

Short Abstract. The talk is part of a project that aims at bringing together two debates which have thus far been pursued mostly separately: the debate on scientific explanation and the debate on grounding in metaphysics. Our starting point is a notion of difference-making for grounding that we define in analogy with notions of difference-making that play a prominent role in the debate on scientific explanation and causation, in particular in recent work by Michael Strevens (2008). We show that in many cases only some, but not all, grounds of a given fact make a difference to the fact's obtaining. Subsequently, we demonstrate the fruitfulness of this notion by applying it to the debate on the contrastivity of grounding that has been initiated by Schaffer (2012). We point out that by employing our notion of difference-making for grounding, one can resist Schaffer's arguments to the effect that grounding should be understood contrastively. Finally, we show that the notion of difference-making helps us to understand the extent to which grounding is an explanatory relation. In particular, we will suggest criteria that help determine under what conditions the grounds of a given fact are explanatorily relevant with respect to that fact.