

The main thesis of my talk is that Husserl's phenomenology, contrary to Marion's criticism, can insure an unrestricted elbow room to phenomena. The secondary thesis is that Husserl's phenomenology even has some advantages over the phenomenology of givenness, advanced by Marion himself as a solution to the problem raised by his criticism. In order to present Marion's criticism and solution, I focus on his interpretation of the principle of principles and on the latest development of the phenomenology of givenness, i.e. the extrapolation of the infinite hermeneutics. In order to present Husserl's solution to the problem raised by Marion's criticism, and the advantages such a solution has over the extrapolation of infinite hermeneutics, I focus on the intersubjective transformation of transcendental phenomenology. My talk is, accordingly, structured in two parts.

## I.

According to Marion, the limits imposed by the principle of principles to the elbow room of phenomena are the limits imposed by the constitutive ego through a prior and definitive horizon of meaning. Consequently, an unrestrictive phenomenology can only be one that manages to free itself from the constitutive ego's limits. The infinite hermeneutics must fulfil exactly this task – to insure the absence of definitive meanings imposed on phenomena.

## II.

According to Husserl, the constitution of things in general is to be understood as a constant intersubjective cooperation. Thus, although it is always tributary to a prior horizon, the meaning a thing receives can never be definitive. Marion's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology is, therefore, unjustified. At the end of the talk I investigate two of the advantages Husserl's phenomenology has over the infinite hermeneutics advanced by Marion: (1) the banning of certain definitive meanings applies not only to phenomena that lend themselves to an infinite hermeneutics, the saturated ones, but to any type of phenomena; (2) an unrestricted phenomenality can presuppose a less solemn and more intuitive perspective on the other – instead of understanding the other only as a saturated phenomenon, as Marion does, we could also understand it as a fellow in relation to which things acquire an open validity.