

The aim of this paper is twofold. For one, we wish to point out an explanatory gap in what recently has been one of the most prominent accounts of affective intentionality: the basic-concern account as we shall call it in the course of our paper. On the other hand, we wish to suggest a broader view that also acknowledges the bodily dimension of affectivity as it has been investigated in the phenomenological tradition.

We argue that the basic-concern account amounts to explaining affective intentionality in terms of what the affected person already finds important or cares about and show that such an approach has its limits when it comes to accommodate a certain kind of intentional feelings, of which we discuss an example case. We argue that this case satisfies the relevant conditions in order to rank as a genuine instance of affective intentionality, but cannot be accounted for by referring to a basic concern in any informative sense. We argue, further, that this and similar cases can be made sense of by taking the bodily dimension of affectivity into account. Thereby, we draw on phenomenological analyses of more primitive forms of affective intentionality such as startling. These forms are much more related to what the subject's bodily sensitivity than to basic concerns. We argue that the view emerging from such investigations is better prepared to account for cases in which persons are affected without having any concern that could ground the relevant intentional feeling.

Finally, in order to further specify and defend the view presented here, we discuss some of the most obvious objections that defenders of the basic-concern account might raise.