

In his *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, Gottlob Frege famously proposed that *Number-Sentences* like ‘The number of Martian moons is two’ are to be analyzed as object-level identity statements in which the expressions flanking ‘is’ are numerical singular terms, i.e. expressions that purport to denote numbers conceived of as objects. Frege’s analysis has the consequence that the truth of *Number-Sentences* would require the existence of numbers as objects. In her recent book *Talking about Numbers*, Katharina Felka proposes, contra Frege, that *Number-Sentences* are to be analyzed as so-called specificational sentences and that, so-analyzed, the truth of *Number-Sentences* does not require the existence of numbers.

In this talk, I show that Felka’s analysis does not have the desired consequence. That is, I show that, just like Frege’s, Felka’s analysis renders the truth of *Number-Sentences* beholden to the existence of numbers.