

The problem of induction, which was put forward by the great empiricist David Hume, has been the subject of much debate in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of science literature. One way to understand the problem of induction is as follows: if there is some time-invariant regularity in nature, can we know it (or have some degree of justification for believing it) from experience? Hume was skeptical about the presence of such regularities in nature. Recently, we see that there is a serious effort to overcome the problem of induction with a metaphysical solution. To be more specific, some philosophers consider that a contemporary metaphysical view “dispositionalism” can help us tackle the problem (among these philosophers are Brian Ellis, E. Jonathan Lowe, and Stephen Mumford and Rani L. Anjum). In this paper, I firstly introduce how the dispositionalist account of nature is different from the Humean account of nature and what this means in terms of the problem of induction. Secondly, I examine the proposals offered to overcome the problem of induction. And finally, I argue that none of them is satisfactory at setting the skeptic’s mind at ease.