Thursday | June 11 2015

14:15 – 14:30
Geert Keil (Berlin)
Introduction

14:30 – 15:45
Ralf Poscher (Freiburg)
Why We Argue About the Law. An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement

16:15 – 17:45
Folke Tersman (Uppsala)
Explaining Moral Disagreement

18:15 – 19:45
Public Lecture
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers)
Surviving Disagreement: Toward an Epistemology for the Humanities

Friday | June 12 2015

11:30 – 12:20
A: Marc Andree Weber (Freiburg)
Epistemic Peerhood and the Limits of Rationality

B: Thomas Crocker (South Carolina)
Disagreement and Constitutive Vision

12:30 – 13:20
A: Manfred Harth (München)
Epistemically Faultless Disagreement and Objectivity

B: Giorgio Pino (Palermo)
On Legal Disagreements: Typology, Scope, and Jurisprudential Implications

16:00 – 16:50
A: Don Loeb (Vermont)
Moral Expressivism and Deep Moral Disagreement

B: Youngjae Lee (New York)
Reasonable Doubt and Moral Disagreement

17:00 – 17:50
A: Giulia Pravato (Barcelona), Andrej Kristan (Genua)
Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Law

B: Isabell Villanueva-Breulmann (Berlin/New York)
When Justices Err in the Face of Disagreement

18.15 – 19.45
Evening Lecture
Brian Leiter (Chicago)
Theoretical Disagreements in Law: Another Look

Saturday | June 13 2015

09:30 – 10:20
A: Simon Kirchin, Steve Pethick (Kent)
Conceptual Disagreement and the Epistemology of Disagreement

B: Brian Janssen (Rotterdam)
Do Judges Have a Moral Obligation to Believe in No Right Answer? Recognizing Vagueness for the Purpose of Setting a Good Precedent

10:30 – 11:20
A: Anna Nuspliger (Osnabrück)
No Ontological Bedrock Dispute without Heavyweight Realism

B: Andreas Funke (Erlangen)
Models of Pragmatics in Legal Philosophy, and the Explanation of Disagreement in Law

11:45 – 12:35
A: Larry Krasnoff (Charleston)
Rawls on the Burdens of Judgment: Political Not Epistemological

B: Lonneke Poort, Ruth Mampuys (Amsterdam)
Regulating Deep Disagreements: the European Struggle for an Assessment Framework for Cultivating GM-crops as an Example
Deep Disagreements

Philosophical and Legal Perspectives

Many disagreements that are central to contemporary political, social, ideological or religious conflicts can neither be dissolved by a compelling argument nor by further information, and they are not based in easily discernible misunderstandings. Yet, they are of considerable importance and in need of a decision or regulation. We call them Deep Disagreements.

Deep disagreements raise issues from various fields of philosophy and law such as epistemology, metaphilosophy, metaethics and legal theory. They are referred to in the philosophical debate about peer disagreements, which is concerned with the question how persons sharing the same level of information and similar intellectual capacities should reasonably react to disagreements. Moreover, they are linked to the recent discussion about the possibility of faultless disagreements. This discussion resembles the legal debate about the right answer thesis, which centers around the question whether all legal disputes have a single right answer. If we do not presuppose a right answer, Dworkin’s famous semantic sting seems to force us to the implausible conclusion that our deep legal disagreements are merely based on linguistic misunderstandings.

This international conference aims to bring together researchers from different disciplines and fields to discuss those philosophical and legal debates, to systematically apply them to deep disagreements, and to test them in socially relevant fields of application. It is the starting conference of the Deep Disagreements project.

Conference Venue

Humboldt-Universität Berlin – Main Building
Unter den Linden 6
Plenary Lectures and Session A: 2249a
Session B: 3013
Public Lecture Thursday Evening: 2094

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Registration is free, but places are limited.
Contact kerstin.helf@hu-berlin.de.

www.deepdisagreements.de