

Recently, a growing number of philosophers have come to subscribe to broadly Subjectivist picture of moral obligation. Though details differ, one central idea that unites these theories is the idea that moral obligation is at least weakly self-intimating, i.e. that any given person is morally obligated to ϕ only if her epistemic situation, or, as it is sometimes helpfully called, her *perspective*, somehow entails that she ought to ϕ . Allowing for such an epistemic restriction of moral obligation permits one to capture a familiar intuition – agents acting from ignorance are generally not to be blamed for their actions. However, there is an important exception to this rule – ignorance does not excuse if it is itself culpable. In my contribution, I will show how accounting for culpable ignorance is quite a tricky matter for proponents of Subjectivism. In fact, some of the most prominent Subjectivist accounts fail to be able to capture intuitions regarding paradigmatic cases of culpable ignorance. I will show that Belief-Subjectivism, as endorsed by Jackson and Prichard, fails to even accommodate basic cases of culpable ignorance through deficient investigation or deficient inference. Evidence-Subjectivism, as recently defended at length by Michael Zimmerman, fares better in this regard, but faces problems in cases in which agents culpably curtail their own evidence in order to avoid being subject to moral obligations. Drawing on work by Sorensen and Wieland, I argue that Evidence- Subjectivist risk slipping into a vicious regress problem when trying to explain why it is wrong for agents to purposefully avoid possible knowledge of their obligations. Finally, I sketch two possible answers to this challenge, arguing that both come with some substantial costs.