

In my talk, I discuss the social cognitive skills and competencies that are required to cooperate successfully in joint actions involving Bratmanian shared intentions. The analysis points to rather sophisticated social cognitive skills such as having a robust theory of mind - that is acquired not until age 4 to 5 in human ontogeny. However, developmental research has shown that also younger children are able to cooperate in various ways. Moreover, phenomenological considerations and findings from social psychology illustrate that empathy and agent-specificities may play a central role in cooperative activities, which has not been considered at all in Bratman's account of shared agency. All this calls for a reconsideration of his approach. The proposed redefinition does not only capture the social cognitive and affective presuppositions of joint actions but also the phenomenal dimension of we-experiences that agents have when being engaged in joint actions. The plausibility of this redefinition will be illustrated by pointing to a number of empirical findings.