

The Aim and the Argument of Aristotle's Metaphysics

Part III: The true path

IIIβ: Metaphysics Λ1-6

IIIβ1: Introduction to Λ, and Λ1-5

Λ and the Metaphysics

The state of scholarship on Metaphysics Λ is very curious. Metaphysics Λ is naturally taken to be the culmination of the Metaphysics as a whole. The Metaphysics is devoted to wisdom or first philosophy, and Aristotle says that first philosophy is the science of divine things or of substances existing without matter; scholars since Farabi have tried to soften this statement, but everyone agrees that the study of such divine things is at least the highest part of Aristotelian metaphysics. Metaphysics Λ is the only place where Aristotle tells us, in any connected way, about these divine things. It is as close as Aristotle comes to presenting the kind of knowledge which he thinks is intrinsically the most valuable. So Λ ought to be a main focus of scholarly interest. But it is not. The fact is that between Ross' commentary of 1924 and the Symposium Aristotelicum volume published in 2000, there has been no serious detailed study of Λ as a whole: there has been work--not in great quantities--on Aristotle's theology, but not on Λ as a text.¹

The paucity of work on Λ is due partly to the view--going back to Bonitz, propagated by Jaeger and Ross, and now extremely widespread--that Λ is, despite appearances, not the intended culmination of the Metaphysics, and indeed not an intended part of the Metaphysics at all. As Michael Frede puts it in his chapter in the Symposium Aristotelicum volume on Λ, "scholars nowadays tend to agree that Metaphysics Λ originally was written by Aristotle as an independent treatise, just as it seems fairly obvious that originally the books Z and H were written as the beginning of a new, independent treatise, rather than as a continuation of a series of books beginning with Metaphysics A. In any case, this is the assumption which I presuppose in my discussion of Λ1, but which is also shared by the authors of the remaining essays in this volume" (Frede-Charles p.53).² And indeed, all the essays in the volume do proceed on that assumption, generally with no explicit discussion, and often with disastrous results, since the text of Λ often cannot be understood without following out its references to earlier books of the Metaphysics. The arguments that have been given to support the claim that Λ is an independent work are quite weak, and I will deal with each of them below. In any case, we have already seen in IIIα1 that the conclusion must be false, given the clear reference of Metaphysics Λ6 back to Θ8's solution of the

¹the Symposium Aristotelicum volume is Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda, edited by Michael Frede and David Charles, OUP 2000. I will cite the book as Frede-Charles or simply FC. on Aristotle's theology note von Arnim, Guthrie, Bodéüs (with almost nothing about Λ) and Natali's 1974 Cosmo e divinità, which get (review by Huby in Classical Review for 1976); also the recent essays on particular topics by de Filippo, Bradshaw, Broadie

²as Frede goes on to note, this is consistent either with the view that Aristotle himself then incorporated these originally independent texts into a single treatise or that someone else did (or that Aristotle assembled many of them together but that someone else then added αΔΚΛ, the view of Jaeger, Ross, and Frede-Patzig). but note that Burnyeat in his appendix to his Map of Metaphysics Zeta (which was presented orally to the Symposium Aristotelicum on Λ, and is cited by Frede in his preface pp.48-9) proposes that Aristotle himself patched Λ together in a hurry as a substitute for the desired theological culmination of the Metaphysics: this breaks Frede's alleged consensus, and comes to something not so different from my own view, though the rhetoric is different

B#14 aporia about the priority of δύναμις or ἐνέργεια (Λ6 1072a4 cites Θ8 simply as εἶρηται, not εἶρηται ἐν ἄλλοις or the like).³

Still, even if there were good reasons to think that Λ was originally an independent treatise, we might still expect it to be a focus of scholarly interest, as the only Aristotelian treatise on first philosophy that reaches the promised discussion of divine things. The deeper reasons why most scholars have not been interested in Λ are the same as the deeper reasons why they do not think it is the promised culmination of the Metaphysics: they think the book is a disappointment, both in form and in content. Formally, after the long and elaborate discussion of sensible οὐσία in ΖΗ, we might hope for an equally worked-out discussion of divine οὐσία. Instead, Λ is short and drastically compressed (Λ3 twice begins a sentence with "μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι", apparently Aristotle's note to himself, "after this, say that ..."; the phrase occurs nowhere else in Aristotle).⁴ There are crucial junctures at which there is not really an argument, but only a drastic shorthand for an argument, which we can expand only by turning to parallel arguments elsewhere. However, we are familiar with the fact that Aristotle sometimes writes more fully and sometimes more telegraphically (to be expanded in oral performance), and the degree of compression of Λ is unfortunately not all that surprising, and certainly no reason to excise it from the Metaphysics. Still, even if Aristotle was determined to write in such brief compass, readers tend to think he could have put those seven Bekker pages to better use. By no means all of Λ is devoted to a positive account of divine οὐσία. Λ1-5 are not about divine οὐσία at all, and Aristotle devotes most of Λ10, after what should be a moment of exaltation, the identification of God as the good of the universe, to unedifying sniping at the accounts of his predecessors and competitors, and not only their accounts of divine things. And Λ8, fully one third of the "theology" Λ6-10, is mostly taken up by a long mathematical calculation (containing several mistakes) of exactly how many divine οὐσία are needed to move the heavens, with little to say about what these οὐσία are like in themselves, or how they are related to God or to their heavens.

But the deeper dissatisfaction has been with the content, with what Aristotle says and what he fails to say when he does talk directly about God. His account of God (or of divine οὐσία in general) seems disappointingly "thin." On the most widespread interpretation of the overall aims of the Metaphysics, that of Owens and Patzig and Frede, the theological culmination of the Metaphysics should say that God is (or that divine οὐσία are) being, οὐσία, and form, in a special primary sense, and should explain the derivative and inferior ways in which other things are forms, οὐσία, and beings: in fact, Λ never says that God is a form at all, and never suggests that God and sensible οὐσία are anything but univocally οὐσία. Λ does give some positive attributes to God, saying that he is ἐνέργεια, life, and νοῦς or νόησις; but the content of his being ἐνέργεια and life boils down to his being νόησις, and Λ9 apparently says that God is a νόησις that is simply νόησις of himself or itself and of nothing else, a circle reminiscent of circles in the Platonic dialogues (the good is a kind of knowledge, namely knowledge of the good, namely ...),⁵ which seems to yield no

³Berti's comment on this passage, in his chapter on Λ6, is rather funny. He says merely: "The reference of εἶρηται δὲ πῶς [sc. in what sense δύναμις is or is not prior to ἐνέργεια] for Schwegler and Reale is to Met. Θ8, while for Bonitz and Ross it is to Λ6 1071b22-6. The latter interpretation concerns a nearer passage, but--as somebody observed during the discussion--in this passage Aristotle does not say in which sense potentiality is prior to actuality and in which it is not" (FC p.197). "Somebody"'s observation is absolutely right, and devastating for the Symposium's collective assumption about the independence of Λ; neither Berti nor anyone else draws the moral.

⁴but cf. the beginning of NE VII = EE VI, "μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησάμενους ἀρχήν, ὅτι ..."; (1145a15-16); also EE II,4 1221b27 "μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον ὅτι ...". somebody--who?--suggests that in Λ3 it could be an abstractor's summary notes [in maybe Damascius?]

⁵references

positive content to the description of God. And it is not only the description of God in himself that is "thin," but also the description of his connections to the sensible world. As we have seen, God seems to have no knowledge of the sensible world, or even of eternal truths other than himself. He is somehow a cause to the sensible world, but he seems to be directly a cause only to the heavens, or only to the outermost heaven, and everything else God produces may be just an incidental result of the heavenly motions. Furthermore, God seems to be only a final cause to the heavens, or rather, to be an efficient cause only by being a final cause. God is a final cause as to-attain-which rather than as to-benefit-whom (so that, as Aristotle says in a parallel text, God does not give commands), but again this seems a very thin connection, since Aristotle says almost nothing about how the heavens would "attain" God by rotating.

What Aristotle says in Λ about God's relation to the world can be contrasted with the accounts of Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas, according to which God is a cause of being to all other things, in that he is a cause, to what would otherwise be a non-existing essence, of the fact that it exists. This gives a "thicker" causal connection between God and other things, and it helps to explain how a general study of being would be needed in order to know God as a cause of being; it also offers a way in which God (as a being whose essence includes existence, and which exists through itself while other things exist through it) would be in a stronger and more primary sense than other beings. Aristotle, by contrast, does not believe in any such "thick" causal connection between God and the world,⁶ does not seem to believe that God is in any stronger sense than other οὐσίαι are, and seems to make God a cause of the being of other things only in rather incidental ways (e.g. I would not exist if it were not for God's activity, since somehow "man and the sun generate man," and so I would never have been born if God did not keep the heavens moving). Thus many readers find something artificial and not-quite-serious about Aristotle's theology. His divine οὐσίαι seem to be merely an accidental special case of his general theory of οὐσία. The usual paradigm of a sensible composite οὐσία is a living thing, and here the form and natural mover of the thing is its soul, an οὐσία-in-the-sense-of-form which cannot exist separately from the living body; but, owing to the peculiarities of what Aristotle imagines the heavens to be like, the heavenly spheres will have movers (perhaps something like forms, though Aristotle never calls them such) which do exist separately from the bodies. So much of what Aristotle says about forms as οὐσίαι should also apply to these unmoved movers of the heavens, except that they will not have the disadvantage of depending on matter: they will combine the intelligibility of the form with the independence of the composite, and so perhaps if there are such things they would be the best case for what Aristotle wants to say about οὐσία in general. But the actual existence of such things seems to be merely a corollary of what is at best an archaic astronomy, perhaps rather an astronomy deliberately rigged to require special immaterial help: without Aristotle's astronomy, the reasons for believing in his divinities collapse, and the rest of his philosophy should get on just as well without them. Indeed, Michael Frede may well be trying to accommodate this series of thoughts in his reconstruction of the ontological role of Aristotle's theology: for he makes no reference to God as a cause of being, and says only that God's Seinsweise would be paradigmatic for Seinsweisen of other οὐσίαι; and it seems that God's Seinsweise (namely existing intelligibly, independently and so on) could be paradigmatic whether there actually is a God to fill that ontological niche or not.⁷ Unfortunately, Λ

⁶as we saw in discussing $\Gamma 2$ in $\text{I}\beta 2$ above, Aristotle would reject the Avicennian explanation of how God is a cause of being for the same reason that he rejects the Platonic (Parmenides) view that things come to be by coming to participate in the form of being. indeed, the Platonic form of being, or what Proclus made of it, is one major strand in the ancestry of Avicenna on God as cause of being (the other is the Mu'tazilite doctrine of ma'dûmât)

⁷in roughly the way that, some people think, the Epicurean concept of god (living the ideally untroubled pleasant life, immune to the concerns of the world, etc.) could play its role in Epicurean philosophy (as an ideal for us to live by),

offers no support even to the slender non-causal connection that Frede suggests between God and sublunar οὐσία, since (as Frede notes) Λ says nothing about God's Seinsweise being different and paradigmatic.⁸

It is perhaps mainly these disappointments that have led to the common view that Λ is not the intended theological culmination of the Metaphysics, with the implication that the forward references earlier in the Metaphysics to a treatment of immaterial οὐσία are to some other theology, which either has been lost or was never completed. It is hard to be sure exactly what lies behind the view, since it is usually assumed rather than argued for. But Michael Frede gives some brief arguments in his introduction to the Frede-Charles Symposium Aristotelicum volume on Λ; other writers refer to Jaeger's discussion of Λ in his Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles (pp.122-8); Jaeger in turn says that he is merely supplementing the main work that was done by Bonitz in one long paragraph of his introduction to the Metaphysics (Bonitz pp.24-5). These writers' arguments fall under the following heads. (1) Bonitz' only argument, mentioned also (but not as probative) by Jaeger and Frede, is that Λ never refers back to earlier books of the Metaphysics; sometimes particular stress is laid on the claim that Λ does not address any of the aporiai of B, and therefore is not carrying out the main program of the Metaphysics as determined by B.⁹ (2) Jaeger suggests that Λ, or rather its theological section Λ6-10, is simply too short to be the theological part of the Metaphysics, since on Aristotle's conception of first philosophy the theology should be the "main part," and the previous treatment of sensible substances (at least ZHΘ) the "preparatory part" of the treatise; but Λ1-5, if read after ZHΘ, can only be a recapitulation of ZHΘ intended to lead into Λ6-10, in which case the main part of the Metaphysics would be only as long as this summary recapitulation of the preparatory part, thus drastically shorter than the preparatory part itself, a conclusion which Jaeger finds so absurd as to need no further refutation (Jaeger p.124).¹⁰ (3) The quasi-repetition of ZHΘ in Λ1-5 is also sometimes taken (as by Frede, p.2) as evidence that Λ is not the Metaphysics' promised discussion of immaterial οὐσία (or why not let ZHΘ stand for themselves, and proceed directly to

whether there actually are such gods or not. I am not sure whether it really is Frede's view that for Aristotle God's Seinsweise could be paradigmatic even if there were no God, but it looks like this is what he is saying, and certainly he makes no use of any causal connections between God and the world

⁸a nice frank statement to this effect now on Frede's introduction to FC, p.50, "but Aristotle in Λ ... no indication of it." perhaps worth quoting the whole thing. on the other hand, Frede's subsequent contrast of Λ's vagueness about the metaphysical project with the clarity of ΓΕ etc. is garbage: those texts also do not say what Frede wishes they did (they say that being is said primarily of οὐσία--so does Λ--but not that οὐσία is said primarily of divine οὐσία)

⁹Bonitz notes Brandis' claim that Λ4's investigation of whether all things have the same ἀρχαί proceeds "niche ohne Berücksichtigung der Aporien des Buches B" (Brandis p.80, Bonitz p.24n); Bonitz says he can't even figure out which aporia Brandis had in mind, and then argues that if Brandis meant #10, then, despite the verbal similarity, Λ4 is worrying about something else, since B#10 is worrying about whether the ἀρχαί of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same. (this is true; the direct connection is in fact with B#9; on the other hand, Λ10 1075b13-14 is obvious referring to B#10, and Aristotle thinks that what he's done earlier in Λ, meaning chiefly in Λ4-5, gives the right path that allows us to avoid the antinomy of B#10)

¹⁰I will return to the question of the status of Λ1-5 and their relation to ZHΘ. Jaeger and others also say that the abbreviated style of much of Λ, its lack of appropriate transitions and so on, shows that Λ is a lecture. This must in some sense be true (the written text cannot be identified with any one oral performance, but Aristotle surely intended it to be a basis for oral performances), but does not distinguish it from the Metaphysics, except that sometimes the written text contains more of the variable details that might be given in a lecture and sometimes the mere skeleton. People sometimes use the description of Λ as a lecture to suggest that later editors, looking for the theological part of the Metaphysics and not finding it, used the notes of this lecture as a substitute; but calling Λ a lecture does not show that Aristotle did not intend this lecture as the end of his series of lectures on first philosophy, and this text as the conclusion of his treatise. Jaeger certainly does not intend the description of Λ as a lecture to bear this extra weight, since he refers to the rest of the Metaphysics as lectures as well.

immaterial οὐσίαι?), but rather a parallel that begins where ZHΘ do and proceeds further than they do. The thought that Λ1-5 are a summary or a briefer parallel to ZHΘ, combined with the brevity and "thinness" of Λ6-10, have led many scholars to conclude that, as Λ1-5 stand to ZHΘ, so Λ6-10 stand to the lost (or merely projected) fully elaborated theology of the Metaphysics.¹¹ Some scholars are so convinced of this reconstruction that this supposed book has even acquired a proper name, "ζ" (pronounced "ζῆτα ἔλαττον").¹² (4) It is also sometimes thought, in part for reasons to do with Λ1-5, that Λ's conception of metaphysics is different from the conception in ZHΘ. The issues here are complicated, and a wide range of positions have been taken. Aristotle refers to the sensible οὐσίαι treated in Λ2-5 as "physical" or "natural" οὐσίαι, by contrast with the οὐσίαι he will treat in Λ6-10 (so Λ6 1071b3-5); he also says that "these οὐσίαι belong to physics (since they have motion), and this [sc. unmoved οὐσία, claimed by some philosophers] to a different [science], if there is no common ἀρχή to [both kinds of οὐσία]" (Λ1 1069a36-b2).¹³ I will discuss the question of the interpretation of this sentence below, but both Bonitz and Jaeger took it to imply that, on Aristotle's own view at the time of writing Λ, Λ1-5 belonged not to first philosophy but to physics. Someone who reaches this conclusion could then proceed in several different ways. Bonitz thinks the physics of Λ1-5 is just there as an introduction to Λ6-10, and so he is willing to describe the overall aim of Λ as metaphysical. Jaeger in the 1912 Entstehungsgeschichte agrees that Aristotle's concern is with metaphysics, but, noting that the passage of Λ1 just cited speaks conditionally in assigning unmoved οὐσίαι to a separate discipline, and noting that Λ never cites this discipline by name as "first philosophy" or "theology," concludes that "this question, whether there must be 'a separate science', is not yet in any way to be treated as solved: metaphysics, πρώτη φιλοσοφία, does not yet exist, it must first be created, and only if there is no common principle over sensible and non-sensible being Λ belongs to the period of the founding of metaphysics Book Λ is a lecture on the constitution of metaphysics as an independent science" (pp.122-3, p.123, p.124). Jaeger in the 1923 Aristoteles no longer doubts that metaphysics already exists in Λ, but the metaphysics is found only in Λ6-10, since Λ1-5 are physics. Jaeger infers from this, first, that Λ is not simply a metaphysical work, but "gives in a compressed sketch an overview of his whole theoretical philosophy."¹⁴ Second and more important, the fact that the study of sensible οὐσίαι is assigned to physics and not first philosophy shows that Aristotle has here a different conception of metaphysics than he has in Z: while Bonitz, and perhaps Jaeger in 1912, thought that Aristotle always regarded the study of sensible οὐσίαι as belonging to physics,¹⁵ Jaeger now thinks that according to Z sensible οὐσίαι belong only "in a certain way" to physics, and can be treated in a different way by metaphysics. So Jaeger concludes

¹¹e.g. "all the evidence suggests that book XII of the Metaphysics is a brief sketch of Aristotle's detailed account of first philosophy, otherwise lost, to which books I-VI provide the introduction," Patzig, "Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics", in Articles on Aristotle v.3 p.42

¹²I have not seen this in print, but heard Lindsay Judson say it at a conference at Princeton in 1990. As far as I can remember, the only objection anyone raised was that the book in question should be called ζῆτα μείζον, our extant Zeta being in comparison ζῆτα ἔλαττον.

¹³there is textual trouble here, although this was apparently unknown to Bonitz and Jaeger; I will return to the issue in the next subsection

¹⁴Aristoteles, German 2nd ed. p.228 = English 2nd ed. p.219. This looks as if it contradicts the previous sentence, where Jaeger says that Λ gives "a complete system of metaphysics in nuce". But I take it that Jaeger is here using the word "metaphysics" loosely and provisionally, to mean what we normally, or the mature Aristotle, would call metaphysics; only on the next page, in comparing Aristotle's procedure in Λ with his procedure in ZHΘ, does Jaeger introduce what he sees as the decisive consideration proving that Λ is earlier, namely that "in Book Λ the concept of metaphysics is restricted to the second part, and the first part is not assigned to metaphysics."

¹⁵I find it difficult to sort out what Jaeger is saying about this at Entstehungsgeschichte pp.97-8.

that Λ comes from a time when Aristotle still thought of metaphysics as exclusively theology, whereas the later Aristotle makes metaphysics a universal ontology; and thus Λ , coming from an earlier stage of Aristotle's thought, cannot be the future theology promised in Z (Aristoteles, German 2nd ed. pp.229-31 = English 2nd ed. pp.220-22). (5) Finally, it is argued that, whether or not Λ has doctrinal disagreements with Z , it cannot be the theology that Z looks forward to, because it does not play the role in the ongoing argument that Z seems to demand of this theology. Thus Frede says,

Λ does not pick up the threads of argument offered in the central books and asking to be developed further in the light of a discussion of separate substances. Z is concerned not just with what kinds of substances there are, but also with the question what it is to be a substance or even what it is to be a being [$ZH\Theta$ analyze composite substances into matter and form, and explain these in terms of potentiality and actuality, and they thus raise for us the question of forms which are pure actualities not dependent on potentiality and matter] And we might thus explain substancehood and being as in the first place a matter of being a pure actuality, an actuality not based on potentiality and matter, then go on to explain the substancehood of items whose actuality does presuppose potentiality and matter, and finally turn to the substancehood of items composed of matter and form. But Λ does not do any of these things. It is concerned with what kinds of substances we should postulate, but not with the question of what it is to be a substance or a being, nor does it explain that being a substance is a matter of being a certain kind of actuality, and that there are radically different kinds of substances because there are radically different forms of actuality. Hence Λ does not precisely fill the gap in the overall argument of the Metaphysics which would be left if Λ were missing from the work. (Frede-Charles pp.2-3)¹⁶

This difference between the task of Λ and the task that Z is supposed to envisage for theology also leads Frede to a new version of Jaeger's argument that Λ shows a different and earlier conception of metaphysics than Z . Frede (like Jaeger Entstehungsgeschichte p.122) thinks that Λ as a whole is $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$ οὐσίας; unlike Jaeger, Frede thinks that Λ agrees with Z in counting the whole investigation $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$ οὐσίας, not just its theological part, as first philosophy. But (Frede says) metaphysics as envisaged in ΓE or $ZH\Theta$ is $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$ οὐσίας as ontology, that is, as a study of what it is to be a being, of being as said primarily of οὐσία and derivatively of other things, and primarily of the primary οὐσία and derivatively of other οὐσία, whereas Λ shows no interest in any of these issues, and therefore seems to "reflect a less developed approach to metaphysics" (Frede-Charles p.50).

None of these arguments have any real force. I will deal below with arguments (3) and (4) and the issues they raise about $\Lambda 1-5$, its relation to $ZH\Theta$, its status as physics or first philosophy, and its implications for the overall σκοπός of Λ . I will reply to the other arguments here, and I will try in so doing to address not only the question of whether Λ is the promised theology of the Metaphysics, but also the question of whether Λ is a disappointment. To begin with argument (2),

¹⁶Similarly, in his own terminology, Owens: "Book Λ has shown itself to be what it announced. It is a study of Entity [= οὐσία], first in sensible Entity and then in immobile Entity. But it shows no interest in setting up a science of separate Entity that treats universally of all Beings. It is content with studying separate Entity in itself and as the final cause of all sensible Entities and of all movements. It makes no attempt to show how separate Entity is expressed in every predication of Being, as the science outlined in $E1$ would seem to require. Book Λ , accordingly, is not adapted to carry out the program envisaged in $A-E1$ " (Doctrine of Being ..., 2nd ed. 4th printing, pp.453-4).

the brevity of Λ , or of $\Lambda 6-10$, does not prove that Aristotle did not intend it as the promised theological culmination of the Metaphysics. As we know, some parts of our text of the Metaphysics (even within a single given book) are more fleshed out, others more skeletal; if Aristotle had succeeded in polishing the Metaphysics for circulation beyond the school, he would have done many things to the text, including filling out Λ at least enough to connect its sentences and make its arguments intelligible.¹⁷ It would still be Λ , not a book about some other topics that readers may wish he had addressed, and it would still be short. (Aristotle did set out a positive theology, fully decked out with stylistic flourishes, in the De Philosophia; that too, on our best guesses, occupied only a single book [Book III], and there is no evidence that it talked about ontology, or laid out any "thicker" doctrine of god than Λ does.) Jaeger is right that theology is the "main part" [Hauptteil] as opposed to "preparatory part" of metaphysics, but there is no reason to expect that the main part should take more pages. For Plato, the good-itself is the "main part" of philosophy (he calls it the μέγιστον μᾶθημα, Republic VI 505a2), but it is grasped in an instant after many years of preparation, and Plato devotes much less space to talking about it, and gives much less help about what it is like, than Aristotle does in talking about his first ἀρχή and good-itself in Λ . If the ἀρχή is anything like what Plato or Aristotle say it is, then even if we succeed in grasping it we will not be able to say much positive about it. While there are positive arguments that allow us to conclude to the existence of the ἀρχή (e.g. inferring from the eternal motion of the heavens to an eternal mover), and to infer some things that must be true of it for it to have these effects (it must be eternally and essentially active), much of the work of coming to know the ἀρχή is negative. The Metaphysics devotes much energy to examining false paths and showing that they do not lead to the desired ἀρχαί: this happens especially in Z , but also the result of Θ 's investigation of δύναμις is to show that δύναμις is posterior to ἐνέργεια and so not truly an ἀρχή, and, as we will see, much of $\Lambda 1-5$ goes to drawing the negative consequences of these investigations. Furthermore, Aristotle is critically examining, not just different paths that might lead to ἀρχαί, but also different descriptions that might be predicated even of a genuine ἀρχή reached by a correct path: νοῦς, in particular, is a genuine ἀρχή, reached by Anaxagoras and Plato as an efficient cause of cosmic order and of the heavenly rotations, but much of what Anaxagoras and Plato say about νοῦς is false or inadequate, and Aristotle will produce his own account of νοῦς in $\Lambda 6-10$ ¹⁸ more by eliminating falsehoods from the conclusions of Anaxagoras and Plato than by independent positive arguments. (The key will be Aristotle's denial of δύναμις to the ἀρχή, and his consequent rejection of all earlier descriptions of the divine νοῦς that depend even implicitly on δύναμις.) Aristotle's theology is not purely negative, but its negativity, and the brevity and "thinness" of its positive descriptions, are essential, and would still be there in any other exposition he might have given of it. It is not as if (for example) Nicomachean Ethics X,8 or De Anima III,5 or Physics VIII,10 were "thicker" or more positive than $\Lambda 6-10$: Aristotle likes to bring his treatises to some sort of theological culmination (often, not always, at the end), and the treatises tend to "converge at the top," but on a theology always reached mainly by negation, and usually expressed in compressed and obscure form.¹⁹ We should be grateful that Λ is as long and as positive as it is; we cannot expect anything qualitatively different.

¹⁷for some reason Bonitz and Jaeger speak as if only $\Lambda 1-5$ were unduly compressed; the worst cases may be in $\Lambda 3$, but e.g. $\Lambda 6$ 1072a9-18 and much of $\Lambda 10$ are also compressed to the verge of unintelligibility

¹⁸not all of $\Lambda 6-10$ are really about νοῦς, but the simplification will do for now

¹⁹the same phenomenon in Posterior Analytics II,19, Eudemian Ethics VIII,3 1249a21-b25, perhaps On Generation and Corruption II,9-11 (or particularly II,10), and, although it is not placed at the end, also De Caelo I,9 279a11-b3

In answer to argument (1), we can of course say that there is no need for each book in a treatise to cite its predecessors: almost nobody wants to separate Metaphysics A and B, yet B refers to A just three times in passing (995b4-6, 996b8-10²⁰ and 997b3-5). But it also depends on what we count as a citation. Obviously Aristotle cannot say "as we said in Book Beta"; he might say, descriptively, "ὡσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν", and sometimes, though not in Λ, Aristotle does cite his own work in this way. But more often he will say merely "it has been said" or "we will investigate later" or the like, and this is indeed what he does in Λ6 in citing Θ8: "τὸ δὴ δύναιμι οἶεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς)" (Λ6 1072a3-4). But even such references are exceptional. Far more often, Aristotle will simply build on something he has said earlier, sometimes with no verbal "reference" to the earlier discussion, sometimes "referring" to it by quickly restating the conclusion that it had argued for or the distinction it had drawn, or solving the aporia that it had raised, and assuming that the briefer echo will remind his readers or hearers of the earlier fuller discussion. (This kind of silent back-reference is by no means peculiar to Aristotle: explicit self-references are always rare in Greek literature, Aristotle being more inclined to them than most authors. In Greek mathematical works, when the proof of one proposition depends on an earlier proposition, there is almost never an explicit reference--the "reference" is typically flagged by verbally repeating the earlier proposition--although editors and translators add explicit references.)²¹ Quite possibly a more polished version of Λ would have included more references of the "εἴρηται" form, but the fact that Λ now has only one such reference is not especially surprising. It can sometimes be hard to decide when a shorter discussion is implicitly "referring" to a fuller discussion (e.g. Λ1-5 to ΖΗΘ) and when it is just a shorter parallel treatment of the same material. But there is no such ambiguity in Λ6's reference to Θ8. Nor does this ambiguity occur in Λ's references to Metaphysics AB, since Λ is not simply restating the points that AB had made more fully, but rather (sometimes after restating the points that AB had made, sometimes not) claiming a solution to the aporiai from B or a fulfillment of the expectations of wisdom from A. We should not exclude the possibility that the "references" to A, B, and Θ are not to the texts of A, B and Θ we now have, but to parallel discussions in some earlier or later treatment of first philosophy: but they are unmistakably references to something in an earlier segment of the same treatise or lecture-series on first philosophy of which Λ is the conclusion.

For although, in support of the thesis that Λ is a complete self-contained treatment of first philosophy, it is often claimed that Λ does not answer any of the aporiai from B, in fact Λ in one way or another "refers to," and solves, B#1, #5, #6, #8, #9, #10, #14, and #15: I will discuss Aristotle's treatment of all these aporiai as I go through Λ, and I have already discussed the Λ treatment of B#14 in IIIα1 and of B#1 in Iβ2c above.²² The references to #6, #8, and #15 are

²⁰actually, this reference probably extends further, and may not be just "in passing"--perhaps correct above

²¹and note that references to other writers, notably Plato, are also very often not explicitly flagged. again a common Greek phenomenon. Xenophon's Hellenica, which takes over from the end of Thucydides' history in the middle of a sentence, never mentions Thucydides

²²note also Syrianus' comment, at the end of his commentary on B, that most of the aporiai are addressed in Λ. since it is sometimes suggested that ΚΛ1-5 (or rather Κ1-8α then Λ1-5) are a parallel to ΒΓΕΖΗΘ (with Λ6-10 then parallel to a lost ζ), it is worth asking whether the aporiai presupposed by Λ are closer to the B version or to the Κ1-2 version. I have so far found one apparently certain case (τάξις in Λ10 1075b24-6 and Κ2 1060a26-7) and one possible case (matter dismissed as an ἀρχή because it is δυνάμει, not in Β#8 but in the parallel Κ2 1060a20-21, perhaps relevant to Λ2) where Λ seems to presuppose something that is in Κ but not the Β parallel. on the other hand, the very same sentence Λ10 1075b24-6 also presupposes something (something eternal as a precondition of γένεσις) which is only in the Β text (Β#8 999b5-6 etc.) and not in the Κ version. and Λ's most strongly marked back-reference to an aporia is to Β#14, the only aporia in Β which has no parallel in Κ at all. although the idea of ΚΛ as a parallel development to ΒΓΕΖΗΘ has its attractions, it does not really work (as Ross notes [AM I,xxix], Κ1-8α are much, much closer to ΒΓΕ

unemphatic and perhaps not very deep, and it might also be said that $\Lambda 3$ is not directly related to B#8 but merely summarizes Z7-9 which in turn respond to B#8.²³ The other references are harder to miss. Brandis had already said in 1834 that the $\Lambda 4-5$ investigates whether the ἀρχαί of different things are the same or different "nicht ohne Berücksichtigung der Aporien des Buches B" (Brandis p.80); Bonitz complains that he can't figure out which aporia Brandis is thinking of, and argues that $\Lambda 4-5$ resembles B#10 only superficially, since B#10 is focussed on whether corruptible things can have the same ἀρχαί as incorruptibles, while $\Lambda 4-5$ are interested only in corruptible things which differ in number or species or genus (Bonitz pp.24-5). This is true, but presumably Brandis was thinking of B#9, which asks whether the ἀρχαί, in particular the στοιχεῖα or ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἀρχαί, are numerically the same for different things; $\Lambda 4-5$ address this question and conclude that different things cannot have numerically, but only specifically or generically or analogically, the same στοιχεῖα (though they may have numerically the same non-ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἀρχαί). But while the immediate target here is B#9, Λ does also address B#10: "no one says why some things are corruptible and others are incorruptible: for they make all beings out of the same ἀρχαί" ($\Lambda 10$ 1075b13-14), where Aristotle must be claiming that he himself has avoided this aporia, presumably in $\Lambda 4-5$ by distinguishing the incorruptible ἀρχαί of corruptible things from the ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἀρχαί that the things are out-of, and in $\Lambda 3$ by arguing that the matter and form that corruptible things are out-of, while not coming-to-be out of any further στοιχεῖα, need not therefore be eternal; this passage in $\Lambda 10$ is in fact the only direct reference to B#10 anywhere in the Metaphysics.²⁴ I have already discussed $\Lambda 6$'s reference to, and solution, of B#14: let me add here that, while $\Lambda 6$ of course picks up from $\Theta 8$ in solving the aporia, and while $\Theta 8$ and indeed Θ as a whole are ultimately directed toward solving B#14, nonetheless $\Lambda 6$ refers to B#14 much more directly than $\Theta 8$ does, in that $\Lambda 6$ closely echoes the arguments from both sides of B#14, and also in that B#14 and $\Lambda 6$ are asking whether the ἀρχαί are δυνάμεις or ἐνέργεια, whereas $\Theta 8$ is not framed in terms of ἀρχαί, but asks whether δυνάμεις or ἐνέργεια is prior (and is cited on this question at $\Lambda 6$ 1072a3-4), although naturally the interest of this question is in its implications for the ἀρχαί.²⁵ Here, as in the other aporiai I have mentioned, Λ should be seen as applying the results of ZH Θ to the question of the ἀρχαί. Beyond these aporiai, it is obvious that B#5, asking whether there are οὐσίαι beyond the sensibles, is solved in $\Lambda 6$; Aristotle has restated the question in $\Lambda 1$ 1069a33-6, as in B#5 997a34-b3 and parallels, by referring to Academic ideas and

in content and also in length than $\Lambda 1-5$ are to ZH Θ). more generally, no attempt to solve doublet-problems in the Metaphysics by reconstructing an Ur-text will work. Λ is closer to referring to B than to referring to K1-2, but really it is referring to an earlier section of the idealized lecture course (not identical with any one performance) on first philosophy, of which we have a fuller version in B and a shorter version in K1-2

²³however, this is shown to be wrong by $\Lambda 3$ 1070a13-14, much closer to B#8 999b17-20 than to anything in Z7-9, although the Λ text is certainly drawing on Z7-9 as well

²⁴note also that the $\Lambda 10$ "for they make all beings out of the same ἀρχαί" echoes B#10 1000b32-1001a1. Jaeger Entstehungsgeschichte p.105 admits that $\Lambda 10$ refers to B#10, but tries to avoid the consequence that Λ is part of the main body of the Metaphysics, responding to the aporiai of B. As Jaeger says, Aristotle here does not give a detailed solution, but only claims that he can give a solution where his predecessors could not. But this is just because the writing of Λ is so abbreviated: orally he would have explained how what he has done gives a solution. For what Aristotle has done earlier in Λ does give a solution; he just needs to say explicitly how it avoids the difficulties that his predecessors, who assumed that all ἀρχαί are ἐνυπάρχουσαι, and that all ἀρχαί are eternal, had been caught in. The fact that Λ , as Jaeger says, "beschränkt sich auf Andeutungen" in responding to this aporia does nothing to separate Λ from the main body of the Metaphysics. Ross, in his survey of where the aporiai of B are answered, says that "Problem 10 is not dealt with expressly, but Aristotle's view may be gathered from Z7-10" (AM I,xxiv). Ross manages not to mention Λ here or anywhere else in his list of where the 15 aporiai are dealt with.

²⁵Ross: "Problem 13 [= my B#14] is not expressly answered, but Aristotle's answer may be inferred from his doctrine that actuality is prior to potentiality ($\Theta 8$)" (AM I,xxiv)

mathematicals, but solves it by introducing a different kind of immaterial οὐσία. Finally, as we saw in Iβ2c, Λ10 gives the answer to B#1, arguing that the ἀρχή that wisdom treats, the good-itself whose existence he has now established, is a final cause and also thereby an efficient cause, and exposing the inadequacy of the views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who had made it only an efficient (and perhaps material) cause, and of Plato who had made it a formal cause. Aristotle has deliberately said nothing about B#1 in ΓΕΖΗΘΙ: only now, having gained the knowledge of the ἀρχή, can he triumphantly resolve the first aporia.²⁶ And this is part of a general strategy of closure in Λ10. The aporiai were supposed to give a criterion for wisdom--we have reached the goal only if we can solve them (B 995a34-b2)--and so now Aristotle tries to show that he has reached the goal, and that his predecessors have not, by recalling various aporiai and showing that his account of the ἀρχαί can resolve them and that its rivals cannot.

Here in Λ10, and more generally in Λ6-10, Aristotle also tries to produce closure by reaching back to A. In asking whether the good ἀρχή is an efficient, formal, or final cause, Aristotle is referring back not only to B#1 but also to A3-7 (to which B#1 itself refers back at 995b4-5). The Λ10 criticism of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato refers back to A3-7, and requires these earlier chapters in order to be understood; and where Aristotle concludes in A7 that no one has succeeded in exhibiting the good as a cause qua good, he is now in Λ10 claiming to have succeeded where these earlier philosophers have failed, and thus also to have defended against Speusippus their common claim that the good is the first ἀρχή and cause of all things (without compromising this claim by admitting a contrary evil ἀρχή). With this same aim of showing that he has delivered on A's promises of wisdom, Aristotle also argues in Λ7 that the ἀρχή he has described meets the Academic definition of θεός (1072b13-30, cp. pseudo-Plato Definitions 411a3-4), so that the knowledge of this ἀρχή will be θεία ἐπιστήμη both as being knowledge of the god and as being the knowledge the god would have (A2 983a5-10). This strategy of closure has usually been missed, because people are not reading Λ as part of the same whole with AB. Thus David Sedley, in his article on Λ10 in Frede-Charles, says "it is unusual and, I think, significant that Aristotle's theological inquiry should end, rather than begin, with the critique of his predecessors" (FC p.327). In fact Aristotle's theological or archeological inquiry began, as usual, with the critique of his predecessors, but it began in Metaphysics A, not in Λ; Aristotle is now referring back to this starting-point, and measuring his solution against the difficulties he had set out to overcome.

Finally, Frede's argument (5), that Λ cannot be the promised theology of the Metaphysics because it does not show exhibit the way of being of immaterial οὐσία as the focal meaning of "οὐσία" and of "being," depends on a false interpretation of what earlier books of the Metaphysics are promising of theology. Frede takes wisdom to be definitionally ontology, and he assumes that the claim that wisdom is also knowledge of divine or immaterial οὐσία must rest on a promise that knowledge of these immaterial οὐσία will give us a knowledge of being as such, since these immaterial οὐσία will be what is being in the primary sense. And he assumes that the reason why Z's investigation of sensible οὐσία is said to be for the sake of immaterial οὐσία is that the sensible οὐσία are not οὐσία or beings in the fullest sense. But, as we saw in Parts I and II above, these interpretations are wrong and without any grounding in the text. There is no discrepancy either between what theology actually does in Λ and what it is promised to do in EZ, or between different conceptions of metaphysics in the different books; the discrepancy is only between Λ and

²⁶Jaeger and Ross avoid seeing this connection by claiming that Γ resolves B#1 as well as #2-4 (which is absurd: Γ never even mentions that cause is said in several ways). if Aristotle had indeed done this, treating the different aporiai of B in roughly the same order he had posed them in, his procedure would be less remarkable: the postponement of B#1 to Λ10 is quite striking

a misinterpretation of EZ. (It is quite strange to blame Λ for not saying that immaterial οὐσίαι are οὐσίαι and beings in a different sense from other οὐσίαι, since Aristotle never says this anywhere else either.)²⁷ In fact Aristotle first determines wisdom as the knowledge of the ἀρχαί, and the claim that wisdom is also knowledge of being qua being rests on a promise that the ἀρχαί will be discovered as causes, to the things that are, of the fact that they are; the further claim that wisdom is knowledge of immaterial οὐσίαι rests on a promise that these immaterial οὐσίαι will be prior to all other things, so that the ἀρχαί of all things will be among them. While Frede is right that EZHΘ are concerned with what it is for things to be, in different senses, their concern is more specifically with the causes, to the things that are in these different senses, of the fact that they are; more specifically yet, their concern is with whether these kinds of causes lead up from the manifest things to the ἀρχαί. There is no suggestion that, to find instances of being in the fullest sense, we must look beyond sensible οὐσίαι. We want to discover immaterial οὐσίαι because, if there are such things, they will be (or have among them) the ἀρχαί, which are the things most worth knowing. There is no suggestion that the knowledge of immaterial οὐσίαι will help us to discover the different meanings of being; the claim is rather that distinguishing the meanings of being will help us to sort out the different causal paths and to see which of them do and do not lead to the desired ἀρχαί. And while Λ does not talk much about the different meanings of being, it talks a lot about the different kinds of cause which have been distinguished in EZHΘ as causes of being in its different senses; and, drawing on the results of EZHΘ, it argues that efficient causes of being-as-ἐνέργεια lead to the ἀρχαί, and that other kinds of causes, of being in other senses, do not. The resulting causal connection between God and being may seem "thin": it would be "thicker" if God were, as in Avicenna and Thomas, the cause of being-as-existence to of-themselves-unactualized essences. But the task of the Metaphysics is not to magnify God as the ultimate cause of being, but to critically examine which senses of being do and which do not lead up to the desired ἀρχαί as their causes; and Aristotle's negative results are just as deserving of respect as his positive ones.

Λ will always be disappointing if it is read as a contribution to ousiology or ontology. But it is very interesting when it is read as what it is, a contribution to archeology. Its central claim, that the first ἀρχή of all things is a pure ἐνέργεια without δύναμις, and is therefore always acting in the same way, implies a revolutionary abandonment of the narrative model of cosmology, which began with ἀρχαί existing by themselves and then explained how the world was generated out of them. The closely connected claim that the first ἀρχή is neither a material nor a formal constituent of any other thing, but causes the actualization of δύναμις in every species from without by its constant activity, is likewise radical when its implications are worked out. Aristotle is certainly developing themes from earlier philosophers, but he is developing them in ways their authors would have found very surprising, and he argues in Λ 10 that his understanding of the ἀρχαί has been able to achieve goals of earlier philosophers, above all the goal of explanation through the good, which they themselves could not achieve.

If we keep a clear view of the archeological task that Λ is supposed to accomplish, we can devote ourselves to understanding how it accomplishes it, and banish the mirage of the missing ontotheology ζ.²⁸ Unavoidably, in interpreting the strategy of Λ , we will have to go beyond what

²⁷"It is true that in Λ the divine substances are called 'primary substances' (1074b9). They are primary in that they are prior to all other substances and thus to everything else. But we might also want to know whether they are also prior in a stronger sense, namely that they are prior in the sense in which they are substances or beings, and whether Aristotle here also is concerned with the question what it is to be a substance or a being. If this is his concern, he seems to give no indication of it" (Frede in FC p.50).

²⁸note Alain de Libera's comment on the Liber de causis.

Aristotle explicitly says in Λ , filling out its abbreviated arguments from presupposed or parallel texts, in earlier books of the Metaphysics and in the "theological" culminations of the Physics, On Generation and Corruption, De Anima, and Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. But we can do this without imagining a qualitatively different book, without changing Aristotle's topic from archeology to ontotheology or changing his "thin" doctrine of God and God's relations to the world to any "thicker" and more theologically satisfying version. And we need not use Λ only to extract the positive theological doctrine that Aristotle might have expounded in different and superior form in ζ : we can take an interest not only in the doctrine but in the argument-structure of Λ , and in how it fulfills its function within the larger argument-structure of the Metaphysics. And this means taking an interest, not only in positive theology, but also in the non-theological Λ 1-5 and in Aristotle's criticism of other accounts of the ἀρχαί.

If Λ were ontotheology it would be a book without real precedent. As archeology, it is making a move, albeit a radical move, within an already established discourse. Λ can only be interpreted by placing it in the context of the earlier accounts of the ἀρχαί to which, especially in Λ 6-10, it constantly alludes, those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Democritus, and Speusippus, above all those of Plato, in the unwritten teachings, the Laws, and especially the Timaeus. Aristotle will take up Anaxagoras', Empedocles' and Plato's shared project of explanation through the good ἀρχή (as described in Λ 3-7), and defend it against Speusippus, but only after a thoroughgoing internal critique of the particular deficiencies of Anaxagoras', Empedocles', and Plato's accounts. Rather surprisingly, Aristotle will also take over what had originally been Democritus' (or Leucippus') strategy of criticism against Anaxagoras, and will accept some important Democritean theses, while also taking over criticisms that the cosmological tradition of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato would make against Democritus' alternative. If we do not take these earlier archeologies and cosmologies seriously, we will find what Aristotle is doing in Λ unserious. In particular, we will not understand what Aristotle means by "νοῦς", or how it gets into the argument. The view that the "first mover" or "unmoved mover" is simply an astronomical special case of οὐσία depends on forgetting the tradition of νοῦς-cosmology and νοῦς-theology, from Anaxagoras through the Timaeus, Philebus and Laws to the Academy. Although the secondary literature would give the impression that "the unmoved mover" (or the first of the 55 "unmoved movers") or "the first [or prime] mover" are Aristotle's canonical descriptions for his first ἀρχή, in fact he uses "first mover" and "unmoved mover" as generic descriptions applying, inter alia, to the soul of any sublunar animal. Even if these descriptions are refined so as to apply only to the first ἀρχή, they still do not describe it as it is in itself, but only signify its causal and priority relations to other things. It is true, but not clear, to say that the ἀρχή is the good: to make clear what it is and why it is good, we must say that it is νοῦς, although this description must be refined and clarified to say that it is a being whose οὐσία is actual νόησις, and to say what it νοεῖ. Aristotle takes over ultimately from Anaxagoras, immediately from Plato, the thesis that νοῦς--Reason itself, existing separately from all other things--is the cause of order to the cosmos and also the cause of rationality to the things that participate in it; he also takes over the more specific view of the Timaeus and Philebus that νοῦς is the first cause of the participation of matter in form, which matter and form are not themselves sufficient to explain.²⁹ With both Anaxagoras and Plato, Aristotle thinks that much or all of νοῦς' action on the cosmos is mediated by its causing the heavens to rotate; but this does not mean that νοῦς is itself an astronomical entity. Throughout Λ , Aristotle will be examining earlier philosophers' routes to the ἀρχαί, most often Anaxagoras' and Plato's, and he thinks that while their paths to ὁμοῦ πάντα or the receptacle and to Platonic forms and genera fail to reach

²⁹on all this see my Plato on God as Nous ... not sure how much of that to repeat here

separately existing ἀρχαί, their path to νοῦς succeeds. Much of what he says about νοῦς will be directed at a reader who already accepts something roughly like the Anaxagorean or Platonic account of νοῦς: Aristotle will argue, in part from conclusions he has established in the Metaphysics, but in part simply from common assumptions of the tradition of νοῦς-cosmology, that various things that Anaxagoras or Plato say about νοῦς must be rejected; and he will continue to whittle away until only the notoriously "thin" account of νοῦς' knowledge and causality survives. If our own default assumptions about the cosmos are not the "thick" theology of the Timaeus, but something more like Democritean materialism, we are likely to find Aristotle's procedure frustratingly misdirected. Aristotle does think that Democritus has valuable things to say, and that Democritus too has a right to be answered. But in Λ his attention is directed much more toward opponents within his own cosmotheological tradition. It can thus become frustrating trying to tease out of the text answers to questions that may seem obvious to us (e.g. why shouldn't the motions of the spheres, or of any other body, simply proceed in the same way from eternity without anything else "moving" them?). I will spend some time on such questions, but I will not allow them to take over. But if we are willing to read Λ as what it is, an archeology and an internal criticism of earlier archeologies, based on the results of earlier books of the Metaphysics (and using also the results of other Aristotelian treatises), we will be able to appreciate many of the accomplishments that other scholars have found disappointing. These accomplishments are not exclusively in the "theological" Λ6-10: all of Λ is closely integrated, and we must start with the non-theological Λ2-5, and the programmatic Λ1, and see what these can tell us about the aims and argument of Λ as a whole.

Λ1, the status of Λ1-5, and the σκοπός of Λ

Because Λ is most often studied, not for its own sake, but for evidence for the theology that Aristotle would have expressed better elsewhere, there has been little work on the non-theological Λ1-5.³⁰ It is not that nothing has been written about these chapters, but they have mostly been mined for evidence to show that Λ is not the promised theology of the Metaphysics but an independent treatise covering something broader than theology, and thus to suggest that, as Λ1-5 are to the longer and more interesting ΖΗΘ, so are Λ6-10 to the longer and more interesting, but unfortunately lost, ζ.

It is certainly true that, on many of the topics addressed in Λ1-5, Aristotle has expressed himself more clearly and at greater length elsewhere. My main interest in these chapters here is in what they tell us about the σκοπός and the argument-structure of Λ as a whole. Here the comments of Bonitz, Jaeger, and Frede, discussed above, are a useful starting-point. There are a number of disputed questions. (i) Are Λ1-5 a full part of Λ, or are they merely a preliminary to Λ6-10? Bonitz, and Jaeger in 1912, think they are just a preliminary, while Jaeger in 1923 and Frede think these chapters have the same status as Λ6-10. (ii) Are Λ1-5, by their own description, physics or metaphysics? Bonitz and Jaeger (in both books) think they are physics, while Frede thinks they are metaphysics. (iii) In consequence, Frede, who thinks Λ1-5 are metaphysics, and Bonitz and the Jaeger of 1912, who think they are physics but merely instrumental to the metaphysical Λ6-10, think the overall σκοπός of Λ is metaphysical, while the Jaeger of 1923 thinks that Λ is not specifically metaphysical, but a broad survey of theoretical philosophy covering physics in Λ1-5

³⁰the chapters on these chapters in Frede-Charles now give much more detailed discussion than had previously been available. unfortunately, the chapters in Frede-Charles, except Frede's introduction, are limited to talking about only one chapter of Λ, and don't put them together to draw conclusions about the larger argument-structure of Λ.

and metaphysics in $\Lambda 6-10$. (iv) However, a further question, both for the writers who think Λ regards itself as metaphysical and for the 1923 Jaeger who thinks Λ regards only its latter half as metaphysical, is what Λ thinks metaphysics is. Bonitz and Jaeger (in both books) think Λ thinks metaphysics is theology, meaning the science of immaterial οὐσίαι; Jaeger at least in 1923 thinks this contradicts $ZH\Theta$, which (he says) take metaphysics to be general ontology or ousiology. Frede, by contrast, argues that Λ does not identify metaphysics with theology either in the sense of "science of [the one first] God" or in the sense of "science of immaterial οὐσίαι", but rather with ousiology, in agreement with $ZH\Theta$; but Frede thinks that Λ disagrees with $ZH\Theta$ (or at least fails to say what $ZH\Theta$ say) in that $ZH\Theta$ take metaphysics as ousiology to be the study of the different senses of ὄν and of οὐσία applicable to different οὐσίαι, while Λ takes it to be simply a description of the different οὐσίαι that there are. (v) Finally, for all writers there is a problem about the relation of $\Lambda 1-5$ to $ZH\Theta$. Since Bonitz, Jaeger and Frede agree that Λ was not written as part of the same treatise with $ZH\Theta$ (and Jaeger in both books, and Frede, think Λ is earlier), they think that $\Lambda 1-5$ are not a deliberate recapitulation of the conclusions of $ZH\Theta$, but a shorter parallel treatment of the same material. At the same time, there are important divergences between $\Lambda 1-5$ and $ZH\Theta$ --in fact, the only extended parallels are between $\Lambda 3$ and $Z 7-8$ (which many writers think was not an originally intended part of $Z!$), and more loosely between $\Lambda 1$ and $Z 1-2$ --and these divergences should presumably be explained by some difference in Aristotle's goals in the two treatments.

To say very briefly how I would answer these questions: (i) I think $\Lambda 1-5$ are intended as preliminary to $\Lambda 6-10$, although much remains to be said about how they function; (ii) I think that (assuming the more probable reading at 1069b2) Aristotle does not describe $\Lambda 1-5$ as physics; they are instead intended as a contribution toward wisdom.³¹ (iii) Λ as a whole is thus devoted toward wisdom, where (iv) in Λ , as everywhere else, wisdom is ἡ περὶ ἀρχῶν θεωρία: as we will see, it is rather misleading to say that Λ identifies wisdom, or its own project, with theology (that is, with the study of immaterial οὐσίαι), and even more misleading to say that it identifies wisdom or its own project with ousiology, although there is a legitimate sense in which Λ is making both of these identifications. And (v), since in my view Λ was intended as part of the same treatise with $ZH\Theta$, there is no reason why Λ should not draw on results of $ZH\Theta$, making brief assertions which will remind readers or hearers of the fuller expositions and proper arguments given earlier. However, the purposes of $\Lambda 1-5$ are much less similar to those of $ZH\Theta$ than (e.g.) Frede or Jaeger 1923 assume. $\Lambda 1-5$ are entirely devoted, like $\Lambda 6-10$, to the question about the ἀρχαί, whereas $ZH\Theta$ were in the first place about the senses of being as οὐσία or δύναμις or ἐνέργεια and about their causes, the οὐσίαι, δυνάμεις, and ἐνέργειαι of things. Aristotle's ultimate interest in these books too was to determine whether these causes lead up to the ἀρχαί: but his explicit questions were generally "does this cause exist separately?", "is this cause prior to this effect?", and the like, rather than "does a chain of causes of this kind lead up to the ἀρχαί?". Now in Λ --not just $\Lambda 1-5$, but also $\Lambda 6$, applying $\Theta 8$ --he is drawing the conclusions for the question of the ἀρχαί.³² He is under no obligation to recall, even briefly, discussions which are not of use for the present point, and he seems to make virtually no use of $Z 4-6$, $Z 10-H 6$, or $\Theta 1-5$. Also, as we will see, his starting from κίνησις as the manifest effect to be traced to the ἀρχαί gives a somewhat different orientation to his discussion.

³¹indeed, they are so intended even if the variant reading at 1069b2 is right and he does describe them as physics

³²these conclusions are likely to seem unexciting, given how much time I spent teasing them out of $ZH\Theta$, where they were implicit

To justify these claims and to understand the program of Λ1-5 in more depth, we will need to examine both the main argument in Λ2-5, and the programmatic Λ1: Λ1 is programmatic not just for Λ2-5 but for Λ as a whole, and it will give us some perspective both on the overall σκοπός of Λ and on how the different parts of Λ function in pursuit of this σκοπός. Λ1 1069a18-b2 can be divided as follows.³³ (1) Aristotle starts by asserting that "the investigation [ἡ θεωρία]"--Aristotle apparently assumes that his audience will know which investigation is meant--"is about οὐσία: for it is of οὐσία that we are seeking the ἀρχαί and causes [literally: it is of οὐσία that the ἀρχαί and causes are being sought, perhaps by earlier philosophers as well as by Aristotle]" (1069a18-19).³⁴ (2) Aristotle then gives four arguments to support the conclusion that "the investigation" is about οὐσία. Three of these arguments, given in extremely abbreviated form, consist in pointing out that οὐσία are in some way prior to beings in other categories. The first argument says, rather obscurely, that οὐσία is the first part of the totality of beings, if they form a whole, or the first term in the series of beings, if they form a succession rather than a whole (a19-21);³⁵ the second argument says that only οὐσία are ἀπλῶς, so that of a non-οὐσία such as whiteness we should not say simply that it is, but only that it is whiteness or a color or a quality (a21-4);³⁶ the third argument says that only οὐσία exist separately (with the implication that other things are dependent on οὐσία for their existence, a24). The fourth argument takes a different tack, arguing that there is an implicit consensus of philosophers that "the investigation" in question is about οὐσία. For even the ancient philosophers (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι = roughly the pre-Socratic physicists), who certainly did not use the word "οὐσία" (Plato seems to have been the first to use the word as a philosophical term),³⁷ nonetheless testify by their practice (ἔργῳ) that "the investigation" is about οὐσία: "for it was of οὐσία that they were seeking the ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα and causes" (a25-6). (3) Aristotle then, picking up on this fourth argument, distinguishes between the attitudes of "the ancients" (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, οἱ πάλαι) and "the moderns" (οἱ νῦν, in the first instance the Academics): "the moderns posit universals as more [μᾶλλον] οὐσία [i.e. as being οὐσία in a higher degree or in a more proper sense] (for the genera, which, on account of their inquiring/seeking λογικῶς, they say are more οὐσία and ἀρχαί,³⁸ are universals), whereas the ancients [posited: as the only οὐσία? as μᾶλλον οὐσία? as ἀρχαί?] individuals, like fire and earth, and not τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα" (a26-30). There are several problems of interpretation here, which I will comment on below. In any case, Aristotle is saying that the "ancient" and "modern" philosophers, despite important differences in what kinds of things they conceived as being οὐσία (or as being more οὐσία than others), and in what kinds of things they conceived as being ἀρχαί, are nonetheless agreed that in "the investigation" in question, the pursuit of the ἀρχαί goes

³³following Frede-Charles, I will treat the final lines of Λ1, 1069b3-7, as part of Λ2, where they logically belong

³⁴Frede has a discussion of this second clause (which he calls "the second sentence") which I find difficult to follow. some of the things he says (e.g. at the bottom of FC p.56) may possibly be challenging the view that the emphasis of the clause is on the word "οὐσία", as presupposed by my translation. nonetheless, Frede's final position, stated at the bottom of p.58, clearly endorses this interpretation; and indeed, given that the second clause is supposed to be justifying the first, no other interpretation is possible

³⁵perhaps add a note on possible meanings of the continuous/successive distinction

³⁶add note on the sub-argument about τὸ μὴ λευκόν and its connections with Δ7

³⁷although Philolaus uses the Doric equivalent ἐστῶ {and, as Kahn notes, Verb 'Be' p.457ff., the Hippocratic De Arte uses οὐσίη as a nominalization of εἶ ἐστι (not, as most cases in Plato, of τί ἐστι)}--I must have some discussion of this somewhere. οὐσία is of course a normal word in non-philosophical senses, typically to mean "wealth," i.e. the answer to "τί ἐστι X+dative?"; as Kahn notes, ἀπουσία "absence" etc. are common too

³⁸grammatically it's easier for μᾶλλον to govern ἀρχάς as well as οὐσίας; but μᾶλλον ἀρχή seems an odd expression, whereas there's a close parallel in H1 for μᾶλλον οὐσία. I'm translating (reversing the Greek word-order) to keep the ambiguity. {Ross takes μᾶλλον both times with the verb, "they tend to posit"; this is far-fetched}

together with the issue about οὐσία: perhaps because the ἀρχαί will be discovered as ἀρχαί of οὐσία, perhaps because the ἀρχαί must themselves be οὐσία. (4) Aristotle then says that there are three οὐσία, by which he means three kinds of οὐσία, or rather three possible kinds of οὐσία, since they may not all turn out to be instantiated. First, there are corruptible sensible οὐσία such as plants and animals, and incorruptible sensible οὐσία, presumably the heavenly bodies (a30-32). Aristotle says that this kind of οὐσία is agreed on by everyone, but due to a corrupt text it is not grammatically obvious whether "this kind of οὐσία" (i.e. ἦν in ἦν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν at 1069a31) refers back just to corruptible sensible οὐσία or to all sensible οὐσία including incorruptible ones; Aristotle says "we must grasp the στοιχεῖα, whether one or many" (a32-3) of "this kind of οὐσία", whatever "this kind" is.³⁹ Beyond these two types of sensible οὐσία there is "another, unmoved [kind of οὐσία], which some people say exists separately" (a33-4), either forms plus mathematical, or just the mathematical, or a single nature serving both roles (a34-6). In reciting, first the agreed-on sensible οὐσία, and then the forms and mathematical as disputed οὐσία beyond these, Aristotle stays very close to the parallel texts B#5 997a34-b3, Z2 1028b8-27, and H1 1042a6-12.⁴⁰ Now for several reasons it seems more likely that "this kind of οὐσία" at a31 and a32-3 includes both corruptible and incorruptible sensible οὐσία. First, in Z2 and H1 and also Δ8 1017b10-13 Aristotle lists, among the things widely agreed to be οὐσία, not only plants and animals and the sublunar elements but also the heavenly bodies (Z2 1028b12-13, H1 1042a10-11) or δαιμόνια (Δ8 1017b12): not everyone agrees that the heavenly bodies are incorruptible, but perhaps he means merely, de re, that they acknowledge those sensible οὐσία which are in fact incorruptible. On the other hand, if he means that everyone acknowledges, de dicto, some incorruptible sensible οὐσία, this also seems true, since the Academics think the heavens are incorruptible, while (e.g.) Anaxagoras and Empedocles and Democritus believe in some (in principle sensible) incorruptible bodies, though not the ones there really are. And it makes more sense for Aristotle to say that the two kinds of sensible οὐσία are ὁμολογούμενα, and that the non-sensible ones are disputed and that we will find the truth about them by grasping the στοιχεῖα of the ὁμολογούμενα οὐσία, than for him to say that corruptible sensible οὐσία are ὁμολογούμενα and that the non-sensible οὐσία are disputed (a dispute we will resolve apparently by grasping the στοιχεῖα of the corruptible sensible οὐσία), while saying nothing about the role in the inquiry of the incorruptible sensible οὐσία. Finally, when Aristotle actually carries out this program in Λ2-5, his arguments start from the fact of motion, not of corruption: "sensible οὐσία is changeable" (Λ1 1069b3), and Aristotle's analyses lead equally to στοιχεῖα of both kinds of sensible οὐσία; Λ2 takes the incorruptibility of the heavens as agreed, and does not seek to establish it starting from sublunar οὐσία. Λ thus stays close to many parallels in beginning from the agreed-on sensible οὐσία, and, by looking for their ἀρχαί, trying to find the truth about the disputed non-sensible οὐσία. (5) Finally, in another sentence whose text and interpretation are both disputed, Aristotle says "the former [two kinds of sensible οὐσία] belong to physics (since they have motion), and the latter [kind of οὐσία] to another [science], if they [i.e. the different kinds of οὐσία] have no common ἀρχή [εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχή κοινή]," or, according to some manuscripts, "if they [i.e. the third kind of οὐσία] have no ἀρχή of motion [εἰ

³⁹discuss the textual possibilities, following Frede in FC pp.78-80. also: it's conceivable that the antecedent of ἦς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν goes back to μία μὲν αισθητή, ἦς, skipping over ἦν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν. so ἦν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν could be just corruptibles but ἦς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν all sensibles. but it would be methodologically bizarre to seek to grasp the στοιχεῖα of things that had not yet been agreed to exist; so it is much more likely that ἦς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν and ἦν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν have the same antecedent.

⁴⁰the Z2 text includes the dispute between Plato, Speusippus (both named in Z2 where they are not in Λ1) and Xenocrates (not named in either text)

μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κινήσεως]" (1069a36-b2).⁴¹ The disputes are whether to read κοινή or κινήσεως, whether Aristotle thinks the condition is fulfilled, and what he thinks will result if the condition is not fulfilled. If Aristotle wrote ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, then he certainly thought the condition was fulfilled: the claim would be that because sensible οὐσίαι are mobile and so have an ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, they are treated by physics, whereas since non-sensible οὐσίαι are immobile, they have no ἀρχὴ κινήσεως and so must be treated by some other science: this would be quite close to what he says in Physics II,7 198a28-31. On the other hand, if we read ἀρχὴ κοινή (with the three best manuscripts EJAb and with the lectio difficilior),⁴² then there is a dispute about whether Aristotle thinks that sensible and non-sensible οὐσίαι have a common ἀρχὴ or not. Jaeger (in 1912) thinks that Aristotle's answer is that they do not, and indeed that the aim of Λ2-5 is to prove that they do not, and thus to justify the conclusion that there is a science of first philosophy, distinct from physics, to treat the non-sensible οὐσίαι. Against this, Frede argues (rightly) that Aristotle concludes in Λ that sensible and non-sensible οὐσίαι do indeed have a common ἀρχὴ; in which case Aristotle is not saying that the apodosis in 1069a36-b2 is true, and indeed would seem to be suggesting that it is false. But if the apodosis is false, there is yet another dispute. Jaeger assumes that the relevant apodosis is "non-sensible οὐσίαι belong to a science other than physics": since Aristotle certainly believes this claim, Jaeger thinks that Aristotle must be trying to establish it by showing that the protasis "sensible and non-sensible οὐσίαι have no common ἀρχὴ" is true. However, it would be very strange to suppose that the existence of a common (presumably non-sensible and non-physical) ἀρχὴ between sensible and non-sensible οὐσίαι would have the effect of subjecting the non-sensible οὐσίαι to physics. Rather, as Michel Crubellier points out (reported by Frede, FC p.77), the apodosis must be the conjunction "sensible οὐσίαι belong to physics and non-sensible οὐσίαι belong to a science other than physics": if and to the extent that both kinds of οὐσίαι proceed from the same ἀρχὴ, the science that knows that ἀρχὴ would treat both of them; but since the ἀρχὴ in question would presumably be non-physical, the result would be not that non-sensible οὐσίαι are treated by physics, but rather than sensible οὐσίαι (which are certainly treated by physics) are also treated by metaphysics to the extent that there is a causal chain up from them to a non-physical ἀρχὴ. And this would be close to what Aristotle says in Metaphysics Z11, that "it is for the sake of this [sc. the question whether there is 'some other οὐσία, such as numbers or the like'] that we are trying to make determinations also about sensible οὐσίαι, since the investigation of sensible οὐσίαι is in a certain way the task of physics and second philosophy" (1037a13-16), being the task of first philosophy only insofar as it may show us a way up to non-sensible ἀρχαί.

As this survey brings out, Λ1 has many passages with some degree of ambiguity that would repay closer study. Here I want first to talk about some difficulties in the short opening and closing sentences I have marked as passages (1) and (5) (1069a18-19 and a36-b2), which are important for understanding the σκοπός of Λ as a whole and the status of Λ1-5 within the larger whole. Then I will come back especially to passage (3), which will be useful for clarifying the more particular program that guides the argument of Λ2-5.

Aristotle begins Metaphysics Λ by saying "the investigation [ἡ θεωρία] is about οὐσία" (1016a18). What is "the investigation"?

⁴¹reference to Frede on which manuscripts have the variant reading (chiefly C and M, the main representatives of Harlfinger's β family other than Ab. C and M are closely related, so their agreement against Ab does not prove that they reflect the original reading of β). none of these manuscripts are reported in any of the editions

⁴²explain why this is the lectio difficilior. if Ab is not contaminated by the alpha tradition (and Harlfinger does not seem to think it is), then stemmatic reasons prove that the consensus of EJAb is the reading of the archetype

Jaeger took this opening of Λ to be in effect a title, declaring the σκοπός of Λ (*Entstehungsgeschichte* p.168, cp. p.122): since Λ is for Jaeger an independent treatise, its first sentence cannot be referring back to anything, and serves as a statement of intention of what the new treatise will be about. However, this interpretation seems impossible, given that Aristotle not only asserts that the investigation is about οὐσία, but also argues for it, first by saying that the ἀρχαί that we are seeking (or that are being sought, perhaps by other philosophers as well) are "the ἀρχαί and causes of οὐσία" rather than of something else,⁴³ then by giving three arguments for some sort of priority of οὐσία over the other categories, then by arguing that both pre-Socratics and Academics at least implicitly agree that the investigation is about οὐσία. If the claim "the investigation is about οὐσία" needs to be, and can intelligibly be, argued for, then it cannot be simply a statement of intention, by which the author freely decides what his book will be about: ἡ θεωρία must refer back to some already-understood subject, about which it can be argued whether it is about οὐσία or about something else. So far I am in agreement with Frede (in FC pp.54-6). I also agree with Frede that when Aristotle refers anaphorically to "the investigation," he must be referring to it under some description that makes it obvious that the pre-Socratics were pursuing the same investigation; Aristotle can then argue that this investigation, the one that the pre-Socratics were pursuing, is in fact an investigation of οὐσία, although, because the pre-Socratics do not use the term "οὐσία", this is not obvious. But Frede is wrong to suggest that the prior description of this investigation is "the investigation of being";⁴⁴ it is rather "the investigation of ἀρχαί". Frede is influenced by the parallel with Z1, which says that the old debate τί τὸ ὄν is really τίς ἡ οὐσία (1028b2-7); but while there are certainly connections between Λ 1 and Z1, the focus is different, and in Λ 1 the pre-Socratics are assumed to be investigating, not in the first instance what being is, but what the ἀρχαί are. The argument that the pre-Socratics agree that the investigation is about οὐσία is that "it was of οὐσία that they were seeking the ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα and causes" (1069a25-6): it is obvious that they were seeking ἀρχαί, so we ask what they were seeking the ἀρχαί of, i.e. what they claimed their ἀρχαί to be στοιχεῖα or causes of, and we find that it was in fact οὐσία. Aristotle does also say things here about τὸ ὄν, not in connection with the pre-Socratics but when he argues that οὐσία are prior to ὄντα in other categories, are ὄντα in a stronger sense than they, and are separable from accidents while accidents are not separable from them (1069a19-24); but all these arguments are in support of the initial claim that "the investigation is about οὐσία, for it is of οὐσία that we are seeking the ἀρχαί and causes" (a18-19). Presumably the thought, as in Γ 2 and Λ 5, is that if all other things can be shown to be posterior to and dependent on οὐσία, then in seeking the ἀρχαί it will be sufficient to investigate the causes of οὐσία, since these will be the causes of all things.⁴⁵ Aristotle would thus be recapitulating the line of thought from earlier in the *Metaphysics*, which had started by saying that wisdom is a knowledge of ἀρχαί, then argued that these ἀρχαί would be causes of being as such,

⁴³when Aristotle says τῶν οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται, the emphasis is (as noted before) on the fact that it is οὐσία rather than something else. the point of the expegetic "αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια" is that αἴτια only make sense with a genitive, whereas the most relevant concept of ἀρχαί is one-place (= τὰ πρῶτα): Aristotle is saying, "in looking for the ἀρχαί, we are looking for what we may call 'the ἀρχαί of οὐσία', i.e. the causes of οὐσία".

⁴⁴cite Frede p.55; however, also cite p.59, where he qualifies this or takes it back. perhaps what he says on p.55 is not his own view, but merely a stage in his readers' education. I find all this hard to follow.

⁴⁵thus especially the opening of Λ 5, "since some things are separate and some are not separate, the former are οὐσία; and for this reason the causes of all things are the same, since πάθη and motions do not exist without οὐσία [sc. and therefore the causes of οὐσία are also causes of their accidents]" (1070b36-1071a2) should be taken as spelling out the point of the abbreviated argument in Λ 1, "again, none of the other things are separate" (1069a24), which was supposed to show that the ἀρχαί we are seeking are the ἀρχαί and causes of οὐσία.

and then that they would be causes of οὐσίαι; in fact, the opening sentence of Λ looks like a reminiscence of H1, "τῶν οὐσιῶν ζητεῖται τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα" (1042a5-6). In any case, the argument of Λ1 shows that the chapter is not the beginning of a new treatise: ἡ θεωρία picks up something Aristotle has already been discussing, presumably in earlier books of the *Metaphysics*, and in picking up that discussion now he is identifying the σκοπός of Λ, not in the first instance as ousiology, but as archeology.

Some more reflections on the argument of Λ1 will help to bring out the particular roles of Λ2-5 and Λ6-10 in the pursuit of that σκοπός. Frede and the Jaeger of 1923 see the relation between these two parts of Λ as quite straightforward: Λ in general is about οὐσίαι, Λ2-5 (like ΖΗΘ) is about sensible οὐσίαι, and Λ6-10 (perhaps like ζ) is about non-sensible οὐσίαι (the only dispute is whether this makes Λ2-5 physics, as Jaeger says, or metaphysics, as Frede says). However, what Λ1 says is that we are seeking the ἀρχαί of οὐσίαι; Λ1 also says that it is the sensible οὐσίαι that are ὁμολογούμεναι, so sound method dictates that we begin with them and look for their ἀρχαί, perhaps discovering other οὐσίαι in the process. And this is how Aristotle in fact proceeds in Λ2-5 (i.e. Λ1 1069b3-Λ5): he begins from sensible οὐσίαι, and specifically from the fact that "sensible οὐσία is changeable" (Λ1 1069b3), and he proceeds to make determinations about their ἀρχαί, discussing their matter in Λ2 and their form in Λ3, and then in Λ4-5 asking whether, or in what sense, the ἀρχαί of all things are the same. What we have in these chapters is not at all a survey of physics, or a survey of sensible οὐσίαι, but a focussed discussion of the ἀρχαί of sensible οὐσίαι, and thus of all sensible things: he concludes the whole discussion by saying, "what and how many are the ἀρχαί of sensible things, and how they are the same and how different, has been said" (Λ5 1071b1-2). (Indeed, as I will argue shortly, even this description is too broad: Aristotle is not saying everything about the ἀρχαί of sensible things, but focussing on a specific set of questions about the ἀρχαί, in pursuit of a particular program.) So if Λ6-10 were to non-sensible οὐσίαι as Λ2-5 are to sensible οὐσίαι, we would have to say that Λ6-10 are about the ἀρχαί of non-sensible οὐσίαι, which is certainly not the right description of these chapters. Indeed, while Aristotle is describing non-sensible οὐσίαι in these chapters, and describing them as ἀρχαί, he goes out of his way to emphasize that they are discovered as ἀρχαί of motion, and thus as ἀρχαί of sensible and mobile οὐσίαι, as against Academic projects of discovering the first ἀρχαί as ἀρχαί of non-sensible and immobile things such as numbers. Thus while in a sense the end of Λ5 (1071b1-2, cited just above) marks the end of the investigation announced by "we must grasp the στοιχεῖα, whether one or many, of [the ὁμολογούμεναι sensible οὐσίαι]" (Λ1 1069a32-3), in another sense this investigation continues to the end of Λ. For the ἀρχαί of sensible οὐσίαι described in Λ2-5 include ἀρχαί that will be discussed in greater depth in Λ6-10. Thus in Λ4-5, alongside the matter and form and conspecific efficient cause (e.g. the father) of a sensible thing, Aristotle ostentatiously adds as ἀρχαί "besides these, what, as first of all things, moves all things" (Λ4 1070b34-5), "besides these the sun and the oblique circuit, which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor conspecific, but movers" (Λ5 1071a15-17), "also what is first in ἐντελέχεια", which just because it is nonconspecific with its effects can be numerically the same ἀρχή for all things (Λ5 1071a35-6); these references will of course be picked up in Λ6. And besides these rather quick references, Λ5 at some length describes ἐνέργεια and δύναμις as ἀρχαί of all things, making clear that the ἀρχή which is ἐνεργεία might be, not ἐνεργεία at one time and δυνάμει at another time, but always ἐνεργεία (1071a3-17); again, Λ6 will take up the issue of ἐνέργεια and δύναμις as ἀρχαί, arguing that a δύναμις is insufficient as a first moving cause, and that we must also posit an ἀρχή which is itself an ἐνέργεια, and is therefore always ἐνεργεία. Finally, the pair νοῦς/πάντα ὁμοῦ, mentioned as possible ἀρχαί at Λ2 1069b20-32, and the pair νοῦς/ὄρεξις,

mentioned as possible ἀρχαί at Λ5 1071a3-4, are both picked up in Λ6-7 (πάντα ὁμοῦ at Λ6 1071b26-8 and Λ7 1072a19-21; νοῦς and ὄρεξις at Λ7 1072a26-30, and νοῦς already in passing at Λ6 1071b36): a critical revision of Anaxagoras' ἀρχαί, as well as of Plato's, will be major goals of Λ6-10, and both Anaxagorean and Platonic ἀρχαί are being put forward as candidate ἀρχαί of sensible things already in Λ2-5.

These texts show that it is not right to say that Λ2-5 is about sensible οὐσίαι as Λ6-10 is about non-sensible οὐσίαι; rather, Λ2-5 is about ἀρχαί of sensible οὐσίαι, and at least some of those ἀρχαί are among the non-sensible οὐσίαι discussed in Λ6-10 (or are, like Platonic forms, false claimants to be such non-sensible οὐσίαι). And so Λ2-5 have an instrumental value toward the Λ6-10 project of discovering non-sensible οὐσίαι as ἀρχαί; it remains to be seen whether Λ2-5 are merely a means to this "theology," or whether they also have an intrinsic "non-theological" value for the project of Λ.

With this gained, we can come back to the final sentence (5) of Λ1, assuming the more probable reading, "the former [two kinds of sensible οὐσίαι] belong to physics (since they have motion), and the latter [kind of οὐσίαι] to another [science], if they [i.e. the different kinds of οὐσίαι] have no common ἀρχή [εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχή κοινή]" (1069a36-b2). The only plausible way for sensible and non-sensible οὐσίαι have a common ἀρχή is for some causal path to lead up to a non-sensible ἀρχή, so that something non-sensible will be an ἀρχή also of sensible οὐσίαι. The question seems to recall B#10, which Λ is supposed to resolve, as we know from Λ10 1075b13-14 (discussed above). B#10 officially asked whether perishables and imperishables have the same ἀρχαί, but the key question is whether the ἀρχαί of perishables are perishable or imperishable: if they are perishable, they would seem to require a regress to prior ἀρχαί, while if they are imperishable, it is mysterious why some things that arise out of imperishable ἀρχαί are perishable (while, presumably, others are imperishable; all this B#10 1000b23-1001a3). The formulation in Λ1 is more sophisticated than the formulation in B#10 (and Λ10), since its issue is not simply of perishable vs. imperishable things, but also of sensible and changeable things vs. non-sensible and unchangeable things, because Aristotle is now interested not simply in whether we can get from ordinary perishable things to imperishable things (like his own heavenly bodies, or Empedoclean elements or Democritean atoms), but in whether we can get from all these physical things to immobile and non-physical things such as Plato claims to exist (we still get into aporia in much the same way: Λ2 argues that anything mobile, whether perishable or not, would require prior ἀρχαί; if these are mobile, there is a regress, and if not, there is a problem how things arising from immobile ἀρχαί can be mobile). And while B#10 seems to assume that the ἀρχαί are constituent στοιχεῖα out of which something comes to be and into which it perishes,⁴⁶ and Λ10 still assumes that this is how Aristotle's predecessors thought about it when "they make all beings out of the same ἀρχαί" (1075b14), Aristotle gives the key to solving the aporia when he distinguishes στοιχεῖα = ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια from external moving ἀρχαί in Λ4. Thus a mobile thing can proceed from non-constituent immobile ἀρχαί, unmoved movers, without obvious absurdity (and Aristotle will explain how it works), so that in this way the mobile and immobile things can have a common ἀρχή; there is still a difficulty about the constituent ἀρχαί of the mobile things (if these cannot be immobile, how do we avoid a regress?), but Aristotle deals with this in Λ2-3 by arguing that matter and form, while not separate eternal ἀρχαί such as the philosophers have been seeking, are also not subjects of change or becoming and perishing and so do not involve a regress to prior ἀρχαί.

⁴⁶B#10 constantly speaks of things as being "out-of" their ἀρχαί, and says πάντα φθείρεται εἰς ταῦτ' ἐξ ὧν ἐστίν, 1000b25-6

We can thus see that Jaeger's 1912 thesis that $\Lambda 1-5$ serve to constitute a separate science of metaphysics by showing that mobile and immobile things have no common $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$, although it is wrong and indeed obviously wrong, nonetheless captures something important about these chapters. Aristotle is indeed arguing that the routes that his predecessors, both physicists and dialecticians, had taken from the manifest things to their constituent $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ do not get us from mobile to immobile things, or even from corruptible to incorruptible things; but he is also indicating a different route, to external non-conspecific moving causes, that he thinks will indeed lead up from sublunar things to the heavenly bodies and their motions and thus to their incorporeal movers. And the disciplinary issue is not, as Jaeger thinks, whether immobile things are different enough from physical ones to be treated by their own separate discipline, but whether mobile things have a causal connection to immobile $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$, so that even the mobile things belong in a certain respect to metaphysics. We will see, when we examine $\Lambda 2-5$ in detail below, that these chapters are not just giving a general survey of the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ of sensible $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$, but are asking quite specific questions about these $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$, with a view to determining which causal chains lead up from sensible $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$, to the contested immaterial $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$ or more generally to separately existing eternal things whether immaterial or not. And so, while sensible $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$ are certainly in some ways the territory of physics, here they are being treated only in the respect in which they belong to theology, or rather to the study of whatever separately existing eternal things there may be, whether immaterial or not.

This allows us to give fuller answers to the questions raised by Bonitz, Jaeger, and Frede about the relation of $\Lambda 1-5$ to the overall $\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ of Λ . (i) Are $\Lambda 1-5$ a full part of Λ , or are they merely a preliminary to $\Lambda 6-10$? It is certainly a mistake to think (with Frede and Jaeger 1923) that $\Lambda 1-5$ have the same status as $\Lambda 6-10$, in that $\Lambda 1-5$ treat sensible and $\Lambda 6-10$ non-sensible $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$; it would be more plausible to say that they have the same status as both treating $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ of sensible $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$ (with $\Lambda 6-10$ specializing to those $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ which exist separately and eternally), but, as I have said, I will try to show that the particular questions $\Lambda 2-5$ are asking about $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ of sensible $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$ are preliminary to $\Lambda 6-10$. (ii) Are $\Lambda 1-5$, by their own description, physics or metaphysics? Assuming the more probable reading $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ κοινή at $\Lambda 1$ 1069b2, Aristotle thinks they are metaphysics, like $\Lambda 6-10$. If we read $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ κινήσεως instead, they must in some sense be physics, at least in that they are about objects which "belong to physics"; even so, they are asking their particular physical questions in pursuit of the metaphysics of $\Lambda 6-10$ (which is what Bonitz and Jaeger 1912 thought). (iii) We must thus reject the thesis of Jaeger 1923 that Λ is a broad survey of theoretical philosophy covering both physics and metaphysics, and agree with everyone else that the $\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ of Λ is metaphysical. (iv) But metaphysics here is not (as Frede says) a general *ousiology*, except inasmuch as it is about the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ of $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$. It is better to call it theology (with Bonitz and Jaeger), but this too can be misleading. The discipline Aristotle is pursuing is wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$. Aristotle thinks that the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ in the strict sense are immaterial $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$. But, although he is quite interested in Λ is answering the B#5 question whether there are such immaterial $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$, he does not reject other candidates for the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ simply on the ground that they are not immaterial: for instance, though Λ is interested in Anaxagoras' account of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and makes a number of criticisms of it, and though Anaxagoras presumably thought $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ was a body, Aristotle never raises this criticism; he is much more concerned to show that $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is pure $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ (equally against Anaxagoras and Timaeus, who both make $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ inactive before the cosmogony); its immateriality is a mere corollary ($\Lambda 6$ 1071b20-22). So to describe Λ 's concern with $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\iota$ as theology (meaning study of immaterial $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$) can be too narrow. But it can also be too broad, since the ultimate conclusion of Λ is that there is only a single $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ in the strict sense,

i.e. a single thing which is prior to all other things, and so wisdom ultimately turns out to be narrower than theology; and while Aristotle does take time in $\Lambda 8$ to describe the other immaterial οὐσίαι, this interest is clearly subordinate to the pursuit of the first ἀρχή of all, the good-itself of $\Lambda 10$, which is what fulfills the promises of $\Lambda 1-2$. (v) Finally, on the relation of $\Lambda 1-5$ to $ZH\Theta$, I will repeat: Λ is not about ways of being, as οὐσία or ἐνέργεια or δύναμις, but about the ἀρχαί; Λ is pulling together the conclusions, of the Metaphysics and also often of physical and even ethical works, and it draws on lines of thought developed more fully in $ZH\Theta$ and elsewhere, but it uses them specifically for answering questions about the ἀρχαί. $\Lambda 6$ is clearly building on $\Theta 8$, not paralleling it. The only passages in Λ and $ZH\Theta$ that are close enough to be described as short and long versions of the same discussion are $\Lambda 3$ and $Z 7-9$ (or $Z 7-8$), and this is because the Z passage is already so archeological (which is why so many readers have been uncomfortable with it in Z). $\Lambda 4-5$ are not remotely like anything in $ZH\Theta$ ($\Lambda 5$'s assertion that ἐνέργεια and δύναμις are each the same τῷ ἀνάλογον may be building on $\Theta 6$, but the chapters are not running in parallel).

We can thus also return to the two arguments against reading Λ as part of the Metaphysics that were hanging over from the last subsection. The idea that Λ is not the Metaphysics' promised discussion of immaterial οὐσίαι, but a parallel that begins where $ZH\Theta$ do and proceeds further than they do, depends on taking $\Lambda 1-5$ to be more like $ZH\Theta$ than they really are (and perhaps also on taking them to be a survey of sensible οὐσίαι, which is true neither of $\Lambda 1-5$ nor of ZH , much less Θ). Λ is using $ZH\Theta$'s discussions of the οὐσίαι, δυνάμεις and ἐνέργεια of sensible things in order to answer the question of separate eternal ἀρχαί, which is what $ZH\Theta$ were supposed to be used for. The idea of a ζ discussing the way-of-being of immaterial οὐσίαι, and showing that they are οὐσίαι and ὄντα in a special primary sense, is a delusion: Aristotle is interested in immaterial οὐσίαι because they may be the ἀρχαί, and he is interested in the senses of being only because he is interested in finding causes of being in those senses; there is no reason to think he would ever say that being is predicated non-univocally of God and Socrates, no matter how much time he had to talk. And there is also no reason to think that he has changed his conception of metaphysics between $ZH\Theta$ and Λ (or between Λ and $ZH\Theta$). Metaphysics is "theology" (with the above caveats) in Λ , but also in $ZH\Theta$; in both texts, sensible οὐσίαι when studied for their own sake belong to physics, and are studied by first philosophy insofar as some causal chain may lead up from them to immaterial οὐσίαι. And Frede's idea that, while in $ZH\Theta$ metaphysics was an investigation of the way-of-being of οὐσίαι, in Λ it is merely a survey of what οὐσίαι there are, again comes from the disappointment of a false expectation of what the theology to follow $ZH\Theta$ was supposed to do. ZH are not asking in what sense different sensible οὐσίαι are beings, but what things are in different senses the οὐσίαι of sensible things, and whether any of them exist separately from and prior to the sensible things; Θ is asking about the δυνάμεις and ἐνέργεια of sensible effects (both motions and οὐσίαι), and whether δυνάμεις or ἐνέργεια are prior; and Λ is doing what it is supposed to in using the conclusions of earlier books to determine whether some causal chain leads up to eternal unmoved οὐσίαι existing beyond the sensible ones.⁴⁷

The program of $\Lambda 2-5$

⁴⁷hangover notes (perhaps to put earlier in this subsection; or in the next subsection on $\Lambda 3$): perhaps on q of drawing on or paralleling ZH , note $\Lambda 3$ on whether matter/form/composite are τὸδε τι or not; this seems to have no parallel in $Z 7-9$ (closer is $H 1$), and it's so short that no one could possibly expect the Λ discussion to stand on its own. maybe, if Aristotle had filled it out, he would have given there a discussion parallel to ZH 's; but maybe he would have filled it out instead by saying "ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον". note I said before that Λ seems not to draw on $Z 10-H 6$. not quite true: note $\Lambda 3$ on πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλή, drawing on $Z 16$; d think through the consequences

Λ1 states the program of looking for the ἀρχαί, or as it also says the στοιχεῖα, of sensible οὐσίαι. It also makes somewhat clearer how we are to look for these ἀρχαί, and what issues we will have to resolve about them, in the passage I have marked as Λ1(3): "the moderns posit universals as more [μᾶλλον] οὐσίαι (for the genera, which, on account of their inquiring/seeking λογικῶς, they say are more οὐσίαι and ἀρχαί, are universals), whereas the ancients [posited, as οὐσίαι or as μᾶλλον οὐσίαι or as ἀρχαί] individuals, like fire and earth, and not τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα" (1069a26-30). Here Aristotle probably means to say in the first instance that the ancients posited fire or earth as ἀρχαί, not that they posited them as the chief or only οὐσίαι;⁴⁸ on the other hand, the Platonists do say not only that universals and genera are ἀρχαί but also that they are μᾶλλον οὐσίαι than the individuals or lower universals that fall under them (so H1 1042a12-16), and the issue about οὐσίαι bears on the issue about ἀρχαί. There is a γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας, and if the physicist will not admit that universals are οὐσίαι he will also not admit them as ἀρχαί, and if a Platonist will not admit that fire and earth are οὐσίαι (or admits them as οὐσίαι only in a weakened sense) then he will also not admit them as ἀρχαί. So in beginning with ordinary sensible οὐσίαι, and looking for their ἀρχαί either φυσικῶς, as their material constituents, or λογικῶς, as the universals under which they fall, we will need also to examine whether the proposed ἀρχαί are οὐσίαι or not; if not, they cannot be ἀρχαί of οὐσίαι.

Aristotle's contrast here between the ancients and the moderns closely echoes B#6. To recall, "there is much aporia ... about the ἀρχαί, whether one should suppose that the genera are στοιχεῖα and ἀρχαί, or rather the things out of which, as primary constituents, each thing is. Thus the στοιχεῖα and ἀρχαί of speech [φωνή] seem to be the things out of which, as primary [constituents], spoken sounds [φωναί] are composed, rather than what is common, [the genus] speech [τὸ κοινὸν ἢ φωνή] Again, both those who say that the στοιχεῖα of bodies are many, and those who say that they are one, say that the things out of which [bodies] are composed and out of which they have been put together are ἀρχαί: thus Empedocles says that fire and water and so on are στοιχεῖα out of which, as constituents, beings are, not that these things are genera of beings" (B#3 998a20-32). From the point of view of people like Empedocles, the letters or στοιχεῖα of speech are paradigmatic for the στοιχεῖα and ἀρχαί of beings: the στοιχεῖα of the syllable βα are β and α and not the universal "speech" or "sound", and analogously the στοιχεῖα of bone would be fire and so on, not the universal "body." (Indeed, the analogy between τὸ κοινὸν ἢ φωνή in B#6 and τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα in Λ1 is so close that we might, with Ross, add a comma and print "τὸ κοινόν, σῶμα", not "the common body" as opposed to a non-common body, but "the thing that is common, namely body.")⁴⁹ B#6 does not speak of "ancients" and "moderns," but it does contrast the people like Empedocles, who seek the ἀρχαί as material constituents of things, with the people who seek the ἀρχαί as genera; in other words, the contrast is between the physicists and the dialecticians. Since Empedocles also seems to be the paradigm "ancient" in Λ1 ("fire and earth"), and since the "moderns" there say that the genera are ἀρχαί, it seems natural to identify the ancients and moderns of Λ1 with the physicists and dialecticians of B#6. Λ1 would then be saying that, in beginning with the agreed-on οὐσίαι and looking for their ἀρχαί, we will have to arbitrate the γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας going on between the physicists and the dialecticians, and decide whether we will seek our ἀρχαί and οὐσίαι, with the physicists, as

⁴⁸for, in the previous sentence, he has admitted that they did not speak of οὐσία; they implicitly witness that the investigation is about οὐσία when they look for the principles of (the things which are in fact) οὐσίαι. but that can't be how they implicitly make fire an οὐσία, since they're not looking for the principles of fire

⁴⁹added note: A9 992a3-6, like the B#3 passage, supports the comma. I think what to do about the Democritus passage from the Physics cited below. in the end the meaning is not much different either way

material causes of the agreed-on οὐσίαι, or rather, with the dialecticians, as their formal causes. And Λ2, examining the material ἀρχή, and Λ3, examining the formal ἀρχή, would be carrying out the two branches of this program.

I think this is close to being right, but the truth is more complicated. One detail that does not fit is τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα (or τὸ κοινόν, σῶμα), apparently an example of a "modern" ἀρχή rejected by the "ancients": this does not sound like the kind of universal that a dialectician would cite as an ἀρχή. And in other texts Aristotle thinks of τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα as a mathematical rather than physical or dialectical ἀρχή; or even as a material rather than formal, thus physical rather than dialectical, ἀρχή. Our passage from Λ1 recalls not only B#6 but also B#12, a dispute between the physicists and the mathematicians, here explicitly described as ancients (οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πρότερον, B#12 1002a8) and moderns (οἱ δ' ὕστεροι καὶ σοφώτεροι τούτων εἶναι δόξαντες, 1002a11-12), the former thinking "that οὐσία and being were body [σῶμα], and that the other things were πάθη of this, so that the ἀρχαί of bodies would be ἀρχαί of [all] beings" (1002a8-10, echoing the Giants of the Sophist τὰ τὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι, 246b1), and the latter asserting that numbers are οὐσίαι. But even though, in this sentence, it is the ancients who make σῶμα an οὐσία, at the beginning of the aporia Aristotle has framed the issue as "whether numbers and σώματα and surfaces and points are οὐσίαι or not" (1001b25-7). Here clearly it is the moderns who make σῶμα an οὐσία, where σώματα are mathematical solids. By contrast, the kinds of σώματα which the ancients recognize as οὐσίαι are fire and earth and so on. But, the moderns argue, "the things which would most seem to signify οὐσία, water and earth and fire and air, out of which the composite bodies are composed--their heats and coldnesses and the like are πάθη, not οὐσίαι, and the body which suffers these things [τὸ σῶμα τὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός] alone remains as a being and a οὐσία" (1001b32-1002a4)--when we subtract all these πάθη from fire to get at its οὐσία, all we are left with is three-dimensional extension, the same substratum which when it takes on different πάθη becomes earth, and which is therefore κοινόν to the different particular kinds of bodies. This seems to be the conflict between fire and earth, on the one hand, and τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα on the other, as ἀρχαί and as οὐσίαι, that Aristotle is thinking of in Λ1; which means that the "moderns" of Λ1 must include mathematicians as well as dialecticians. Furthermore, while B#12 presents τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα as a mathematical ἀρχή, and as a step on the way up to the more basic mathematical ἀρχαί, boundaries and units, it can also be thought of as a particular kind of physical ἀρχή. The argument of the "moderns" in B#12 is clearly echoing the argument of the Timaeus from fire and so on to the receptacle, the three-dimensional extension or "space" [χώρα] of which the other things are πάθη;⁵⁰ and yet the Timaeus is on its own self-description doing physics here, and Aristotle treats the receptacle as a material ἀρχή directly comparable to the material ἀρχαί of other physicists. So it seems that, alongside the "modern" disciplines of dialectic and mathematics, which lead to their own ἀρχαί, there is also a "modern" style of doing physics, which leads to material ἀρχαί of natural things quite different from the traditional earth or fire. And Aristotle does not even think Plato was the inventor of this modern style of physics: "Democritus says that none of the first things comes-to-be out of another; but nonetheless for him τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα is the ἀρχή of all things, differing in its pieces in size and shape" (Physics III,4 203a33-b2), where τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα is what Democritus calls being, the matter that the atoms are different-sized and -shaped chunks of (warning: Metaphysics A4 985b4-10 says, more correctly, that for Democritus being and not being are the material causes of all things). Since Aristotle takes at least Democritus and Plato as giving

⁵⁰note also Timaeus 53c4-6, proceeding from the fact that "fire and earth and water and air are σώματα" to analyzing the common σῶμα back to its two-dimensional boundaries, as B#12 goes on to do; this passage is very likely in the background to Aristotle's use of σῶμα in B#12. on all this see my treatment of B#12 in Iβ3 above

physical and material but nonetheless "modern" ἀρχαί, Λ1 is not asking simply whether we should pursue material or formal ἀρχαί, but also whether, even among material ἀρχαί, we should accept things like fire or something "universal" like τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα. And indeed this is the central question that Λ2 will take up about the material ἀρχή.

For, to understand the program of Λ2-5, we must examine what questions these chapters ask, and not simply what subjects they cover. Their overall subject was announced in Λ1: "we must grasp the στοιχεῖα of [sensible οὐσίαι], whether one or many" (1069a32-3), to which Aristotle refers back at the end of Λ5, "what and how many are the ἀρχαί of sensible things, and how they are the same and how different, has been said" (Λ5 1071b1-2). These texts might suggest that Λ2-5 are simply a survey of the ἀρχαί or στοιχεῖα of sensible οὐσίαι, with Λ2 devoted to matter and Λ3 to form, and then Λ4-5 pursuing the question "how they are the same and how different" (but why would he be specially interested in this question? to gain a more accurate count of how many ἀρχαί there are?). But Λ2 and Λ3 cannot really be read as survey-accounts of matter and form; they focus on quite specific questions about matter and form, and often not the questions Aristotle devotes most time to elsewhere. Thus Λ3 has nothing about the relation of form to essence or definition, and only one line about the status of form as οὐσία; this chapter, like Z7-9, instead focusses all-but-exclusively on the question of whether (or in what sense) the form must preexist before the composite is generated, with the aim of showing that there is no need to posit separate eternal forms to account for generation; in the process, Aristotle argues that forms are not perishable in such a way as to lead to a regress of ἀρχαί, but also not imperishable in such a way as to be eternal. This can be seen as a contribution to solving various aporiai (notably B#8 and #10), but it does not add up to a general account of form. Likewise Λ2, after distinguishing matter from privation and identifying it with τὸ δυνάμει ὄν, spends its time, first on an (obscure) critical evaluation of various pre-Socratic material ἀρχαί, and then on arguing that there is variation within matter and not a single undifferentiated matter for all things: the starting-point is familiar, but the focus is not where it usually is; notably, the matter of the heavenly bodies, discussed here, is mentioned elsewhere only at Metaphysics H1 1042b3-8 and Θ8 1050b20-24. So why is Aristotle discussing these particular questions?

Part of the answer is that Λ2-3 are already directed toward answering the question of Λ4-5, whether or in what sense all sensible things have the same ἀρχαί. All sensible and thus changeable οὐσίαι have matter (indeed, according to Λ4, changeable non-οὐσίαι do too), but is there some one matter which they all have? Likewise they all have form, but is there some one form, or at least some one formal constituent (e.g. a genus, or being or unity) which they all have? Or, if not all, do at least many of them, say all the members of a species, share some one form? Clearly Λ2, in saying "all things that change have matter, but [a] different [matter]" (1069b24-5), is contributing to answering these questions; when Λ3 says that "causes as the λόγος" (i.e. formal causes) are not prior to but simultaneous with their effects (1070a21-2), thereby implying that no one thing can be a formal cause to a whole species (or it would be eternal and prior to each of its effects), it too is contributing to answering the questions of Λ4-5. And indeed Λ5 concludes that "your matter and form and mover and mine" are numerically different, and only "the same in universal λόγος" (1071a28-9). But this is not likely to be the whole story: Λ3's interest in whether the form exists prior to the composite cannot be explained simply as a means to proving that different things have different forms. To understand more fully the aims of Λ2-3 we have to ask what aims the question of Λ4-5 is serving in turn.

We have seen that Aristotle assumes that the ἀρχαί in the strict sense, the first of all things, knowledge of which constitutes wisdom, must not only be eternal, but also be things that exist

separately or are τόδε τι. Here in Λ Aristotle does not usually restrict the term "ἀρχή" to this strict sense, but is happy to refer to matter and form as ἀρχαί.⁵¹ Nonetheless, he is pursuing wisdom, and therefore wants to find things that are ἀρχαί in the strict sense. Both matter and form are in some sense eternal, and Λ2-3 argues that they are both ἀρχαί presupposed by coming-to-be, but in each case there is a problem about whether they are separate or τόδε τι. As the K version of B#8 puts it, with brutal brevity, "if the ἀρχή that is now being sought is not separate from bodies, what else would one posit it to be other than matter? But this is not in ἐνέργεια, but in δύναμις. So the form and shape would seem to be more an ἀρχή, and more principal [κυριωτέρα] than [the matter];⁵² but [the form] is corruptible, so that there is no eternal οὐσία, separate and καθ' αὐτήν, at all" (K2 1060a19-24). The argument against matter being the desired ἀρχή can be filled out by saying that since matter is pure δύναμις, it is not actually τόδε τι (so Θ7), or by saying that the δύναμις never exists separately but is always bound up with one of its contrary actualizations (so GC II,1). Form is not corruptible in the strict sense, since (as Z7-9 and Λ3 argue) there is no process of its coming-to-be or perishing, but (as those chapters also argue) it exists only when the composite exists and does not exist when the composite has perished, so that, not being eternal, it is not the desired ἀρχή. Of course, there is always form in general, and there is always horse-form, but not always this horse-form: in the sense in which horse-form is eternal, it is a form shared by many things, and a form shared by many things is not τόδε τι. This is why the question of Λ4-5 is so important: if the many causal chains, leading up from the changeable things that exist at different times, converge on a single ἀρχή, this ἀρχή will surely be eternal; whether it is an "eternal οὐσία, separate and καθ' αὐτήν" such as we have been seeking depends on whether they converge on a single τόδε, and not just a single universal type or a single δύναμις. While the question of the convergence of causal chains is more familiar for formal causes, Λ4-5 raises it equally for form and matter, and Λ2 contributes to answering it for matter just as Λ3 contributes to answering it for form. And the main conclusion of Λ2-5, drawn in Λ5, is that chains of constituent causes or στοιχεῖα, whether matter or form, do not converge on a single τόδε, and that to find such an ἀρχή we have to proceed through extrinsic causes, i.e. efficient causes, and more particularly through efficient causes which are not conspecific with their effects. The question of convergence of causal chains is closely connected with the ancient/modern dispute about οὐσία mentioned in Λ1: for if the "ancients" are right that a genus, or τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα, is not an οὐσία, then the different formal causal chains leading to the same genus, or the different material causal chains leading to the same κοινὸν σῶμα, will not converge on a single τόδε, and so will not yield the desired ἀρχή. And since Aristotle's interest in the convergence of causal chains is subordinate to his interest in finding "the first of all things," we can see why Λ2-3 are so concerned, not just with whether there is a single matter for all things, or a single form for all things in a species, but also with whether this matter or form exists prior to the form-matter composites of which it is a cause, like a Platonic form, or like a pre-Socratic material ἀρχή before the emergence of the cosmos. If it does exist prior to them, it will exist separately, and so must be τόδε; and so, again, whether such prior existence is possible will depend on the Λ1 question of whether a shared matter or form is an οὐσία.

⁵¹however, he does use the strict sense of "ἀρχή" at Λ8 1073b23-25, "the ἀρχή and first of beings is unmoved both per se and per accidens, but produces the first eternal and single motion." note that "ἀρχή" in this sense does not apply even to the movers of the non-equatorial celestial motions, but only to the first. and at the end of Λ10, one of the criticisms of Speusippus is that he makes ἀρχὰς πολλάς; "but beings are unwilling to be governed badly," followed by the Homeric denunciation of πολυκοιρανίη.

⁵²reading, with Jaeger and Christ against Ross, μᾶλλον τ' ἂν ἀρχή καὶ κυριωτέρα ταύτης.

In pursuing these questions, $\Lambda 2-5$ are taking up an inquiry that the end of Physics I had deferred to metaphysics: "about the formal ἀρχή, whether it is one or many, and what it is or what they are, it is the task of first philosophy to determine with precision, so let it be set aside until that time. But about natural and corruptible forms we will speak in what is to be shown afterward [i.e. in the remainder of the Physics, or specifically Physics II]" (192a34-b2). The reference to first philosophy is to $\Lambda 2-5$ (if to anything extant), and confirms that those chapters are intended as metaphysics. The "formal ἀρχή" is here being contrasted with the "natural and corruptible forms" which are studied in physics, and which Physics I is happy to call ἀρχαί; in calling these forms "corruptible" (like the K version of B#8, cited above), Aristotle is implying that they are not ἀρχαί in the strict sense, while leaving open the question whether there is some other kind of form, presumably a Platonic form shared by many corruptible individuals, that would be a strict ἀρχή as studied by first philosophy. In order to determine whether there is such a form, we would have to determine "about the formal ἀρχή, whether it is one or many," i.e. whether all corruptible things (or at least many of them) share a single eternal form. This is just what $\Lambda 2-5$ do that Physics I does not: Physics I goes on to conclude "that there are ἀρχαί [sc. broadly so called], and what they are, and how many in number [i.e. matter, form, privation], let us have determined thus" (192b2-3), where the end of $\Lambda 5$ adds the missing question, "what and how many are the ἀρχαί of sensible things, and how they are the same and how different, has been said" ($\Lambda 5$ 1071b1-2). It is because it is looking for a formal ἀρχή in the strict sense that Λ must ask whether the forms of many things are the same; the answer is negative, and there are no Platonic forms, but $\Lambda 2-5$, beyond showing that material and formal causes do not lead to ἀρχαί in the strict sense, also redirect us to the non-constituent causes that do.

What is distinctive in $\Lambda 2-3$

$\Lambda 2-3$ begin from the fact of motion or change--"sensible οὐσία is changeable" ($\Lambda 1$ 1069b3)⁵³--and use it to infer to the ἀρχαί of sensible and changeable οὐσίαι. The task, as described in $\Lambda 1$, is to get from sensible οὐσίαι to non-sensible οὐσίαι as their ἀρχαί; and so Aristotle begins from what is distinctive about sensible οὐσίαι, and then looks for what causes this may require.⁵⁴ The strategy of Λ thus recalls the strategy of the Physics: Physics I similarly begins from the fact of motion and infers to matter and form and privation as (in a broad sense) ἀρχαί of sensible things, and Physics VIII begins from the fact of motion and infers the existence of something unmoved as a first efficient cause of motion to the things that are moved. $\Lambda 2$ restricts itself to the very first stage of this project, focussing exclusively on matter. Form is not mentioned until the very last sentence of the chapter (1069b32-4), which is a deliberate transition to $\Lambda 3$; until then, $\Lambda 2$ speaks only of matter and a contrariety, and the contraries themselves are not described as ἀρχαί before this last sentence. The chapter-break between $\Lambda 2$ and $\Lambda 3$ is thus a natural division, a transition from matter to form: for while $\Lambda 3$ talks about matter and form together ("neither the matter nor the form comes-to-be," 1069b35, etc.), all the emphasis is on form and the question of its prior or separate existence: comments on the status of matter generally function as points of departure for comparative statements about the status of form. In investigating form and the

⁵³recall that this is where I (following Frede and Charles) take $\Lambda 2$ to begin

⁵⁴as Theophrastus says, "since [the ἀρχή] is connected with sensible things, and since nature is, to sum it up, in motion, and this is ἴδιον, clearly [the ἀρχή] should be posited as a cause of motion" (Metaphysics 4b19-22); the same thought is presupposed in Aristotle's criticism of the Platonists, "although wisdom seeks the cause of the manifest things, we have abandoned this, for we say nothing about the cause from which change arises" (Metaphysics A9 992a24-6)

question of its preexistence starting from motion (rather than from predication) Aristotle is echoing or paralleling Z7-9; both here and there, he is contributing to resolving B#8, here unmistakably referred to ($\Lambda 3$ 1069b35-1070a4 to B#8 999b6-14, $\Lambda 3$ 1070a13-17 to B#8 999b17-20). Much of the content of $\Lambda 2$ -3 is naturally familiar from elsewhere, $\Lambda 2$ from other treatments of matter (Z3, $\Theta 7$, Physics I, GC II,1 and I,3-4) and $\Lambda 3$ from Z7-9, and I have already made use of $\Lambda 3$ in discussing Z7-9 (in $\Pi\gamma 2$ above). So I will focus here on some distinctive features of the treatments of matter and form in $\Lambda 2$ -3 (and chiefly in $\Lambda 2$, which is further from its "parallels"), and on how these features fit into the overall strategy of Λ .

$\Lambda 2$ can be divided into three main sections, plus the final summary and transition to $\Lambda 3$. (i) Aristotle argues ($\Lambda 1$ 1069b3- $\Lambda 2$ 1069b20) that every change, whether in οὐσία or in an accidental category, presupposes a pair of contraries between which it takes place, and also a third thing, the matter, which underlies the contraries and persists through the change; the matter must be δυνάμει both contraries, and this gives the key to solving Parmenides' aporia of whether τὸ ὄν comes-to-be ἐξ ὄντος or ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Much of this can be taken as simply restating the positive solution from Physics I, while skipping the dialectical complications (and avoiding the terms "form" and "privation"). But two differences are worth noting. First, this section, more than Physics I, is concerned to distinguish the four kinds of change (in οὐσία, quantity, quality and where) and to stress that the analysis here given applies to all of them.⁵⁵ Aristotle stresses this here because he will say at $\Lambda 2$ 1069b24-6 that the heavenly bodies too have matter, but only for spatial and not for substantial change. Second and more important, Aristotle makes the notion of matter as δυνάμει the contraries, and δυνάμει ὄν, central to his account here, whereas in Physics I this is mentioned only after the main solution has been given, and only in brief tangential remarks (at Physics I,8 191b27-9, I,9 192a2-3, and I,9 192a25-9). When Aristotle gives his solution to Parmenides' aporia at Physics I,8 191b13-27, he explains how something comes-to-be ἐκ μὴ ὄντος only per accidens, and also ἐξ ὄντος only per accidens, without invoking δύναμις; he then says "so this is one way [of solving the aporia]; another is [based on the fact] that the same things can be said both κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν and [κατὰ] τὴν ἐνέργειαν: these things have been determined more precisely elsewhere" (191b27-9); this promise of a second solution is taken up in $\Lambda 2$, "so that not only can [something] come-to-be ἐκ μὴ ὄντος per accidens, but also all things come-to-be ἐξ ὄντος, but [ἐκ] δυνάμει ὄντος, and ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ" (1069b18-20). (ii) Then, in a sentence whose text and syntax are controversial ($\Lambda 2$ 1069b20-24), Aristotle compares the account of matter he has just given to various pre-Socratic accounts of a material ἀρχή. As I would print and translate the text, it says, "and this is the One of Anaxagoras. For that is better than all-things-together, or the mixture of Empedocles and Anaximander, or the way Democritus says: for us, it was all things δυνάμει, but not ἐνεργείᾳ. So [these thinkers] would have touched on matter." I will return below to the questions of how Aristotle is interpreting these physicists, and of what point he is trying to make by comparing his account of the material ἀρχή with theirs. (iii) Then, in 1069b24-32, Aristotle asserts, against some accounts of the material ἀρχή (apparently including the account he is attributing to Anaxagoras: I will return to this question below), that "all things that change have matter, but [a] different [matter]" (1069b24-5), and he gives two arguments for this, first that the incorruptible heavenly bodies, having a matter only for local and not for substantial change, do not have the same matter as corruptible bodies, and then that all bodies (even, apparently, all sublunar bodies) cannot have had the same matter in an undifferentiated original condition, as Anaxagoras and many other physicists think, since then there would be no sufficient reason for differentiation

⁵⁵but see Physics I,7 190a31-b3; although this does not say that the ὑποκείμενον in non-substantial changes is also a ὕλη.

to emerge. Aristotle might well add a third argument, which instead he adds in $\Lambda 4$, namely that changeable things in different categories cannot have the same matter. (iv) Finally, the concluding sentence 1069b32-4 sums up, picking up from (i) rather than from (ii) or (iii), "so there are three causes and three ἀρχαί, two being the contrariety, of which one is λόγος and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter": as we have seen, this is the first place in the chapter or the book where he has used the word "form" (except for Platonic forms at $\Lambda 1$ 1069a35), or its contrary "privation," and it marks a transition to the investigation of form as an ἀρχή in $\Lambda 3$.

Throughout $\Lambda 2$ Aristotle is concerned above all with ἀρχαί, and with what things are out-of-ἐκ]. What he is doing here serves the argument of Λ as a whole, and he looks back on this chapter in $\Lambda 10$, in contrasting his own account of the ἀρχαί with previous accounts. "Everyone makes everything out of contraries" ($\Lambda 10$ 1075a28, cp. *Physics* I,7 188b27-9), and Aristotle thinks there is some truth in this, and so he too begins with contraries, but he also wants to show they are not sufficient, and that matter is an ἀρχή distinct from the contraries: "but neither the 'everything' nor the 'out of contraries' is right, nor do they say how many things the contraries are present in, or how they are 'out of' the contraries: for the contraries are not affected by each other. But for us this is solved in a reasonable way by there being some third thing [i.e. a matter distinct from the contraries]" ($\Lambda 10$ 1075a28-32). The point is not simply that there is a material ἀρχή, since Aristotle's opponents believe this too; but "they [= presumably not all but many of them] make one of the contraries matter, like those who [make] the unequal [matter] for the equal, or the many for the one" ($\Lambda 10$ 1075a32-3). And Aristotle is especially concerned with the temptation to make one of the contraries matter for the other by identifying matter with privation, or more generally with non-being. Parmenides had raised the aporia against coming-to-be, whether what is comes-to-be out of being or out of non-being, and Aristotle gives his own solution in $\Lambda 2$ (as in *Physics* I), but he is also aware of, and responding to, another type of solution. "Some people make the things-that-are out of non-being, and others, in order not to be compelled to this, make all things one" ($\Lambda 10$ 1075b14-16). The "others" here are the Eleatics, but who are the first group? Not simply a naïve view, pre-Parmenidean and even pre-philosophical,⁵⁶ as a parallel makes clear: the Academics got themselves into various strange and problematic views about the ἀρχαί, for many reasons but "chiefly through posing the aporia archaically. For they thought that all things would be one, [namely] being-itself, unless one solved and came to an issue with the saying of Parmenides, 'never shall this prevail,⁵⁷ that not-beings are,' rather it was necessary to show that not-being is: for in this way, [i.e.] out of being and something else, the things-that-are will be, if they are many" (N2 1089a1-6). And this post-Parmenidean view that not-being is an ἀρχή, and specifically a material ἀρχή of things that come-to-be, is clearly also one of his concerns in $\Lambda 2$: as he says there (in a bit perhaps wrongly placed at 1069b26-9, but certainly going in $\Lambda 2$), "one might raise the aporia, out of what kind of not-being coming-to-be-is: for not-being is threefold." The three relevant senses of not-being are the ones he mentions in the sequel to the N2 passage, in objecting to the thesis that the things-that-are are out of being and not-being: there too he asks "from what kind of not-being and [from] being are the things-that-are?" (N2 1089a15-16), and distinguishes between not-being in each of the categories (the not-straight, etc.), not-being as falsehood, and non-being as τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν (N2 1089a16-31). And in $\Lambda 2$, in laying out his own account, he says that things "come-to-be out of not-being per accidens" ($\Lambda 2$ 1069b18-19, and at more length *Physics* I,7 191b13-17, stressing that this happens only per accidens), where this kind of not-being is privation, i.e. not-being in each of the categories in which change takes place. His

⁵⁶as Sedley thinks (in FC, p.342), and Ross ad loc

⁵⁷or whatever δαμῆ means (Coxon says it's passive)

main burden here is to insist that the material ἀρχή, defined as whatever things come-to-be out of per se and not merely per accidens, should not be identified (as the Academics identify it) with privation, but rather with δύναμις. "All things come to be out of what-is, but out of what-is δυνάμει, and out of what-is-not ἐνεργείᾳ" (Λ2 1069b19-20, cp. N2 1089a28-31): in a sense this is being (the aspect Λ2 seems to emphasize, and of course Physics I, which does not give the solution through δύναμις), and in a sense it is not-being (the aspect N2 emphasizes), but a sense different from privation. In thus distinguishing matter from privation, and saying that only the matter, not the contraries, persists through change, Aristotle is avoiding the conclusion that the privation is an ἀρχή, in the strong sense that the privation out of which something comes-to-be is numerically eternal, as the Academics presumably think. As he says more explicitly in Physics I,9, the material ἀρχή "perishes and comes-to-be in a way, and in a way not. For as that in which, it perishes per se (for what perishes is in this, the privation), but taken as δύναμις, it does not perish per se, but must be imperishable and ingenerable," on pain of regress (192a25-9).⁵⁸ A welcome corollary of this solution is that the ἀρχή out of which things come-to-be that is numerically eternal, the persisting matter, is pure δύναμις, and inseparable from the contraries which alone make it actually τόδε τι (so too GC II,1 329a24-33): so the material ἀρχή is not τόδε τι and separate (as, say, the receptacle of the Timaeus is supposed to be), and hence is not an ἀρχή in the strict sense.

Aristotle's argument is not directed exclusively against the Academics. He also attributes the view that all things are out of being and also out of not-being, in such a way that not-being is a material ἀρχή, to Democritus, and he also attributes a different but related view to Anaxagoras. As often with Aristotle, he means in a single blow to strike both pre-Socratic views and their more sophisticated modern analogues. "Leucippus and his follower Democritus say that the full and the empty are στοιχεῖα, calling the former being and the latter not-being ... so that these are causes as matter of the things-that are" (Metaphysics A4 985b4-6, 9-10): Aristotle takes both Democritus and Plato to be defending plurality against Parmenides' challenge, and N2 1089a1-6 (cited above), on those who answered Parmenides by saying that not-being is, and that the things-that-are are out of being and not-being, is deliberately assimilating Plato and Democritus.⁵⁹ The assimilation has the effect of reading Democritus "charitably" as anticipating more modern accounts, but also of suggesting that Plato is repeating an old and discredited mistake, that he is "posing the aporia archaically."

By the same type of assimilation Aristotle attributes to Anaxagoras, not the view that not-being is a material ἀρχή, but a related view. Once, in Λ7, he assimilates ὁμοῦ πάντα to not-being: "if it is not thus, [the world will be, or come-to-be] out of night and all-things-together and not-being" (1072a19-20, cp. Λ6 1071b26-8); elsewhere he treats Anaxagoras' ὁμοῦ πάντα as a single material ἀρχή (rather than a mixture of infinitely many material ἀρχαί), but not as not-being. Most elaborately, in Metaphysics A8, Aristotle proposes an interpretation of Anaxagoras according to which "he names two στοιχεῖα" (989a30-31), νοῦς and the ὁμοῦ πάντα conceived as a single ἀρχή. Aristotle admits that Anaxagoras himself would not have put it this way, but argues that, when his view is reformulated to avoid various absurdities, "he might turn out to be saying

⁵⁸note on Aristotle's interpretation of ἐν ᾧ as privation [=, I suppose, the condition in which the thing-that-perishes was: e.g. the unmusical man who becomes musical was "in" the condition of unmusicality, and this is what perishes per se, whereas the man does so only per accidens]; the receptacle of the Timaeus is the ἐν ᾧ of coming-to-be

⁵⁹Likewise Physics I,3 says that "some people gave in to both [Parmenides'] arguments, to the argument that all things are one, if 'being' signifies one thing, [by saying] that not-being is, and to the argument from dichotomy, by positing indivisible magnitudes" (187a1-3): this sounds like Democritus, but the context shows that Aristotle can mean only Plato or Platonists (the "argument from dichotomy" argues that man is both animal and biped, so that one being is also two beings, 186b14-35; the "indivisible magnitudes" must be indefinable Forms).

something more modern-sounding [καινοπρεπεστέρως λέγειν]" (989b5-6). The original chaos should not be regarded as a mixture, because this would imply that the constituents had existed separately before being mixed, and because substances cannot be mixed with qualities, as Anaxagoras' account taken literally would imply. Regarded as a single ἀρχή, the chaos, rather than containing all the contraries, must be described as having none of them in itself, being "neither ποιόν τι nor ποσόν nor τι" (989b11-12); so "it would follow for him to say that the ἀρχαί are the One (for this is simple and unmixed [sc. as νοῦς is]) and the Other, such as we posit the indeterminate to be before it is determined and participates in some form" (989b16-19). Anaxagoras' ἀρχαί would thus be a familiar pair of Academic ἀρχαί, like the One and the Others of Parmenides Hypothesis 3: the material ἀρχή would be in some sense a privation (it might be called inequality, otherness, multiplicity), but not simply not-being.

Aristotle is recalling this interpretation of Anaxagoras in Λ2, in comparing the material ἀρχή as he has described it with various pre-Socratic ἀρχαί. As I would print and translate the text, it says, "and this is the One of Anaxagoras. For that is better than all-things-together, or the mixture of Empedocles and Anaximander, or the way Democritus says: for us, it was all things δυνάμει, but not ἐνεργείᾳ. So [these thinkers] would have touched on matter" (Λ2 1069b20-24). There are several disputed points in this text,⁶⁰ but it is clear that Aristotle is contrasting two interpretations of Anaxagoras on the pre-cosmic matter, and saying that the way that interprets it as a single material ἀρχή which is potentially the contraries is better philosophy than the (historically correct) way that interprets it as a mixture of different and contrary material ἀρχαί: the A8 text, although it does not speak of potentiality and although it calls the material ἀρχή "the Other" rather than "the One," is offering the kind of modernizing interpretation of Anaxagoras that Aristotle is referring to here. And it should also be clear (against David Charles' reading) that "the mixture of Empedocles and Anaximander" is on the disfavored side of the comparison: their pre-cosmic material ἀρχή, if interpreted as a mixture, would be like all-things-together, an assembly of many material ἀρχαί rather than a single material ἀρχή.⁶¹ "The way Democritus says" cannot possibly be the same as

⁶⁰I am following the texts of the manuscripts {rejecting one transmitted variant}, and supplying what I think is the right punctuation. in 1069b10-23 I read: καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἐν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μίγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάδωνου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν· ἦν ἡμῖν πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐ. {I admit to being uneasy about the asyndeton in the last clause, but the two ways I know of avoiding it--other than simply interpolating a particle--are cures worse than the disease [namely: making the final phrase either the subject of βέλτιον or the object of φησιν]. Jaeger's emendation of ἡμῖν to μέν is possible [as he notes, E corrupts ἡμῖν to ἡ μέν at Λ7 1072b16, although there is a special ratio corruptelae there and anyway that direction of corruption would be easier than the reverse] but it is not necessary, and does not cure the asyndeton. I agree with Jaeger in rejecting the variant, ὁμοῦ πάντα for ἡμῖν πάντα, recorded by E and followed by some recentiores including M, and accepted by Ross}. the main issues here are about punctuation and construal ... go through the issues as inferrable from Ross' commentary and from Charles (Jackson and post) ... also note Charles' own nuttier proposal ... for me, the crucial point is that Empedocles and Anaximander and Democritus are on the negative side of the comparison, and that the final phrase is not a quote from Democritus or even a modified quote from Democritus (the latter, incidentally, is what Alexander thought, apud Averroem) ... Jaeger's text could possibly be right, and it would not have much impact on my overall interpretation of the passage, but I don't think it's likely to be right; the asyndeton is the only troubling thing about the transmitted reading, and is it really sufficient grounds for emending? (perhaps the last clause can be taken as somehow explicating τοῦτο in the first clause?)

⁶¹this is how Aristotle standardly interprets Empedocles' Sphairos, often explicitly assimilating it to Anaxagoras' ὁμοῦ πάντα; sometimes he takes Anaximander's ἄπειρον this way, sometimes as a single intrinsically indeterminate material ἀρχή. cite Physics I,4 187a20-23: it is not clear how he is interpreting Anaximander here, but anyway the contraries are present in the material ἀρχή--presumably actually present--and then are separated out. note here that he uses "the one" as a name for the material ἀρχή, apparently for all three thinkers; in talking about Anaxagoras and Empedocles as "saying that there is one and many" he is following the Sophist's description of Empedocles

"the One of Anaxagoras," or as the theory of a single matter in potentiality to the contraries that Aristotle has been developing: presumably, what Democritus says is that all things are out of being and not-being as material ἀρχαί, as opposed to the modernized Anaxagoras who makes them out of a single indeterminate material ἀρχή but not out of not-being, and the historical Anaxagoras and Empedocles and Anaximander, who make them out of many material ἀρχαί which are all equally beings. Democritus must thus also be on the disfavored side of the comparison. Ross' and Jaeger's idea that "for us, it was all things δυνάμει, but not ἐνεργείᾳ" (or however we print and translate this phrase), rather than "the One of Anaxagoras," is the subject of "is better than all-things-together," is grammatically contorted, but would not change the overall point. In any case, Aristotle is extracting, by violently "charitable" interpretation of an "ancient" thinker, Anaxagoras, a "modern" view of a single intrinsically indeterminate material ἀρχή, like the receptacle of the Timaeus or the Others of Parmenides Hypothesis 3 or Aristotle's own interpretation of matter as δύναμις; he might also treat Anaximander in much the same way, but does not bother to do so here.

However, while the modernized Anaxagorean account of a single material ἀρχή is philosophically better than the historical Anaxagorean account of infinitely many material ἀρχαί, it is still not correct, if the matter is supposed to be a single τόδε, which might have existed separately before the world came-to-be. "All things that change have matter, but [a] different [matter]" (1069b24-5), both because heavenly and sublunar bodies cannot have the same matter, and because not all bodies could have come from a single uniform pre-cosmic matter, since a single νοῦς and a single matter would not contain a sufficient reason for the diversity of things that come-to-be (as noted above, Λ4 adds the argument that there cannot be a numerically single matter for different categories). This has implications for the ancients-vs.-moderns issue as described in Λ1. The moderns are right that there is a single material ἀρχή, like τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα rather than like "fire and earth" (1069a28-30), but this matter is one only by analogy across the categories and also between sublunar matter for generation and celestial matter for locomotion, although it is one in a stronger sense for all sublunar bodies; furthermore, even the matter of sublunar bodies is one only by being a single δύναμις, inseparable from the contraries and from "fire and earth" and the like. Both because it is one only by analogy, and because it is a δύναμις, the single material ἀρχή is not τόδε τι, and so the ancients were right to reject the moderns' claim that their universal matter is an οὐσία and so could be an ἀρχή in the desired strict sense. As Aristotle puts it in GC II,1, against Anaximander interpreted the "modern" way and against the Timaeus, "those who posited a single matter beyond the aforesaid [= earth, water, air, fire], and made it bodily and separate, are mistaken. For it is impossible for this body to be without sensible contrariety: for this ἄπειρον, which some people say to be the ἀρχή, must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot ... [then criticisms of the receptacle of the Timaeus] ... But we say that there is a matter of sensible bodies, but that it is not separate but always accompanied by a contrariety, out of which the so-called στοιχεῖα [= earth, water, air, fire] come-to-be" (329a8-13, a24-6).

Aristotle then, in the final sentence of Λ2, officially lists form and privation alongside matter as ἀρχαί, and turns in Λ3 to investigate the status of form: the overwhelming concern is, by analyzing the causes involved in coming-to-be, to determine whether the form preexists, and specifically whether it preexists as τόδε τι, before the composite comes-to-be. We have already discussed Aristotle's basic strategy of argument in this chapter: as in Z7-9, he is addressing the argument from B#8 that coming-to-be presupposes a pre-eternal matter and a pre-eternal form, and equally the aporia from B#10 about whether the ἀρχαί of perishable things are perishable. The main claim here is that the form, insofar as it is τόδε τι, does not exist before the composite, but also does not

come-to-be or perish per se in such a way that it would require a prior form and matter; we also know that matter, while eternal, is not τόδε τι, and that while the form taken universally must exist before the composite in the artisan or natural generator, form in this sense is not τόδε τι. The main argument has been discussed in *Ily2* above, since it parallels the main argument of *Z7-9*. Here I want only to bring out a few differences between *Λ3* and *Z7-9*.

The most obvious difference is simply that *Λ3* is much shorter: it often gives only shorthands for arguments, which in oral presentation would have to be filled out, either by giving explicit back-references--"as has been shown in the λόγοι περὶ τῆς οὐσίας"--or by repeating the arguments as given in *Z7-9*. As part of this abbreviation, *Λ3* skips the *Z9* appendices on chance or spontaneous coming-to-be and on the coming-to-be of accidents. Again, *Λ3* does not properly spell out how form can be at one time and not-be at another time without process of coming-to-be or perishing, although *Λ3* does clearly allude to this conception of incidental coming-to-be and perishing (1070a15-17 and maybe a22-4), which can be spelled out from fuller parallels. Another omission is that while *Λ3*, like *Z8*, argues that Platonic forms--the form existing as τόδε τι before the composite comes-to-be--are not necessary to account for coming-to-be, *Λ3* does not make *Z8*'s argument for the stronger claim that such a form would make coming-to-be impossible, since the matter cannot now come-to-be F if F is an already existing τόδε, any more that Socrates can now come-to-be Callias if Socrates and Callias both already exist. *Z8* had gotten into some trouble in the course of this argument, since in trying to explain how M does come-to-be F, Aristotle had used the example of the bronze becoming round. Here the bronze, the preexisting matter, is τόδε, and for it to become round and so take on the form is for it to become τοιόνδε; the resulting bronze sphere, the form-matter composite, is τόδε τοιόνδε (*Z8* culminating in 1033b19-26, all discussed *Ily2* above). There is a legitimate point to saying that, even in natural substantial coming-to-be, the form is τοιόνδε: the point, namely, that at the beginning of the process, the terminus that the generator is aiming at is a τοιόνδε and not an already existing τόδε. Nonetheless, the resulting form is a τόδε, or is what makes the potentially τόδε matter into an actually τόδε composite, and the language of *Z8* is misleading in suggesting--with the *Timaeus* rather than with Aristotle's own conviction--that the matter is τόδε, the form τοιόνδε, and that the composite is τόδε τοιόνδε and thus not a per se unity. In the context of *Λ*, it is very important to avoid suggesting that the preexisting matter is a τόδε, and *Λ3* avoids the misleading language of *Z8*: drawing presumably on *Λ2*'s conclusion that matter is merely δύναμις, Aristotle now says that "matter is τόδε τι [only] in appearance" (*Λ3* 1070a9-10),⁶² while the form or "nature" is a τόδε and a ἕξις (he means the positive member of a contrariety, as opposed to στέρησις) which is the terminus of a change, as analyzed in *Λ2*, and which constitutes the composite οὐσία (*Λ3* 1070a11-13). Here, in comparing the three things that are said to be οὐσίαι among sensibles, the matter, form, and composite, and assessing whether they are properly τόδε τι, Aristotle is not echoing anything in *Z7-9*, but rather *Z3*, and especially closely *H1* 1042a26-31. This is worth noting, because *Λ* does not contain any structural component really corresponding to *Z3* (*Λ2* is closest, but its focus is on matter as δύναμις--not mentioned in *Z3*--and on matter as the subject of change, not as the ultimate subject of predication), and certainly none corresponding to anything in *Z10-H6*. Rather than giving full argumentative discussions corresponding to these sections of *ZH*, Aristotle simply takes up from them the results he needs for his argument, and incorporates them into *Λ3*: we can say, this means incorporating them into the part of *Λ* corresponding to *Z7-9*, but it is better to say, incorporating

⁶²I have no idea why Jaeger thinks the text is corrupt here. Ross too expresses doubts, but he prints the transmitted text and interprets it correctly in his commentary, rightly citing the parallel *Z16* 1040b5-10, of which more shortly

them into Λ's answer to B#8 (and connected aporiai), assessing whether matter or form or neither are ἀρχαί existing prior to sensible composites.

Aristotle does in Λ3 cite some justification for saying that matter is not really τόδε τι: he writes, "matter is τόδε τι [only] in appearance, for whatever things [exist, or are united] by contact and not by growing-together [σύμφυσις] are [merely] matter and ὑποκείμενον [sc. for an οὐσία, rather than being οὐσίαι themselves]" (1070a9-11). Aristotle is thinking here not just of a "modern" universal prime matter, but also of the "ancient" particular material constituents of things, whether Empedoclean elements, or Anaxagorean homoeomerous parts of animals, or Empedoclean anhomoeomerous parts of animals, all of which are said to be material causes existing prior to the composite: as Aristotle says a few lines down, "fire, flesh, head ... are all matter [rather than οὐσίαι properly speaking], and the last in the sequence [is matter of] what is most properly οὐσία" (1070a19-20). Aristotle takes his justification here for denying that these material constituents are properly οὐσίαι from Z16: "most of the things which appear to be οὐσίαι [τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν] are [in fact merely] δυνάμεις, the parts of animals (for none of these is separated; and when they have been separated, then they all exist as matter) and earth and fire and air: for none of these is one, rather they are like a heap, before they are concocted and some one thing comes-to-be out of them" (Z16 1040b5-10).⁶³ So Λ3's implicit reason for why the material constituents of agreed-on οὐσίαι like plants and animals⁶⁴ are τόδε τι only τῶ φαίνεσθαι is just Z16's reason why they are merely δοκοῦσαι οὐσίαι: within an animal they are mere δυνάμεις and not separately existing things, and when you try to separate them (by actualizing them as wholes in themselves) they become mere heaps and not substantial wholes. And the reason why, when within a larger substantial whole such as an animal, they must be mere δυνάμεις and not actual οὐσίαι in their own right, is the argument of Z13, that since it is contradictory for something to be both actually one and actually many, "it is impossible for an οὐσία to be out of οὐσίαι present [ἐνυπάρχουσαι] in actuality" (Z13 1039a3-4), so that its constituents must be merely potentially separate and potentially οὐσίαι (argued Z13 1039a3-8). So, although Λ3 does not explicitly mention δύναμις (presumably resting instead on the description of matter as δύναμις in Λ2), and does not repeat the course of argument of Z10-H6, it is relying on the discussion of constituents in these chapters, and their argument that constituents are mere δυνάμεις, in order to conclude that material constituents are not οὐσίαι and thus not ἀρχαί of the agreed-on οὐσίαι.

After the comparison of matter and form and composite, and the claim and shorthand-argument that matter is not really τόδε τι, Aristotle's procedure in the remainder of Λ3 is to progressively eliminate (going from easier to harder cases) any material or formal cause that might be an ἀρχή, i.e. a τόδε τι existing prior to the composite. He first eliminates forms of artifacts, asserting that "in some cases the τόδε τι does not exist παρά the composite οὐσία, like the form of a house, except as the art" (Λ3 1070a13-15), echoing B#8, "it is clear that it is not possible in every case [to posit the form παρά the composite], for we would not posit a house παρά the individual houses" (B#8 999b18-20).⁶⁵ Aristotle may have some text or oral statement of Plato denying forms of artifacts

⁶³note on Z16 1040b14-16, its sense and its use of σύμφυσις, which is opposite to the use on Λ3 1070a10-11 but is still likely to have been in his mind in writing the latter passage; see Ross' note *ad loc.*

⁶⁴recall that Λ1 1069a31-2 had listed, among the corruptible ὁμολογούμεναι οὐσίαι, only plants and animals--not the Empedoclean elements, which we apparently have to infer as ἀρχαί of these (vs. Z2 and H1; note that these lists also include the parts of animals). have I made this point earlier? should I add it?

⁶⁵note that there is no direct parallel in Z7-9 (Z8 1033b19-21 asks the question about the house, and the answer Aristotle goes on to give is of course negative, but there is no claim here that the case of artifacts is more obvious than the case of natural, or specifically living, things); so Λ3 has a direct relation to B#8 not mediated through Z7-9. see discussion of all these passages in IIγ2 above. note there is also a parallel H3 1043b18-21

(he says just below in Λ3, "Plato said that there are forms [only of] whatever things are by nature," 1070a18-19), but he must also have some argument in mind: perhaps that, in the case of an artifact, where we can observe its generation, there is no temptation to suppose that something further has entered into the composite, beyond the material constituents and the art; or perhaps simply that because houses are what they are in relation to human needs, it is absurd to suppose that there has always been a house in rerum natura prior to any human activity. In any case, everyone agrees that artifacts are posterior to natural things, and so give us no way to find ἀρχαί.⁶⁶ The more serious possibilities are from natural things; and here too Aristotle starts by eliminating the easiest cases, the Empedoclean elements and the homeoemerous and anhomeoemerous parts of plants and animals. "Plato was not wrong to say that there are forms [only of] whatever things are by nature--if indeed there are forms--and not of such things as fire, flesh, head: for these are all matter [rather than οὐσίαι properly speaking], and the last in the sequence [is matter of] what is most properly οὐσία" (Λ3 1070a18-20).⁶⁷ Whether we think of flesh and head as separately existing material things (like flesh for Anaxagoras, or heads in the early days of the cosmos for Empedocles) or as separately existing forms, does not make much difference: either way, a head is not really a head when it is not part of an animal, and when it is a part of an animal it is a δύναμις and not a separate οὐσία.⁶⁸ So the most hopeful case for a τόδε existing prior to the composite is neither matter, nor the form of an artifact, nor a material constituent of a natural whole, nor the form of such a constituent, but the form of a natural whole, especially of a living whole. Plato can be thanked for recognizing that these are his best case and for allowing us to disregard the others, and Plato is right that the form of a natural whole is τόδε τι; but, as Aristotle goes on to argue (1070a21-4), even in the best case, this τόδε does not exist before the composite, but only simultaneously with it, for the reasons developed more fully in Z8. Aristotle is even willing to admit that, perhaps some forms, perhaps some part of the soul such as νοῦς, might continue to exist after the composite has perished, and to wave this off for further discussion, in the De Anima or wherever: it does not matter, since the interest of Λ is in whether these forms exist as ἀρχαί before the composite, and whether they exist afterward is irrelevant. So Λ3 concludes "so it is clear that for these reasons at least [i.e. to account for coming-to-be], there is no need for there to be ideas" (1070a26-7, echoing Z8 1033b26-9), for the same reasons as Z8, namely that the natural or artificial generator is sufficient as a preexisting cause of the form's coming to be in the matter, without also supposing a preexisting form. So of the candidate ἀρχαί mentioned in B#6-8, the matter, the form and the particular material constituents have been eliminated; this leaves only the genera, which Aristotle discusses not here, but in Λ4-5, in addressing the question from B#9, whether the same στοιχεῖον can be present in different things, and especially in things differing in species.

Some comments on Λ4-5

⁶⁶except Plato in Laws X; but even there, he is talking about divine artifacts rather than human ones

⁶⁷Jaeger's emendation ἀλλ' οὐ in 1070a19 (for ἄλλα or ἀλλά), which Jaeger cites as a conjecture of Cherniss but is already mentioned in Ross' commentary, restores sense where Ross had given up on the passage as nonsense, and is almost certainly correct. however, it should be emphasized that it is an emendation: Jaeger says that J has ἄλλου, in which case ἀλλ' οὐ would be not an emendation but simply a different way of reading the presumed uncial archetype; but, according to Vuillemin-Diem, J in fact has ἀλλα (no accent)

⁶⁸why not fire when it is not part of an animal? I suppose the view is that it is still a part of some sort of natural composite

I have already spoken about the importance of Λ4-5 and the role they play in Λ1-5. Λ4-5 are a single closely connected discussion, representing the culmination of the argument of Λ so far. Λ2-3 ask whether material and formal causes lead to an ἀρχή in the strict sense, a τόδε existing prior to its effects, and this question turns in part on whether the material or formal causes of many different effects lead up to a single τόδε; Λ4-5 conclude that they do not, but that extrinsic causes, and in particular non-conspecific efficient causes, do lead up to a numerically single ἀρχή which is the cause of many different effects: from the many members of each sublunar species up to the sun as the first cause of generation, and then up to the movers of the heavenly rotations. Thus Λ4-5, in saying "what and how many are the ἀρχαί of sensible things, and how they are the same and how different" (from the conclusion of Λ5, 1071b1-2), are redeeming both Λ1's promise to "grasp the στοιχεῖα of [sensible οὐσία], whether one or many" (1069a32-3), and its promise to determine whether there is an ἀρχή κοινή between changing and unchanging things, i.e. whether there is a causal path up from changing things to an unchanging ἀρχή: Λ4-5 certainly do not prove that generation and the motions of the heavens require an unchanging cause, but they reorient us away from material and formal causal paths, and toward the only kind of causal path that might genuinely lead to an unchanging ἀρχή. So to understand these chapters, we need to see both how they complete the inquiry of Λ1-5, and how they prepare for Λ6.

I have already said much of what needs to be said about Λ4-5. Here, rather than going through every detail, I will just outline the argument of these chapters, and then note a few points which are controversial or need further discussion.

Λ4-5 can be broken down as follows. (i) Λ4 1070a31-3: crude first statement of the thesis of Λ4-5, namely that "the causes and ἀρχαί are in a way different for different things, and in a way, speaking universally and by analogy, the same for all things." (ii) 1070a33-b10 Aristotle starts by ignoring any distinction between stronger and weaker senses of "the same," asking whether rather than how the ἀρχαί of all things are the same, and giving an aporia against beings in different categories sharing the same ἀρχαί: for things in one category cannot be made out of things in another category, nor is there anything outside the categories which could be a shared constituent of things in different categories (I will return to some details of this argument below). Aristotle is assuming, for purposes of this argument, that the ἀρχαί in question will be στοιχεῖα, that is, constituent ἀρχαί. (iii) 1070b10-21 In a weak sense, namely by analogy,⁶⁹ the ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα of all (sc. changeable?) things are the same, namely form and privation and matter; in any stronger sense of "same," however, these are not the same for different categories. (iv) 1070b22-35 However, there are also non-constituent causes, ἀρχαί which are not στοιχεῖα: beyond the στοιχεῖα, form and privation and matter, there is also the external moving cause (the example, several times, is the art as efficient cause of its artifacts). In a sense, this might be reduced to the form, since the efficient cause both of artifacts and of natural things is the same in species with their form, "the art of housebuilding is somehow the form of house, and man generates man"; but "there is also, beyond these, what as first of all things moves all things" (1070b33-5), and this is in no way reducible to a στοιχεῖον.⁷⁰ (v) Λ5 1070b36-1071a3 Another way in which the causes of all things are the same,⁷¹ besides the analogical identity of the στοιχεῖα in different categories, is that the causes of οὐσία are the causes of all things, since accidents are dependent on οὐσία

⁶⁹here at Λ4 1070b17-18, and again at Λ5 1071a4 and 1071a26-7, Aristotle uses the same odd phrase as twice in Θ6, τῷ ἀνάλογον.

⁷⁰here--or wherever you talk about this passage--note the textual and construal issues raised by Gerson and by your reply to Gerson. I still don't quite understand Bonitz' comment here, but think his emendation is correct

⁷¹reading, of course, (Christ-Ross-Jaeger, not Bonitz) ταῦτά, not ταῦτα.

for their existence; these causes of οὐσίαι "might be soul and body, or νοῦς and desire [ὄρεξις] and body" (1071a2-3). (vi) 1071a3-17 Another way in which the ἀρχαί of all things are analogically the same, besides the analogical identity of the three στοιχεῖα that have been mentioned, is that the ἀρχαί of all things are ἐνέργεια and δύναμις, and (as we learned in Θ6) ἐνέργεια and δύναμις are each one by analogy: that is, ἐνέργεια are not confined to a single genus, and neither are δυνάμεις, but the ἐνέργεια of X is always related to the δύναμις for X as the ἐνέργεια of Y is related to the δύναμις for Y, even if X is an οὐσία and Y is a motion. Speaking of ἐνέργεια and δύναμις as ἀρχαί of all things, each analogically one, is supposed to go beyond speaking of form and matter as ἀρχαί or στοιχεῖα of all things, each analogically one, because while "in some cases the same thing is ἐνεργεῖα at one time and δυνάμει at another time" (1071a6-7), so that the matter for X is δυνάμει X, and then takes on the form of X and becomes ἐνεργεῖα X, "ἐνεργεῖα and δυνάμει differ in a different way in the case of things which do not have the same matter, things whose form is not the same but different: thus the cause of man is, on the one hand, the elements fire and earth [etc.] as matter, and on the other hand the form that is proper [to man], but then also something else which is external, like the father, and beyond these the sun and the oblique circle [i.e. the sun's motion in the plane of the ecliptic], which are neither matter nor form nor privation, nor of the same species, but movers" (1071a11-17). That is: while the form of X is in one way the ἐνέργεια of X and an ἀρχή of X, and while the conspecific generator of X, which is an external ἀρχή of X, also in a different way contains the ἐνέργεια of X, there are other external ἀρχαί of X which can also in a different way be called ἐνέργεια. These are things which are not only external to X, but non-conspecific with X: as Aristotle says, they do not have the same matter with X, and therefore also cannot have the same form with X. In speaking of things that "do not have the same matter," Aristotle is recalling his account of moved and unmoved movers (or affected and unaffected agents) from the On Generation and Corruption: "those [agents] which do not have the same matter [as their patients] act without being affected, like the art of medicine, which in producing health is in no way affected by the person who is being healed So those agents which do not have their form in matter are unaffected, whereas those which are in matter [sc. the same kind of matter as the patient] are subject to affection" (GC I,7 324a34-b1, b4-6). The agent that does not have the same matter as its patient might be an art producing an artifact, or the sun acting on sublunar bodies, or the movers of the heavens acting on the heavens. In these cases it is not right to say that the agent was actually X and that the patient was actually not-X but potentially X and becomes actually X: the agent is not of the same genus as the patient, and its ἐνέργεια cannot be the same as the ἐνέργεια that the patient comes to have, nor contrary to the ἐνέργεια that the patient originally has. Aristotle still wants to insist that the agent must be ἐνεργεῖα in order to act on the patient (the sun is actually heating and approaching or receding, etc.), but this ἐνέργεια is related to the patient's δύναμις in a quite different way than the form or even the conspecific generator, and leads to a different kind of ἀρχή. (vii) 1071a17-29 Aristotle has said that the ἀρχαί of all things are ἐνέργεια and δύναμις, or what is ἐνεργεῖα and what is δυνάμει; these "can be formulated universally" (1071a17-18), but "they are not universals" (a19-20):⁷² "for the ἀρχή of the individual is individual: for man is the ἀρχή of man in general, but this is no one [οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς], rather Peleus is the [ἀρχή] of Achilles and your

⁷²I take ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν at 1071a19-20 to mean "these [sc. the ἀρχαί which have just been mentioned, τὸ ἐνεργεῖα πρῶτον τοδί and τὸ δυνάμει {πρῶτον τοδί}] are not the universals," rather than (with Ross) "these universals do not exist" (which is not Aristotle's usual view about universals, and the things that have just been mentioned, with τοδί, don't look much like universals); but even on Ross' construal the implication would be much the same. note that the accent of ἔστιν doesn't imply anything--whatever one makes of the whole mess about the rules for accenting it (on which see Kahn, Verb 'Be', pp.420-424), it is always accented after οὐκ.

father of you, and this β of this $\beta\alpha$, but β in general of $\beta\alpha$ as such" (a20-24). This is most immediately an answer to B#15, whether the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ are individuals or universals: "man is the $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ of man in general," but the man who is referred to by the first occurrence of "man" in this sentence is no one [$\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$: Aristotle is here following Megarian usage, his own normal usage being to say that this man is $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}$ $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon$ $\tau\iota$, $\alpha\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\iota\acute{o}\nu\delta\epsilon$]:⁷³ there is one man who is the $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ of Achilles, and another man who is the $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ of Socrates, but no one man who is the $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ of them both. Thus while the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ can be expressed in universal $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$, the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ themselves--man as an efficient cause of man, and likewise the form and the matter of man--are individuals and peculiar to individual effects. And this also implies an answer to B#9: not only are the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ and $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ of things in different genera different (and one only by analogy), but "even [the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$] of things which are in the same species are different, though not in species: [the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$] of the individuals are different, your matter and form and mover and mine, but the same in universal $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ " (a27-9). (viii) 1071a29-b1 Conclusion of Λ 4-5: there are thus three ways in which the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ of all things are the same: (a) by analogy across different categories; (b) because the causes of $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ are the causes of all things; and finally (c) "what is first in actuality," meaning that what is in $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in the second way distinguished under (vi), as a non-conspecific efficient cause which is always in $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, can be a numerically single cause for all things, since it is individually eternal and since it need not be in the same species or even the same category as any of its effects. (ix) 1071b1-2 Conclusion to Λ 1-5: "what and how many are the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ of sensible things, and how they are the same and how different, has been said," picking up Λ 1's promise to "grasp the $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, whether one or many" of the agreed-on sensible $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (and thus of all sensible things), and making the transition to Λ 6, which asks whether there are unchanging $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ by asking whether they exist among the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ of sensible $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ that Λ 4-5 have laid out.

The basic motive behind all this argument is that the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ that wisdom seeks, the first of all things, are supposed to be $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ of all things (only Speusippus denies this). So if someone claims that X is an $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ in the desired sense, a necessary condition is that X, while remaining one and the same, can be an $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ of things in all the different genera. While Aristotle's official thesis is the moderate and uncontroversial-sounding claim that "the causes of all things are in a way different, and in a way the same," and while he judiciously assesses how much unity each kind of $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ possesses, in fact his only real interest is in whether X possesses the kind of unity that it needs in order to be among the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ that wisdom seems, namely the numerical unity of a $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon$. His main energy goes to showing that things that are $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ as $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ --the form, privation, and matter--cannot be numerically one for all things, even for all things in the same species, although they can be specifically one within each species, and analogically one for all things. This is a negative conclusion; the positive conclusion, or at least positive suggestion, is that there are also $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ which are not $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, extrinsic moving causes, and furthermore that among these there are non-conspecific causes, "things which do not have the same matter," and which therefore can both be numerically eternal (unlike the conspecific moving causes discussed in Λ 3) and numerically one for effects of different species. Form and matter, the results of an inquiry into the causes of being as $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ as given in ZH, do not lead to $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ in the desired sense; $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ and $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$, the results of the inquiry of Θ , may lead to $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ in the desired sense, but not if they simply lead us to form and matter again, or to a conspecific moving cause. The desired $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ will have to be a quite special moving cause, a quite special $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ or $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$; Aristotle will draw in Λ 6 the conclusion for which he is already preparing the ground in Λ 5, that it must be an

⁷³note on the Megarians and $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\tau\iota\varsigma$ (some discussion in I β 4c above); note that in the formula attributed to Stilpo (the earliest), the word is $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ or $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$, not $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\tau\iota\varsigma$.

ἐνέργεια and not a δύναμις, and furthermore a pure ἐνέργεια, not an ἐνέργεια predicated of something that is at another time δυνάμει.

Michel Crubellier, in his excellent article on Λ4 in the *Symposium Aristotelicum* volume on Λ, says quite rightly that Aristotle's main targets in Λ4-5, in arguing that the ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα of all things cannot be numerically one, are the Platonists. It is only the Platonists who would be tempted to generate οὐσίαι out of a relational material ἀρχή (alluded to at Λ4 1070b3-4, cp. N1 1088a15-b4), or to generate both οὐσίαι and relations out of more universal "intelligible στοιχεῖα, like being or unity" (1070b7); and, as Aristotle says elsewhere, to treat all ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα is a basic Platonist error. Crubellier expresses puzzlement as to why Aristotle should be interested in "weaker and more sophisticated forms of metaphysical unity" (FC p.141) when he has an ἀρχή that is numerically one, but the reason is that the Platonists thought their στοιχεῖα, such as the animal common to all animals, or the unity and being common to all beings, were each numerically one, and that Aristotle, in order to discredit these as ἀρχαί, has to show that they are not numerically one, and thus has to explain what lesser sort of unity they do have. (This is why he had asked the question whether each of the ἀρχαί is numerically or only specifically one back in B#9, and this is why he answers it here.)

Crubellier suggests that, in objecting to the Platonic thesis that each of the ἀρχαί is numerically one, "Aristotle is objecting to the Platonic view that there can be one science able to grasp the principles of existing things and all possible knowledge" (FC p.138). But if this is what Aristotle is worried about, it will not accomplish much to argue that things in different categories cannot share the same στοιχεῖα: at most this would force the Platonist to admit that there is not a universal science of all beings but only a universal science of all οὐσίαι, which would not be much of a concession. Rather, here as in many parallel passages, Aristotle brings up the case of the different categories, which give an easy counterexample to Plato's claims, as a sign of a more general misguidedness in the way Plato looks for ἀρχαί. "There is nothing common παρά οὐσία and the other categories, but the στοιχεῖον is prior to [sc. and therefore must exist παρά] the things of which it is a στοιχεῖον" (1070b1-3), which shows that it is a mistake to look for ἀρχαί in something universal, since if this way of searching were right, the highest ἀρχαί would be being and unity, which are predicated of all the categories (similar argument e.g. in B#7).⁷⁴ Again,

⁷⁴at 1070b7 I read, with EJ (and Crubellier; d check Bonitz) οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχείων, οἷον τὸ ὄν ἢ τὸ ἔν, not (with Ab, Ross, Jaeger) οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχείων. Ross translates the whole passage as: "How can all things have the same elements? For none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of elements, e.g. b or a cannot be the same as ba. (None, therefore, of the intelligibles, e.g. being or unity, can be an element; for these are predicable of each of the compounds as well.) None of the elements, then, will be either a substance or a relative term; but it must be one or the other. All things, then, have not the same elements." But (i) for this sense, Aristotle should have written οὐδὲν οὖν, not οὐδὲ δὴ; (ii) Ross is forced to say (in a footnote to his translation, not in his commentary) that νοητά "is apparently almost a technical name for the abstract terms which are found in all the categories alike," a sense I would be extremely reluctant to posit; (iii) if the argument worked, it would also show that genera are not στοιχεῖα, which is contrary to Aristotle's usual way of putting it and seems much too strong. Ross takes the argument to go "being and unity are predicable of their compounds, στοιχεῖα are not the same as their compounds, therefore being and unity are not στοιχεῖα", but Aristotle does not seem to be saying that στοιχεῖα cannot be predicated of their compounds (he does say this at N1 1088b4-5, but there he seems to mean {?} that the στοιχεῖα cannot be posterior to or parasitic on [e.g. by being per se accidents of] the things of which they are στοιχεῖα: so there would be something wrong is the few and many were ἀρχαί of number, since what is few or many is always a number, and so few and many do not exist prior to number [he gives this and similar examples here]); in the Λ4 context the point seems to be rather that being, if it is a στοιχεῖον of οὐσία, cannot be an οὐσία, nor likewise a relation, etc., whence the absurdity. The clause that Ross translates "for these are predicable of each of the compounds as well"--it should literally be "for these belong to each of the compounds as well"--is not, as Ross thinks, an argument that being and unity are not στοιχεῖα, but rather an argument that they are στοιχεῖα (στοιχεῖα are supposed to belong to their compounds), and

relations cannot be στοιχεῖα of οὐσίαι, nor can οὐσίαι be στοιχεῖα of relations, nor can there be something outside the categories which is a στοιχεῖον of them both (1070b3-4); since we are indeed looking for something which will be an ἀρχή of things in all categories at once, this shows that it is a mistake to expect the ἀρχή to be a στοιχεῖον of the things of which it is an ἀρχή. Very similarly in A9 Aristotle had used the different categories to object to seeking universal στοιχεῖα of all beings: "in general, to seek the στοιχεῖα of beings without having distinguished in how many ways they are said [i.e. said to be] [makes it] impossible to find them, especially if we seek in this way [namely, by asking] what kind of στοιχεῖα [beings] are out of: for it's surely not possible to grasp what things acting or being acted on or the straight are out of, rather this is possible, if at all, only for οὐσίαι: so that it is not right either to seek, or to think that one possesses, the στοιχεῖα of all beings" (992b18-24). This is not a criticism of looking for ἀρχαί of all beings, a project that Aristotle reaffirms in Γ1-2, but the way to look for ἀρχαί that will be ἀρχαί of all beings is not to look for things that are predicated equally of all beings, or for things that are constituents equally of all beings, but rather to find ἀρχαί of οὐσίαι, which will therefore also be ἀρχαί, but not στοιχεῖα, of all other beings as well. It remains conceivable that these ἀρχαί will be στοιχεῖα of οὐσίαι. But the point of the exercise has been to accustom the reader to the idea that the ἀρχαί of beings need not be physical or dialectical constituents, but may be things that they depend on for their existence in some other way. And looking for στοιχεῖα of οὐσίαι cannot succeed in getting us to ἀρχαί that are numerically one, since the στοιχεῖα of the different things in the genus οὐσία are one only generically.

It is striking and a bit disconcerting that Aristotle here stresses that the form, like the matter, is a στοιχεῖον, whereas in Z17 (and H3) he had stressed that a form is an ἀρχή that is not a στοιχεῖον, that "a στοιχεῖον is that into which [the thing] is divided, being present [ἐνυπάρχον] [in the thing] as matter, like the α and β of the syllable" (Z17 1041b31-3). But "στοιχεῖον" is not a technical term with a fixed application.⁷⁵ To think of some ἀρχή as a στοιχεῖον is to compare it metaphorically with the letters of the alphabet. Whenever Aristotle puts any stress on the notion of στοιχεῖον (in contrast to the more general notion of ἀρχή), it is to criticize someone who has been led astray by the letters-analogy in his search for the ἀρχαί. In ZH, his targets are the physicists who think that the στοιχεῖα of something are its material constituents, and the Platonist dialecticians who think that the στοιχεῖα of something are its genera (or genera and differentiae): in either case, these στοιχεῖα would be independently existing things which combine to yield the composite οὐσία, and in either case the λόγος of the οὐσία would resolve it into these constituents. Aristotle argues that these constituents are not actual οὐσίαι, because, if they were, the plurality of them could not also constitute one actual composite οὐσία. Aristotle takes over from his opponents the description of both material constituents and genera as στοιχεῖα, but he takes it as characteristic of a στοιχεῖον that it is present in something only as a δύναμις, as the letters must be if the "syllable" is an actual οὐσία. On this understanding of στοιχεῖα, the form or the ultimate differentia, which is what actualizes (and, at least sometimes, what unites) the constituents or the genera into an οὐσία, cannot itself be a further στοιχεῖον, or it would need something further to actualize it and unite it with the others. Using the letter-analogy, the form or the ultimate differentia would be the order of the letters within the syllable, which is not itself a further letter. This is not an ἀρχή in the strict sense, since it cannot exist apart from, or be

therefore that they, like other στοιχεῖα, should not be identical with the things of which they are στοιχεῖα, such as οὐσίαι. (We could try saying that, although being is an ἀρχή of individual οὐσίαι, it is not an ἀρχή of οὐσία as such, but is identical with οὐσία; but then it couldn't also belong to relations.)

⁷⁵as Crubellier rightly notes

formulated apart from, the στοιχεῖα; but it is at least as much an ἀρχή as the στοιχεῖα are, and it is necessary for giving a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας of the composite. Aristotle claims that people who only look for στοιχεῖα, whether material constituents or genera, will either (like the physicists, and the Platonists according to H3) leave out the form or (like the Platonists according to H6) treat it as one more στοιχεῖον among the others, and therefore will be unable to account for the unity and actuality of the οὐσία; and Aristotle wants to show that his own alternative way of conceiving the form allows him to give a λόγος of the composite that escapes the criticisms he has made against the physicists and the Platonists.

Thus far ZH; but Λ1-5 has a different (though overlapping) set of concerns. In Λ Aristotle has no interest in discrediting his opponents' ἀρχαί by arguing that they cannot account for the unity of the many στοιχεῖα within the composite οὐσία: his argument that matter and the parts of animals are δυνάμεις does not seem to turn on the unity of the composite, and he argues that genera are not τόδε because they are universals, not because they are δυνάμεις. His overwhelming concern now is whether a given proposed ἀρχή can be a τόδε while also being an ἀρχή of many different things. Part of the attraction of the letter metaphor, for Democritus and for Plato, was that one letter can enter into many different combinations, and so be a cause of many different effects. But, as Aristotle points out in B#9, it is a single letter-type, not a single letter-token, which is a part of many combinations at once; this is not a criticism of Democritus, but it is a criticism of Plato, who wants the genus animal to be a single τόδε and yet to be a στοιχεῖον of both man and horse, indeed of both Socrates and Xanthippe. In Λ Aristotle is interested in pursuing this criticism of Plato, and so the problem about στοιχεῖα that interests him is not the unity of β and α in βα, but the unity of the α in βα with the α in γα. Here the relevant fact about a στοιχεῖον is simply that it is an ἀρχή of something that is present within the thing; since there is no τόδε, but only a universal type, that is simultaneously present in two different οὐσίαι, it follows that if we conceive ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα, either they will not be common to many effects, or they will not be τόδε, and in either case they will not be ἀρχαί in the strict sense. This argument applies just as much to forms as to genera, and so Aristotle is happy to count forms as στοιχεῖα, since they are ἀρχαί present in the thing; whether they are δυνάμεις or ἐνέργειαι is irrelevant to the argument, and so is irrelevant to Λ's conception of στοιχεῖα. Thus while Z17 says that the form is not a στοιχεῖον in order to say that the physicists and Platonists, by looking for ἀρχαί only as στοιχεῖα, will either leave out the form or conceive it incorrectly, Λ4-5 says that the form is a στοιχεῖον in order to say that the physicists and Platonists, by looking for ἀρχαί only as στοιχεῖα, such as matter and form, will not discover the ἀρχαί that, as numerically single τόδε, are causes of many different effects.

The right way to discover strict ἀρχαί, then, is to look for ἀρχαί of οὐσίαι, and, furthermore, for things that are ἀρχαί of οὐσίαι not as their στοιχεῖα but as their movers. One way that Λ4-5 specifies these moving ἀρχαί is by distinguishing conspecific efficient causes, e.g. man as the generator of man, from non-conspecific efficient causes such as the sun; though Λ4-5 gives no hint as to why the sun should be necessary for the generation of animals. But Λ4-5 also says something more surprising: the causes of οὐσίαι are the causes of all things, and these "might be soul and body, or νοῦς and desire [ὄρεξις] and body" (Λ5 1071a2-3, cited above).⁷⁶ The commentators generally seem bewildered by this passage. Ross, following the pseudo-Alexander, says "Aristotle concentrates his attention on living things, which are in the strict sense the only substances (Z 1040b5-10, H 1043b21-3), and indicates their material and formal causes, (1) σῶμα and (2) ψυχή (subdivided, in the special case of man, into νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις)." This is impossible and desperate.

⁷⁶perhaps note (here, or the previous citation) on ἔσται, since some people (e.g. Bonitz) have been puzzled about this. it just means "will turn out to be, if one investigates"

Bonitz quite rightly asks what ὄρεξις has to do with all this: ὄρεξις is inconceivable as a formal cause of an animal, and the sensitive and vegetative souls seem to have vanished; it is also surprising to be told that σῶμα is the material cause of living things, and Λ3 1070a5-6 has said that even artifacts are οὐσίαι. Bonitz says ad locum "I confess that I simply do not understand these words," but this may be because he, like Ross and pseudo-Alexander, assumes that Aristotle is thinking of formal and material causes. But, if we start from the subdivision of soul as cause into νοῦς and ὄρεξις, it is clear that Aristotle is thinking of moving causes. As Aristotle says in discussing the soul's ability to move the body, "these two things appear to be movers, either ὄρεξις or νοῦς, if you count imagination as a kind of νόησις ... so both of these produce motion in place, νοῦς and ὄρεξις" (De Anima III,10 433a9-10, a13); there is then a further more difficult question which of these is prior, or whether one's moving power can be reduced to the other's. Since the pair νοῦς and ὄρεξις make sense only as moving causes (into which soul's moving power can be divided), soul must from the outset have been meant as a moving cause; presumably, soul and body are an initial crude division of moving or efficient causes, then divided more finely into νοῦς and ὄρεξις and body. In making the initial division, Aristotle seems to be alluding to Laws X. Plato there systematically contrasts soul and body as efficient causes, and argues that soul is prior to body, and that its activity in causing motion is prior to body's, even that it is "the cause of all things" (896d8); Plato gives several lists of the motions or modes of causality of soul (892b3, 896c9-d1, 897a1-3) and contrasting lists of the motions or modes of causality of bodies (892b4, 896d1-2, 897a5-b1). The lists of the soul's modes of causality include νοῦς at 892b3 (and souls act in different ways when they associate with or participate in νοῦς or ἄνοια, 897b1-4), and a longer list includes wish [βούλεσθαι], daring, fear, hate and love (897a1-3), all reasonably summed up as ὄρεξις. Aristotle's reference to all this at Λ5 1071a2-3 is very brief and non-argumentative: it is just a place-holder for a further investigation of what the causes of οὐσίαι will be, but it shows what kinds of causes he has in mind. They will be causes of motion, and thus of generation; more specifically, Aristotle, like Plato in Laws X, is looking for the first and most universal causes of motion to the bodily world; like Plato he sees these in the causes of the regular motions of the heavenly bodies, and like Plato he thinks that these causes are psychic, νοῦς and ὄρεξις rather than pushing or heating. In Λ7, as in De Anima III,10, he will analyze further the causes of the soul's activities of moving the body, and conclude that the first cause is "the ὄρεκτόν and the νοητόν: for they move without being moved" (Λ7 1072a26-7, very close to DA III,10 433b11-12). The investigation of Λ6-10 is thus well prepared for by the results of Λ4-5. In looking for the first of all things, we will look for causes of οὐσίαι, not for material or formal but for efficient causes, and particularly for non-conspecific efficient causes presupposed by the usual bodily modes of motion and generation, and which may be individually eternal and individually presiding over the whole bodily world. These causes will be ἐνέργεια and δυνάμεις, and calling on Θ8's thesis of the priority of ἐνέργεια, they will be more particularly ἐνέργεια, and indeed pure ἐνέργεια, not ἐνέργεια predicated of a prior οὐσία which is in itself δύναμις. Following the argument of Laws X, they will be psychic rather than bodily ἐνέργεια, the νοῦς and ὄρεξις which cause the motions of the heavens. Refining and going beyond Plato's argument by means of the more sophisticated analyses of Physics VIII and De Anima III, Aristotle shows that these ἐνέργεια will not be psychic motions (or a soul whose οὐσία is motion), but a pure ἐνέργεια which is not a κίνησις; this ἐνέργεια does not depend on a soul, but is in, and is, the νοῦς in which soul participates in order to think and act wisely; and the first such ἐνέργεια will be the first νοητόν and first ὄρεκτόν of a wise soul, which is the good-itself.^{77 78}

⁷⁷textual note to work in in the appropriate place: there's something odd with the sentence Λ2 1069b26-8, between Λ2

(vi) and (vii), double-bracketed by Jaeger. perhaps it really goes with b18-20, as Jaeger suggests; Ross suggests that it resumes from b18-20, all of (iv) being a historical parenthesis [but that implies that (v) and (vi) are also parenthetical, which I find far-fetched; also it looks as if the sentence should go before b18-20, not after]; or perhaps it's somehow supposed to explain a presupposition of (vii). perhaps the logic is: what kind of not-being is it out-of? presumably out of a not-being which is potentially something; but then etc.--thus read τι in 1069b28 as complement, not subject, of ἐστὶ (Ross and Jaeger print ἔστω), with subject supplied from the contested sentence. Jaeger obviously can't accept this; Ross' translation says "exists," but apparently takes this to translate "ἐστὶ τι" (!?), and supplies the subject from the contested sentence. Charles at FC p.97 takes τι as subject, I'm not sure how he's understanding it; Charles has p.89n a different proposal for reading the contested sentence, which aligns it with (vi) rather than (vii); he relies on K11 1067b25-20; my feeling is that this doesn't work, but d work it out

⁷⁸textual note to work in in the appropriate place: note Crubellier's discussion, pp.153-5, of textual problems around Λ4 1070b24, NB using Arabic evidence; also Code pp.176-7 on textual problems around Λ5 1071a24