Philip Fox
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Philip FoxE-Mail: philip.fox@hu-berlin.de |
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Reseach Interests |
Epistemic and practical normativity, political philosophy, normative and applied ethics. |
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Vita |
Doctoral student in Philosophy at Humboldt University Berlin since autumn 2018, supported by the Carl und Max Schneider-Stiftung and the German Academic Scholarship Foundation. Prior to that, studies in Philosophy and Economics in Bayreuth, Oxford and Berlin, supported by the German Academic Scholarship Foundation. |
| Publications |
„Naturalizing the Contributory“, Synthese, online first, 2021. (PDF) „Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance“, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 15 (3): 222-254, 2019. (PDF) „Agency & The Pill that Makes us Moral“, Grazer Philosophische Studien 92: 127-135, 2015. (PDF)
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| Talks and Comments |
“Constitutivism, Quietism, and the Unity of Normative Reasons”, Summer Institute on Practical Normativity, Princeton University (05.08.2018) Comment on “Perfecting Political Liberalism” by John Colin Bradley, 8th Princeton-Humboldt Graduate Philosophy Conference, Humboldt University Berlin (24.07.2018) “The Prospects of Epistemic Constitutivism”, 8th Princeton-Humboldt Graduate Philosophy Conference, Humboldt University Berlin (23.07.2018) “Is Agent-Relativity Optional?”, Fourth Student Conference of the Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie, Humboldt University Berlin (28.09.2017) “Constitutivism about Epistemic Rationality”, Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg (09.09.2016) “The Subjective Incoherence Argument against Parfit’s Agony Argument”, Second Student Conference of the Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie, University of Osnabrück (17.09.2015) “How to Deal With the Asymmetry of Rational Requirements”, 2nd London School of Economics/University of Bayreuth Student Philosophy Conference, University of Bayreuth (08.05.2014) |
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Projects |
Can the objective authority of normative principles be explained in a philosophically illuminating way? Taken as a question about practical (and especially moral) normativity, some people think that quietism is a plausible response. On this view, an explanatorily ambitious account of practical normativity is neither possible nor necessary. Taken as a question about epistemic normativity, some people think instead that constitutivism is a plausible response. On this view, it is possible to provide an explanatorily ambitious account of epistemic normativity (e.g. by invoking the notion of a constitutive standard or function). The central question behind my dissertation project is whether one could legitimately hold different views about the nature of practical and epistemic normativity, respectively, and if not, what this means for the project of meta-normative theorizing. |
| Courses Taught |
At Humboldt University Berlin: Quietism Introduction to Political Philosophy Introduction to Normative Ethics Philosophical Writing Introduction to Philosophy |
