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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Practical Philosophy/Ethics

Philip Fox


Philip Fox

E-Mail: philip.fox@hu-berlin.de

Reseach Interests

Epistemic and Practical Normativity, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy, Kant’s Practical Philosophy


Doctoral student in Philosophy at Humboldt University Berlin since autumn 2018 (with pre-doc scholarships from the German Academic Scholarship Foundation and the Carl und Max Schneider-Stiftung). Prior to that, studies in Philosophy and Economics in Bayreuth, Oxford and Berlin (supported by the German Academic Scholarship Foundation).


„Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance“, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 15 (3): 222-254, 2019. (PDF)

„Agency & The Pill that Makes us Moral“, Grazer Philosophische Studien 92: 127-135, 2015. (PDF)
Talks and Comments

“Constitutivism, Quietism, and the Unity of Normative Reasons”, Summer Institute on Practical Normativity, Princeton University (05.08.2018)

Comment on “Perfecting Political Liberalism” by John Colin Bradley, 8th Princeton-Humboldt Graduate Philosophy Conference, Humboldt University Berlin (24.07.2018)

“The Prospects of Epistemic Constitutivism”, 8th Princeton-Humboldt Graduate Philosophy Conference, Humboldt University Berlin (23.07.2018)

“Is Agent-Relativity Optional?”, Fourth Student Conference of the Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie, Humboldt University Berlin (28.09.2017)

“Constitutivism about Epistemic Rationality”, Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg (09.09.2016) 

“The Subjective Incoherence Argument against Parfit’s Agony Argument”, Second Student Conference of the Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie, University of Osnabrück (17.09.2015)

“How to Deal With the Asymmetry of Rational Requirements”, 2nd London School of Economics/University of Bayreuth Student Philosophy Conference, University of Bayreuth (08.05.2014)


Can the objective authority of normative principles be explained in a philosophically illuminating way? Taken as a question about practical (and especially moral) principles, some people find quietism to be a plausible response. On this view, an explanatorily ambitious account of practical normativity is neither possible nor necessary. Taken as a question about epistemic principles, some people find constitutivism to be a plausible response. On this view, it is possible to provide an explanatorily ambitious account of epistemic normativity (e.g. by invoking the notion of a constitutive standard or function). The central question behind my dissertation project is whether one could legitimately hold different views about the nature of practical and epistemic normativity, respectively, and if not, what this means for the project of meta-normative theorizing.

Courses Taught

At Humboldt University Berlin:

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Tutorial, SS 2018

Introduction to Normative Ethics 
Tutorial, WS 2017/18
At University of Bayreuth:

Philosophical Writing
Tutorial (with Jan Grohn), SS 2014

Introduction to Philosophy
Tutorial, WS 2014/14