Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Institut für Philosophie

Abstract:
Carnap (1950) is famous for his anti-metaphysical positions, for example in his rejection of the question of realism and anti-realism. He holds that ontological questions can be answered only within a specific linguistic framework. 
Current "Neo-Carnapian" positions in metaontology are deflationist views. As such, they hold that metaphysical questions are in some sense shallow or have no real answer.
Pluralism seeks to deflate metaphysical questions by arguing that, at least for some discourses, there is no unique privileged linguistic framework. As a consequence, there is no unique framework in which ontological questions can be answered, as the respective frameworks are either incomparable, or one is as good as the other. 
A trouble arises if pluralism can be understood as realist position, in which different linguistic frameworks are understood as being able to express the same facts equally well. While this pluralism is deflationary in some sense, it does not fit with a general anti-metaphysical stance. I argue that pluralism is not consistent with either realism or anti-realism, and therefore is best understood as rejection of metaphysical questions.

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