

This paper provides a pragmatist-inspired interpretation of the notion that ‘democracy tracks the truth’, a metaphor that goes to the heart of what epistemic democrats hold, namely that democratic deliberation and decision-making procedures tend to get it right. In particular, this paper argues for the following claim: *By establishing a partial equality in epistemic authority and by including many diverse (disagreeing or dissenting) viewpoints into deliberative environments, such environments tend to give rise to a higher epistemic quality of individual and collective judgments.* What seems like a contradiction in terms – *that by introducing more subjectivity, more perspectives, more diversity and dissent, we arrive at more warranted or truth-apt individual and collective judgments* – turns out to be one key element for a proper interpretation of the idea that democracy via deliberation has ‘truth-tracking’ capability. The paper, hence, sees itself as contributing to ‘normative political epistemology’ (Jeffrey Friedman), which asks about the appropriate epistemic circumstances of democratic politics. As ramified as the now rich debate under the header ‘epistemic democracy’ has become, what is still lacking in the debate is a clearly stated and thoroughly developed conceptual elucidation of the epistemic underpinnings that are at stake here. And these underpinnings have extensive consequences for how we can reasonably talk about the epistemic dimension of democratic deliberation. The aim of this paper is to fill this lacuna in the literature.