

Decision-theoretic analysis of intertemporal choice often associates a decision-maker's lack of self-control with a preference reversal over the attainment of a larger-later and a smaller-sooner reward as the realization of those rewards draws nearer through time. In light of such preference reversals, game-theoretic models of intrapersonal decision making, coupled with the notion of best-response reasoning, are used to explain self-constraint, whereby, anticipating a preference reversal, decision-makers deliberately constrain their future choice sets in order to precommit themselves to the attainment of their preferred outcomes. While such strategies may seem familiar and are quite widespread, this leaves the need to account for one's ability to overcome temptations through the exercise of self-control. Maintaining the view of self-control as a distinct phenomenon from subtle versions of self-constraint I analyze the possibility of using the theory of team reasoning—a relatively new branch of game theory—to do this.