prospects for thirder-style reasoning – one of the main alternatives to Lewisian halfer-style reasoning – are better than widely assumed. The main problem for thirder-style reasoning, it is usually believed, is that it yields catastrophic recommendations in *Presumptuous Philosopher*-type scenarios (Bostrom 2001, Leitgeb 2010). However, as I argue, these scenarios differ in crucial ways from the Doomsday Argument and Sleeping Beauty as regards the appearance of apparent anomalous causal powers. Accordingly, there is little reason to suppose that they call for analogous answers as the Doomsday Argument and Sleeping Beauty, opening up possibilities for a successful defense of thirder-style reasoning as applied to the Sleeping Beauty problem.