

In contemporary philosophy of perception, discussions around the significance of illusions and hallucinations have come to the forefront of research thanks to the rise of the so-called disjunctivist theory. Disjunctivists conceive of illusions and hallucinations as *non-veridical* experiences. This is an *epistemological claim* about the *content* of perceptual experience, which is considered to be inherently normative in the sense of being true or false, depending on how well it reveals how things are. A broader, phenomenological analysis of perceptual experience will nevertheless show that illusions and hallucinations are better understood as deviating from *perceptual, not epistemic norms*. By drawing conceptual resources in the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the point of the paper is to clarify I mean by “perceptual norms” and to highlight *three* main phenomenological differences between illusions, hallucinations and (veridical) perception. I will proceed by focussing on three dimensions of experience that no disjunctivist pays sufficient attention to (if at all), namely perception’s relation to *time, action, and others*.

By looking at Husserl’s structure of fulfilment, I will define illusions and hallucinations as *experiences of non-fulfilment*, thereby showing that the normative standard of perceptual experience is provided by the *horizon of expectations*, that will either be confirmed or disconfirmed by the further course of experience. Second, my analysis of the Müller-Lyer illusion will provide further reasons not to confuse perceptual and epistemic norms by insisting that perceptual experiences and reports can vary independently of one another. Thirdly, it will be shown that for Merleau-Ponty the difference between epistemic and perceptual norms manifests itself most clearly in the different kinds of actions and behaviours that perceptions, illusions and hallucinations prompt. In brief, the aim of the paper is to provide evidence that illusions and hallucinations differ in important ways from perception *even from a first personal point of view*. If that attempt is successful, I will have shown how phenomenology can make an important contribution to an important ongoing debate in contemporary philosophy of perception.