Christian Barth

Wie ist es zu erklären, dass wir uns vermittels geistiger Akte auf Gegenstände beziehen können? Und wodurch sind uns geistige Akte bewusst?
René Descartes und Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz geben faszinierende Antworten auf diese beiden zentralen Fragen der Philosophie des Geistes. In dieser Studie werden die Konzeptionen beider Autoren im Detail ana- lysiert, miteinander verglichen und mit heutigen Positionen in Beziehung gesetzt. Die Analysen zeigen, dass Descartes eine deflationäre Konzeption des Bewusstseins (conscientia) vertritt. Bewusstsein ist lediglich ein Aspekt der Intentionalität, die ihrerseits das wesentliche Merkmal des cartesischen Geistes ausmacht. Im Vergleich dazu vertritt Leibniz eine weitaus kom- plexere und anspruchsvollere Konzeption des Geistes, die aus heutiger Sicht anschlussfähiger erscheint. Die herausragenden Merkmale seiner Position sind die strukturelle Auffassung der Intentionalität und die Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Formen von Bewusstsein (apperception und conscientia), die dem phänomenalen Bewusstsein und dem reflexiven Selbstbewusstsein entsprechen. Im Unterschied zu Descartes weist Leibniz auch nicht-rationalen Tieren Bewusstsein in Form der Apperzeption zu. Conscientia bleibt dagegen den rationalen Substanzen vorbehalten.

Does thought depend on language? Primarily as a consequence of the cognitive turn in empirical disciplines like psychology and ethology, many current empirical researchers and empirically minded philosophers tend to answer this question in the negative. This book rejects this mainstream view and develops a philosophical argument in favor of a universal dependence of language on thought. In doing so, it comprises insights of two primary representatives of 20th century and contemporary philosophy, namely Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom.

Barth offers an introduction to the debate concerning the language-dependence of thought and lays the methodological foundation for the subsequent argument in favor of a universal dependence of thought on language, presenting an account and defense of the transcendental method in reference to the writings of Peter F. Strawson. He then offers a transcendental argument in favor of a universal language-dependence of thought, beginning with a reevaluation of a basic idea for an argument originally presented by Donald Davidson. Later, two main objections to the conclusion of this transcendental argument are addressed and rejected using Robert Brandom’s inferentialist and normativist account of thought and language. In the course of doing so, the recent debate on Brandom’s work is addressed extensively, and main objections to Brandom’s work are presented and answered.

This special issue includes essays from international scholars who present new results of their research on early modern conceptions of consciousness. The essays address the conceptions of Descartes, the Cartesians, Locke, Leibniz, Reid, and British common sense philosophers.

Authors: Christian Barth, Boris Hennig, Larry Jorgensen, Vili Lähteenmäki, Steven Nadler, Alison Simmons, and Udo Thiel.

􏰳􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰡􏰊􏰡􏰌􏰏􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰄􏰞􏰇􏰵􏰊􏰬􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰅􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰨􏰊􏰅􏰄􏰥􏰍􏰆􏰇􏰄􏰮􏰇􏰌􏰮􏰆􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰡􏰪􏰥􏰄􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰊􏰟􏰟􏰪􏰏􏰋􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰤􏰪􏰇􏰫􏰃􏰄􏰟􏰃􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇􏰋􏰌􏰡􏰌􏰞􏰋􏰥􏰇􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰅􏰊􏰞􏰭 􏰐􏰨􏰊􏰐􏰌􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰄􏰥􏰥􏰨􏰌􏰇􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰞􏰌􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰊􏰡􏰡􏰅􏱆􏰇􏰫􏰃􏰌􏰞􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰥􏰌􏰅􏰬􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰵􏰨􏰅􏰅􏰭􏰢􏰅􏰪􏰫􏰞􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰞􏰉􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰢􏰌􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰥􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰤􏰊􏰉􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰋􏰬􏰊􏰞􏰤􏰊􏰐􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰊􏰞􏰇􏰄􏰋􏰌􏰊􏰇􏰡􏰨􏰤􏰇􏰵􏰪􏰏􏰫􏰊􏰏􏰋􏰇􏰢􏱆􏰇􏰀􏰪􏰞􏰊􏰅􏰋􏰇􏰀􏰊􏰬􏰄􏰋􏰥􏰪􏰞􏰮􏰇􏰈􏰇􏰍􏰪􏰋This paper argues in favour of lingualism, i.e., the position according to which thought depends on language. The notion of thought at issue is the one we apply when we understand ourselves as full-blown thinking beings. The argument takes advantage of an idea put forward by Donald Davidson. A modified version of this idea is developed into a comprehensive line of thought, which consists of five steps. The argument from truth claims that the possession of the capacity of thought requires possession of a grasp of the contrast between objective truth and falsehood. The subsequent four part arguments show that we can only conceive of a subject as phylogenetically acquiring a grasp of this contrast, if we conceive of her as acquiring a natural language. The conclusion of this argument implies that attributions of thought to non-linguistic being in contemporary ethology and developmental psychology must be carefully interpreted. They must not be understood as attributions of states we attribute to ourselves when we understand ourselves as thinking beings in the full-blown sense. Instead, the former notions of thought must be understood as technical notions, which are analogues to our ordinary notion of thought.􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇 􏰄􏰋􏰌􏰊􏰇 􏰄􏰥􏰇 􏰋􏰌􏰬􏰌􏰅􏰪􏰡􏰌􏰋􏰇 􏰄􏰞􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰊􏰇 􏰟􏰪􏰍􏰡􏰏􏰌􏰃􏰌􏰞􏰥􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇 􏰅􏰄􏰞􏰌􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰆􏰇 􏰫􏰃􏰄􏰟􏰃􏰇 􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰄􏰥􏰤􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰻􏰬􏰌􏰇 􏰥􏰤􏰌􏰡􏰥􏰮􏰇 􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰵􏰏􏰪􏰍􏰇􏰤􏰏􏰨􏰤􏰃􏰇􏰟􏰅􏰊􏰄􏰍􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰡􏰪􏰥􏰥􏰌􏰥􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰊􏰡􏰊􏰟􏰄􏰤􏱆􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇􏰏􏰌􏱉􏰨􏰄􏰏􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰡􏰪􏰥􏰥􏰌􏰥􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰊􏰇 􏰐􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰡􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰤􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰤􏰇􏰢􏰌􏰤􏰫􏰌􏰌􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰢􏰺􏰌􏰟􏰤􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇􏰤􏰏􏰨􏰤􏰃􏰇􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇􏰵􏰊􏰅􏰥􏰌􏰃􏰪􏰪􏰋􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰥􏰨􏰢􏰥􏰌􏱉􏰨􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰵􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰇􏰡􏰊􏰏􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰥􏰇􏰥􏰃􏰪􏰫􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰊􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰞􏰅􏱆􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰟􏰌􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰊􏰇􏰥􏰨􏰢􏰺􏰌􏰟􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰡􏰃􏱆􏰅􏰪􏰐􏰌􏰞􏰌􏰤􏰄􏰟􏰊􏰅􏰅􏱆􏰇􏰊􏰟􏱉􏰨􏰄􏰏􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰊􏰇􏰐􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰡􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰤􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰤􏰆􏰇􏰄􏰵􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰭 􏰟􏰌􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰃􏰌􏰏􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰟􏱉􏰨􏰄􏰏􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰊􏰇􏰞􏰊􏰤􏰨􏰏􏰊􏰅􏰇􏰅􏰊􏰞􏰐􏰨􏰊􏰐􏰌􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰟􏰅􏰨􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰄􏰍􏰡􏰅􏰄􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰤􏰤􏰏􏰄􏰢􏰨􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇 􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰞􏰭􏰅􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰨􏰄􏰥􏰤􏰄􏰟􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇 􏰄􏰞􏰇 􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰤􏰌􏰍􏰡􏰪􏰏􏰊􏰏􏱆􏰇 􏰌􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰅􏰪􏰐􏱆􏰇 􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇 􏰋􏰌􏰬􏰌􏰅􏰪􏰡􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰊􏰅􏰇 􏰡􏰥􏱆􏰟􏰃􏰪􏰅􏰪􏰐􏱆􏰇 􏰍􏰨􏰥􏰤􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰇 􏰟􏰊􏰏􏰌􏰵􏰨􏰅􏰅􏱆􏰇 􏰄􏰞􏰤􏰌􏰏􏰡􏰏􏰌􏰤􏰌􏰋􏰮􏰇 􏰳􏰃􏰌􏱆􏰇 􏰍􏰨􏰥􏰤􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰇 􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰪􏰪􏰋􏰇 􏰊􏰥􏰇 􏰊􏰤􏰤􏰏􏰄􏰢􏰨􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰥􏰤􏰊􏰤􏰌􏰥􏰇 􏰫􏰌􏰇 􏰊􏰤􏰤􏰏􏰄􏰢􏰨􏰤􏰌􏰇 􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰥􏰌􏰅􏰬􏰌􏰥􏰇 􏰫􏰃􏰌􏰞􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰥􏰌􏰅􏰬􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰞􏰉􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰢􏰌􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰥􏰇􏰄􏰞􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰵􏰨􏰅􏰅􏰭􏰢􏰅􏰪􏰫􏰞􏰇􏰥􏰌􏰞􏰥􏰌􏰮􏰇􏰷􏰞􏰥􏰤􏰌􏰊􏰋􏰆􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰵􏰪􏰏􏰍􏰌􏰏􏰇􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇 􏰍􏰨􏰥􏰤􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰇 􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰪􏰪􏰋􏰇 􏰊􏰥􏰇 􏰤􏰌􏰟􏰃􏰞􏰄􏰟􏰊􏰅􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰆􏰇 􏰫􏰃􏰄􏰟􏰃􏰇 􏰊􏰏􏰌􏰇 􏰊􏰞􏰊􏰅􏰪􏰐􏰨􏰌􏰥􏰇 􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰇 􏰪􏰏􏰋􏰄􏰞􏰊􏰏􏱆􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰳􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰡􏰊􏰡􏰌􏰏􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰄􏰞􏰇􏰵􏰊􏰬􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰅􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰨􏰊􏰅􏰄􏰥􏰍􏰆􏰇􏰄􏰮􏰇􏰌􏰮􏰆􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰡􏰪􏰥􏰄􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰊􏰟􏰟􏰪􏰏􏰋􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰤􏰪􏰇􏰫􏰃􏰄􏰟􏰃􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇􏰋􏰌􏰡􏰌􏰞􏰋􏰥􏰇􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰅􏰊􏰞􏰭 􏰐􏰨􏰊􏰐􏰌􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰄􏰥􏰥􏰨􏰌􏰇􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰞􏰌􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰊􏰡􏰡􏰅􏱆􏰇􏰫􏰃􏰌􏰞􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰥􏰌􏰅􏰬􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰵􏰨􏰅􏰅􏰭􏰢􏰅􏰪􏰫􏰞􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰞􏰉􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰢􏰌􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰥􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰤􏰊􏰉􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰋􏰬􏰊􏰞􏰤􏰊􏰐􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰊􏰞􏰇􏰄􏰋􏰌􏰊􏰇􏰡􏰨􏰤􏰇􏰵􏰪􏰏􏰫􏰊􏰏􏰋􏰇􏰢􏱆􏰇􏰀􏰪􏰞􏰊􏰅􏰋􏰇􏰀􏰊􏰬􏰄􏰋􏰥􏰪􏰞􏰮􏰇􏰈􏰇􏰍􏰪􏰋􏰄􏰻􏰌􏰋􏰇 􏰬􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇 􏰄􏰋􏰌􏰊􏰇 􏰄􏰥􏰇 􏰋􏰌􏰬􏰌􏰅􏰪􏰡􏰌􏰋􏰇 􏰄􏰞􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰊􏰇 􏰟􏰪􏰍􏰡􏰏􏰌􏰃􏰌􏰞􏰥􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇 􏰅􏰄􏰞􏰌􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰆􏰇 􏰫􏰃􏰄􏰟􏰃􏰇 􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰄􏰥􏰤􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰻􏰬􏰌􏰇 􏰥􏰤􏰌􏰡􏰥􏰮􏰇 􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰵􏰏􏰪􏰍􏰇􏰤􏰏􏰨􏰤􏰃􏰇􏰟􏰅􏰊􏰄􏰍􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰡􏰪􏰥􏰥􏰌􏰥􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰊􏰡􏰊􏰟􏰄􏰤􏱆􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇􏰏􏰌􏱉􏰨􏰄􏰏􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰡􏰪􏰥􏰥􏰌􏰥􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰊􏰇 􏰐􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰡􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰤􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰤􏰇􏰢􏰌􏰤􏰫􏰌􏰌􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰢􏰺􏰌􏰟􏰤􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇􏰤􏰏􏰨􏰤􏰃􏰇􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇􏰵􏰊􏰅􏰥􏰌􏰃􏰪􏰪􏰋􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰥􏰨􏰢􏰥􏰌􏱉􏰨􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰵􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰇􏰡􏰊􏰏􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰥􏰇􏰥􏰃􏰪􏰫􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰊􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰞􏰅􏱆􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰟􏰌􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰊􏰇􏰥􏰨􏰢􏰺􏰌􏰟􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰡􏰃􏱆􏰅􏰪􏰐􏰌􏰞􏰌􏰤􏰄􏰟􏰊􏰅􏰅􏱆􏰇􏰊􏰟􏱉􏰨􏰄􏰏􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰊􏰇􏰐􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰡􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰤􏰏􏰊􏰥􏰤􏰆􏰇􏰄􏰵􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰭 􏰟􏰌􏰄􏰬􏰌􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰃􏰌􏰏􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰟􏱉􏰨􏰄􏰏􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰊􏰇􏰞􏰊􏰤􏰨􏰏􏰊􏰅􏰇􏰅􏰊􏰞􏰐􏰨􏰊􏰐􏰌􏰮􏰇􏰳􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰟􏰅􏰨􏰥􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇􏰪􏰵􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰏􏰐􏰨􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰇􏰄􏰍􏰡􏰅􏰄􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰊􏰤􏰇􏰊􏰤􏰤􏰏􏰄􏰢􏰨􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇 􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰞􏰭􏰅􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰨􏰄􏰥􏰤􏰄􏰟􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇 􏰄􏰞􏰇 􏰟􏰪􏰞􏰤􏰌􏰍􏰡􏰪􏰏􏰊􏰏􏱆􏰇 􏰌􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰅􏰪􏰐􏱆􏰇 􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇 􏰋􏰌􏰬􏰌􏰅􏰪􏰡􏰍􏰌􏰞􏰤􏰊􏰅􏰇 􏰡􏰥􏱆􏰟􏰃􏰪􏰅􏰪􏰐􏱆􏰇 􏰍􏰨􏰥􏰤􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰇 􏰟􏰊􏰏􏰌􏰵􏰨􏰅􏰅􏱆􏰇 􏰄􏰞􏰤􏰌􏰏􏰡􏰏􏰌􏰤􏰌􏰋􏰮􏰇 􏰳􏰃􏰌􏱆􏰇 􏰍􏰨􏰥􏰤􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰇 􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰪􏰪􏰋􏰇 􏰊􏰥􏰇 􏰊􏰤􏰤􏰏􏰄􏰢􏰨􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰥􏰤􏰊􏰤􏰌􏰥􏰇 􏰫􏰌􏰇 􏰊􏰤􏰤􏰏􏰄􏰢􏰨􏰤􏰌􏰇 􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰥􏰌􏰅􏰬􏰌􏰥􏰇 􏰫􏰃􏰌􏰞􏰇􏰫􏰌􏰇􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰊􏰞􏰋􏰇􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰥􏰌􏰅􏰬􏰌􏰥􏰇􏰊􏰥􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰄􏰞􏰉􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰇􏰢􏰌􏰄􏰞􏰐􏰥􏰇􏰄􏰞􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰵􏰨􏰅􏰅􏰭􏰢􏰅􏰪􏰫􏰞􏰇􏰥􏰌􏰞􏰥􏰌􏰮􏰇􏰷􏰞􏰥􏰤􏰌􏰊􏰋􏰆􏰇􏰤􏰃􏰌􏰇􏰵􏰪􏰏􏰍􏰌􏰏􏰇􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨􏰐􏰃􏰤􏰇 􏰍􏰨􏰥􏰤􏰇 􏰢􏰌􏰇 􏰨􏰞􏰋􏰌􏰏􏰥􏰤􏰪􏰪􏰋􏰇 􏰊􏰥􏰇 􏰤􏰌􏰟􏰃􏰞􏰄􏰟􏰊􏰅􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰥􏰆􏰇 􏰫􏰃􏰄􏰟􏰃􏰇 􏰊􏰏􏰌􏰇 􏰊􏰞􏰊􏰅􏰪􏰐􏰨􏰌􏰥􏰇 􏰤􏰪􏰇 􏰪􏰨􏰏􏰇 􏰪􏰏􏰋􏰄􏰞􏰊􏰏􏱆􏰇 􏰞􏰪􏰤􏰄􏰪􏰞􏰇 􏰪􏰵􏰇 􏰤􏰃􏰪􏰨

Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft haben ihren traditionellen Berührungspunkt in der Rechtsphilosophie, die sich mit der Klärung juristischer Grundbegriffe wie dem Begriff des Rechts selbst, der Erklärung des Wesens rechtlicher Institutionen sowie der Rechtfertigung derselben befasst. Einen zweiten Berührungspunkt verdanken Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft der Sprache. Sprache ist in der Rechtspraxis wie in allen Lebensbereichen Mittel der Kommunikation. Doch darüber hinaus ist das Recht in besonderer Weise auf Sprache angewiesen, denn es ist der Gesetzgebung wesentlich, Recht in sprachlich kodifizierter Form zu setzen. Bezugspunkt für Rechtsfragen sind Gesetzestexte. Die sprachliche Kodifizierung des Rechts soll zum einen eine inhaltliche Fixierung der Rechtsnormen ermöglichen, zum anderen die Zugänglichkeit der Normen für alle Rechtssubjekte gewährleisten. Aufgrund dieser essentiellen Bedeutung der Sprache für das Recht sind für die Rechtswissenschaft Fragen von Interesse, die zum Kernbestand sprachphilosophischer Problemstellungen gehören. Vor allen Dingen ist die Frage relevant, ob sprachlichen Ausdrücken überhaupt legitimerweise eine Bedeutung zugesprochen werden kann. Sollte dies – wie Bedeutungsskeptiker behaupten – nicht der Fall sein, hätte dies schwerwiegende Folgen für die Institution des Rechts.
In diesem Beitrag möchte ich ein Stück weit der Frage nachgehen, wie man die Konstitution sprachlicher Bedeutung im juristischen Diskurs erklären und gegen eine Version des Bedeutungsskeptizismus verteidigen kann, die in der Rechtswissenschaft von der Strukturierenden Rechtslehre vertreten wird. Bezugspunkt meiner konstruktiven Überlegungen ist Matthias Klatts Buch Theorie der Wortlautgrenze. Semantische Normativität in der juristischen Argumentation. In diesem Buch verfolgt Klatt das Ziel, die Idee einer vorgegebenen Bedeutung von Rechtstexten und die klassische Lehre der Wortlautgrenze unter Bezugnahme auf das Werk von Robert Brandom zu verteidigen.

Robert Brandom entwickelt in seinem Hauptwerk Making It Explicit (1994) und in seinem kürzeren Buch Articulating Reasons (2000) eine umfassende Theorie begrifflichen Gewahrseins, begrifflicher Aktivität und begrifflicher Gehalte. Im Zentrum von Brandoms Theorie steht der Vorgang des Explizitmachens. Laut Brandoms These des globalen Expressivismus müssen begriffliches Gewahrsein, begriffliche Aktivität und begrifflicher Gehalt unter Verweis auf die Aktivität des Explizitmachens erklärt werden. Angesichts dieser explanatorisch fundamentalen Rolle des Explizitmachens ist es erstaunlich, dass Brandoms Konzeption des Explizitmachens in der Forschungsliteratur bisher kaum Beachtung gefunden hat. Der vorliegende Aufsatz entwickelt eine Rekonstruktion des Explizitmachens bei Brandom und setzt sich in Abschnitt 7 mit Brandoms Konzeption kritisch auseinander. Im Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes werden sich allerdings beileibe nicht alle Aspekte des Explizitmachens in Augenschein nehmen lassen. Im Detail wird nur Brandoms Idee untersucht werden können, das Explizitmachen enthalte einen Prozess der Konzeptualisierung eines nicht-begrifflichen Gehalts.

The idea of the self and the capacity of self-knowledge  are core topics of early modern debates on the mind. Main figures that shaped the philosophical discussion were René Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche, and John Locke. Although disagreeing in many other areas, the empiricist Locke somewhat surprisingly finds an ally in the Cartesian Malebranche in maintaining a rather pessimistic view of our capacities to acquire self-knowledge. Descartes, in contrast, advanced an optimistic view claiming that we are able to gain clear and distinct self-knowledge that provides the secure foundation for all other knowledge and that implies that we know the mind better than bodies. As so often, Leibniz attempts to find middle ground, thereby taking on board the truths he sees in the competing positions while trying to avoid their downsides. As we will see, Leibniz shares ground with Malebranche in contending that inner sentiment merely supplies confused knowledge of the occurrence of thoughts in the self. On the other hand, he finds Malebranche’s “we see all ideas in God”-doctrine incomprehensible and takes up in modified form the Cartesian conception of innate ideas as dispositions to think.  The original way in which he develops his dispositional account of ideas and his distinction between two forms of reflection allow him to eventually propose a much more optimistic position on the question of self-knowledge than Malebranche does. With these resources at hand, he attempts to explain how confused inner sentiment can nevertheless be the source for metaphysical concepts and metaphysical self-knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the metaphysical features pertaining to the self. In his own genuine way, Leibniz positions himself between Malebranche’s pessimism and Descartes’s optimism.

For Wilfrid Sellars, conversation with past figures is an essential aspect of doing philosophy.  René Descartes belongs to his preferred dialogue partners. This is not the case because he considers Descartes’s views to be true, but because he thinks that Descartes is a philosopher whose views, although in many respects wrong, provide the opportunity to learn important insights.  However, it is clear to Sellars that serious exegetical work has to be done before we can take advantage of this opportunity. It is thus no surprise that Sellars takes issue with Descartes’s views in several writings and lectures.  This exegetical ambition distinguishes Sellars from 20th century and contemporary authors such as Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam who present themselves as radical critics of what they call the ‘Cartesian picture of the mind.’ Often, these authors operate rather carelessly in exegetical matters.  Not so Sellars. Although we will find several of his exegetical claims disputable, there is no doubt about the carefulness and seriousness of his exegetical work. It provides the basis on which Sellars develops his insightful critique of Descartes’s views.
In order to get an overview of Descartes’s conception of the mind, we will present his core claims and distinctions in the next section. In section three, we will then expound and critically discuss Sellars’s exegetical claims about Descartes’s conceptions of intentionality and consciousness. Sellars’s critique of Descartes’s views that revolves around the Myth of the Given and the conflation of sensing and conceiving will be addressed in section four. Section five summarizes the chapter’s main points.

In his famous monadological metaphysics, Leibniz distinguishes between simple monads, animal monads, and rational monads or minds. This tripartite metaphysical distinction is mirrored by his discrimination between cognitive performances these three types of monads are capable of. Simple monads perceive; animal monads additionally remember, sense, and mimic reasoning by associating mental images; rational monads, furthermore, think, reflect on and know themselves, know eternal truths, and reason logically. This essay will focus on Leibniz's account of the cognitive performances of minds and their relationship to those of animal monads. After Leibniz's notion of perception is introduced in section three, in section four the essay turns to his conception of sensation in animal monads. The following sections five to seven address the mental performances typical of minds and present Leibniz's conceptions of ideas, concepts, thoughts, apperception, sensation in rational monads, and conscientia. While at the beginning of the essay Leibniz's views get situated in the context of early modern philosophy of mind, especially as it relates to Descartes and the Aristotelian tradition, the essay concludes with a summary of the main innovations we find in his conception of cognition.

Does Descartes accept the phenomenal intentionality thesis as the thesis is presented in Terence Horgan's and John Tienson's 2002 article «Intentionality of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of Intentionality»? Raising this question, the paper intends to shed new light on Descartes's conceptions of intentionality and conscientia. In addition, it attempts to identify the aspects of Descartes's view of the mind that account for what we nowadays call «phenomenal consciousness». It turns out that it is an integral part of Descartes's conception of intentionality that thinking substances are conscious of their thoughts. However, the same is not generally true of the phenomenal character that Cartesian thoughts exhibit. Instead, at least in the case of sensory thoughts, the phenomenal character is determined by inner sensory objects that are " carried " by these thoughts, but that do not contribute to the thoughts' intentionality. The upshot is that Descartes does not accept Horgan's and Tienson's phenomenal intentionality thesis since intentionality is not grounded in phenomenal character.

The aim of the paper is to illuminate some core aspects of Leibniz’s conception of judgement and its place in his conception of the mind. In particular, the paper argues for three claims: First, the act of judgement is at the centre of Leibniz’s conception of the mind in that minds strive at actualising innate knowledge concerning deriva- tive truths, where the actualising involves an act of judgement. Second, Leibniz does not hold a judgement account of predication, but a two-component account that distinguishes between predication and alethic evaluation. Third, Leibniz understands the act of affirmative judgement in terms of establishing active dispositions, i.e. strivings, to make reasons available for future reasoning that aims at answering whether-questions (whether a proposition p is true or not). Correspondingly, he understands the act of negative judgement in terms of establishing dispositions to ban propositions from future reasoning that aims at answering whether-questions. In the final analysis, the acts of affirmative as well as of negative judgement turn out to be acts of changing memory dispositions.

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-016-9422-z

This comment addresses the topic of consciousness, which is one of the two main strands of Udo Thiel’s rich and inspiring book The Early Modern Subject. The other main topic, personal identity, is one that I will have to leave aside. The same holds true for most of the tremendous number of authors Thiel discusses. Instead of making scattered remarks on several authors, I will focus on one author, namely René Descartes, and his role in the development of early modern conceptions of consciousness.

Leibniz’ view on sensation is arguably the most elaborate one in early modern philosophy. I argue that Leibniz distinguishes between a wide concept of sensation and a narrow concept that only applies to conscious sensations. Moreover, Leibniz’ conception of conscious sensation consists of three parts. The aim of this paper is to explain the components of these conceptions and their interaction.
In the first section, I shortly delineate the place the notion of sensation occupies within the science Leibniz calls “psychologia”. In the second section, I present and discuss three main characterisations Leibniz gives of sensation. I argue that Leibniz has different targets in mind when formulating them: The first two characterisations concern sensation in general, whereas the third one refers to conscious sensation. In sections three to five, I reconstruct in detail the components of Leibniz’ conception of the general category of sensation and his conception of conscious sensation. Section six shortly addresses a fourth characterisation of sensation that connects conscious sensation to apperception. This section also aims to show that sensory apperception should not be understood as an act of reflection.

The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phe- nomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order concep- tion of it. In this conception, the consciousness aspect of phenomenal consciousness is explained in terms of a specific type of attention. This type of attention, in turn, is accounted for in terms of cognitive appetites aiming at knowledge about a repre- sented object by means of initiating cognitive operations on representational content. Furthermore, against the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account, it is argued that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character. According to this view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests on the con- fusing effect of imperfect acts of attention directed towards representational contents. Holding this view, Leibniz finds fruitful middle ground between contemporary stan- dard positions like higher-order theories, representationalist conceptions, and qualia accounts of phenomenal consciousness. His position possesses resources to meet sev- eral objections these standard accounts are confronted with.

Do living beings possess only one single soul? Leibniz is unmistakable in giving a positive answer to this question. Moreover, the souls of living beings are not aggregates of sub- ordinate souls. Rather, in Leibniz’s view they are true unities. In both respects, Leibniz is a follower of the unitarist position Thomas Aquinas famously would endorse. But Aquinas combined his soul unitarism with two further, closely related propositions. First, Aquinas accepts the Aristotelian distinction between absolutely distinct kinds of souls in nature, namely vegetative, sensory, and rational souls. Second, Aquinas also endorses the, again Aristotelian, distinction between three kinds of faculties that are characteristic of these kinds of souls: the faculty of nutrition, the faculty of sensation, and the rational faculty of thinking. However, some living beings pose a problem for Aquinas’s position. There are liv- ing beings in nature, namely animals and human beings, that manifest the possession of more than one of these faculties. Animals manifest the possession of the faculties of nutri- tion and sensation. Human beings additionally manifest the possession of the rational fac- ulty of thinking. But how is it possible that a unitary soul – the sensory souls of animals and the rational souls of human beings – can incorporate a plurality of absolutely distinct faculties?
While Leibniz agrees with Aquinas on his soul unitarism, it is controversial whether or not he also accepts Aquinas’s thesis of a plurality of absolutely distinct kinds of souls in na- ture. According to a widespread view, Leibniz endorses the ancient idea that all natural beings form a “Great Chain of Being.” According to this view, Leibniz’s strong adherence to the principle of continuity commits him to the view that all living beings can be ordered in a series that is perfectly continuous and does not show any gaps. If this view is correct, Leibniz would not so much hold that there is a plurality of absolutely distinct kinds of souls in nature. Rather, he would maintain that all souls in nature are gradual variants of one and the same absolute kind of souls. Accordingly, Leibniz would approve of a kinds-of-souls monism rather than a kinds-of-souls pluralism. This would also imply that Leibniz’s posi- tion is very similar to that of Descartes. While Descartes also shares Aquinas’s soul unitar- ism, he disagrees with Aquinas as far as the question of a plurality of soul kinds in nature is concerned. For Descartes, all souls in nature belong to the same kind: they are all minds. If Leibniz only accepts gradual differences among souls, he agrees with Descartes in claiming that all souls in nature are of one and the same kind, although they would disagree with re- spect to what this kind of souls consists in.
In this paper, I argue that Leibniz does not accept kinds-of-souls monism. Although the principle of continuity plays a central role in his philosophy of nature, he does not reject the idea that the souls in nature belong to absolutely distinct kinds. True, Leibniz endorses the view that all souls in nature can be ordered in a continuous series. However, Leibniz be- lieves that this claim is reconcilable with the assumption that there are absolute distinctions between these souls. The decisive point of Leibniz’s conception is that he considers souls to be continuous only in some respects, whereas they are absolutely, rather than merely grad- ually, distinct in others. This is neglected by those authors who ascribe a kinds-of-souls monism to Leibniz. Accordingly, Leibniz’s position is much more Thomistic than Carte- sian in spirit. This, of course, raises the question of how Leibniz handles the problem Aqui- nas’s unitarism faces with regard to the plurality of absolutely distinct faculties that are sup- posed to be incorporated in sensory and rational souls. In the final part of this paper, I will argue that Leibniz has better prospects to meet this problem.
In section two of this paper, I will sketch the view of Aquinas on the question of how many souls a living being possesses and of how many kinds of souls exist in nature. The position of Aquinas will serve as a historical point of reference for the following discussion of Leibniz’s view. The exposition of Leibniz’s view in sections three to seven will mainly concern the question of how the application of the principle of continuity to souls in nature is to be understood. In doing so, I will not attempt to give a complete survey of what Leibniz thought on this matter throughout his career, but mainly restrict attention to writings from Leibniz’s later period, after 1700. As I have already mentioned, my main aim in these sec- tions is to argue in favour of the view that the late Leibniz allows for absolutely distinct kinds of souls in nature. In the concluding eighth section, I will compare Leibniz’s with Aquinas’s soul unitarism and kinds-of-souls pluralism. My aim is to show that Leibniz’s position is promising with regard to coping with difficulties Aquinas’s view faces.

It is argued in this paper that a close analysis of Leibniz’s statements about conscientia and related notions reveals that Leibniz does not understand conscientia as phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, a positive account of Leibnizian conscientia is suggested that rests on the foregoing insight. My contention is that Leibnizian conscientia is best understood as a form of introspection.

At first glance, Leibniz’ concept of apperception seems to be a straightforward matter. As is well known, in paragraph 4 of the Principles of Nature and Grace (1714) Leibniz identifies apperception with consciousness and the reflective knowledge of one’s inner states. Similarly, in paragraph 14 of the Monadology (1714), he identifies apperception with consciousness. Since the Principles and the Monadology are generally considered to be authoritative texts in which Leibniz summarises his late metaphysical views, it is tempting to interpret Leibniz’ conception of apperception from the New Essays on Human Understanding (1703-05) onwards in the light of these later texts. Robert McRae took up this interpretative strategy in his monograph Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought from 1976. Mark Kulstad criticised and modified this account substantially in his Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection from 1991. To simplify a bit, both authors claim that, for Leibniz, apperception is identical with or, at least, essentially connected with reflection.
In this talk, I will first explain why the reflective account of apperception fails for the New Essays. In the second paragraph, I will sketch an alternative account that does not understand apperception in terms of reflection, but in terms of attention.

For Descartes, consciousness is closely connected to the intellective perception of thought. This paper argues that the prevalent interpretations of Descartes's account of consciousness in terms of higher-order perception and self-representation fail. These interpretations mistakenly assume that Cartesian consciousness possesses the same theoretical structure in all cases. It is shown by a close analysis of relevant passages that for Descartes the consciousness of perceptions and the consciousness of volitions have different theoretical structures. From this analysis a more adequate picture of Cartesian consciousness is developed and, finally, compared with a recent reconstruction developed by Vili Lähteenmäki.

In Making it Explicit, Robert Brandom distinguishes between two versions of the linguistic approach to intentionality: the resemblance limb and the relational limb (MIE 150). Furthermore, Brandom considers Wilfrid Sellars and Donald Davidson to hold relational accounts of intentionality. In this paper, I will, first, investigate whether Brandom is right in attributing a relational position to Sellars and, second, determine how Sellars’s relationalism looks like and what arguments Sellars presents in favour this position. Third, I will sketch Davidson’s main argument for the relational position. Finally, I will compare Davidson’s and Sellars’s positions and argue that Sellars’s should be preferred to Davidson’s view.

The paper develops adequacy constraints on accounts of Cartesian conscientia (sections one and two) and proposes an account – called the "deflationary account" – that is claimed to meet these constraints (sections three and four).
The first section develops an important adequacy constraint that stems from the relation between conscientia and cognitio interna. Descartes discusses cognitio interna in the 6th Replies (AT VII 422/CSM II 285) and The Search for Truth (AT X 524/CSM II 417-418). He says that cognitio interna is acquired through conscientia. Any adequate account of conscientia needs to account for this fact. Section two highlights the key passage any adequate account of conscientia has to make intelligible, namely Descartes' definition of "idea" in the addendum to the 2nd Replies (AT VII 160)/CSM II 113). According to the key passage, a mind is conscius of its thoughts in virtue of an immediate perception of the thoughts' form. Margaret Wilson understands "form" as denoting the thoughts' "determinate nature" (Wilson 1978). In the case of fearing a lion, my thought has the form "fearing-a-lion". While Wilson can explain how conscientia can be the source for cognitio interna, her account seems to run into a vicious regress. Alison Simmons claims that conscientia is due to a sui generis reflexive property thoughts exhibit (Simmons 2012). Her account avoids the regress problem, but does not seem to explain how conscientia can be the source of cognitio interna. Section three presents an alternative account of Cartesian conscientia. It is deflationary in spirit in that it sees conscientia merely as an aspect of the intentionality of thoughts. The deflationary account avoids the regress problem. But at first glance, it does not seem capable of explaining how conscientia can be the source of cognitio interna. In section four it is argued that this problem can be remedied.

Suggested Reading:
• Broughton, Janet, "Self-Knowledge ", in: Broughton/Carriero (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Descartes, 2008, 179-195
• Simmons, Alison, "Cartesian Consciousness Reconsidered", Philosopher's Imprint 12/2 (January 2012)
• Wilson, Margaret D., Descartes (Arguments of the Philosophers), 1978, chapter IV.2 ("Consciousness")