

The current debate about just work revolves around how best to improve working conditions in regard to the economic, social, and psychological dimensions of work, such as income, working environments, and job satisfaction. But what if some jobs cannot be made “more decent”? What if there is *essentially* “bad” work that is nonetheless socially necessary? If bad work exists, the question arises how society can and should deal with it. In many contemporary societies, such work is performed by the members of lower classes who are materially so badly off that they have no choice but to accept these jobs. This seems problematic from a perspective of justice. Hence, we need to start thinking about just ways of distributing not only the *benefits* but also the *burdens* of work, and specifically “bad” work, among the members of a society. This presupposes that we know what we mean when we talk about bad work. By developing an account of bad work, I put this hitherto neglected aspect of justice in the labour market in the focus of philosophical and political attention and thus broaden the philosophical debate about just work.