The goal of this talk is to analyze what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. I argue that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a feature that a philosophical account either has or has not. I analyze the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical account can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, and evaluate the relevant empirical information on which they base their philosophical account. Object-normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing, itself, can be normative, for instance, if a philosophical account addresses the role of epistemic norms in scientific practice. Meta-normativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical account contains. Some philosophers make normative claims about science, as it should be, rather than about science, as it actually is. These three kinds of normativity give rise to a comprehensive and clear view of what normativity in the philosophy of science is.