

Strawsonians about responsibility agree that an agent is morally responsible for some wrongdoing if and only if it is appropriate to blame her for it. Most of them also agree that there is an asymmetrical, metaphysical, explanatory relation between the two sides of the biconditional such that one side explains the other. But they disagree about the order of explanation: is an agent an appropriate target of blame because she is responsible, or is she responsible because she is an appropriate target of blame? In my talk, I will argue that both accounts have problems that have been ignored in the current debate. I will then develop a third version of Strawsonianism, according to which both sides of the biconditional are metaphysically on the same level. This view says that being morally responsible *just is* being an appropriate target of blame, and the *just is*-operator is neither asymmetrical nor explanatory. I will show that this view has important advantages over the explanatory versions of Strawsonianism.