Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Klassische Deutsche Philosophie

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin | Institut für Philosophie | Klassische Deutsche Philosophie | Veranstaltungen | 1. Buchsymposium am Lehrstuhl für Klassische Deutsche Philosophie:

1. Buchsymposium am Lehrstuhl für Klassische Deutsche Philosophie:

James Kreines, "Reason in the World. Hegel's Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal" 

(OUP forthcoming)



Datum: Dienstag, 11. November 2014

Ort: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Hauptgebäude (Unter den Linden 6), Raum 2249a

Sprecher:  James Kreines (Claremont McKenna College)

                  Robert Stern (University of Sheffield)

                  Franz Knappik (HU Berlin)


Programm (geändert):

10.30-11.00 Précis James Kreines

11.00-11.45 Kommentar Robert Stern: "Kreines on the problem of metaphysics in Kant and Hegel"

11.45-12.30 Diskussion

12.30-14.00 Mittagspause

14.00-14.45 Kommentar Franz Knappik: "And yet he is a monist"

14.45-15.30 Diskussion


Keine Teilnahmegebühr. Um Anmeldung bei Sabine Hassel ( wird gebeten. Angemeldete Teilnehmer erhalten im Vorfeld Material aus dem Buchmanuskript



This book defends a new interpretation of Hegel’s theoretical philosophy, according to which Hegel’s project in his central Science of Logic has a single organizing focus, provided by taking metaphysics as fundamental to philosophy, rather than any epistemological problem about knowledge or intentionality. Hegel pursues more specifically the metaphysics of reason, concerned with grounds, reasons, or conditions in terms of which things can be explained – and ultimately with the possibility of complete reasons. There is no threat to such metaphysics in epistemological or skeptical worries. The real threat is Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic case that metaphysics comes into conflict with itself. But Hegel, despite familiar worries, has a powerful case that Kant’s own insights in the Dialectic can be turned to more metaphysical purposes. And we can understand in these terms the unified focus of the seemingly disparate discussions at the conclusion of Hegel’s Science of Logic. Hegel defends, first, his general claim that the reasons which explain things are always found in immanent concepts, universals or kinds. And he will argue from here to conclusions which are distinctive in being metaphysically ambitious yet surprisingly distant from any form of metaphysical foundationalism, whether scientistic, theological, or otherwise. Hegel’s project, then, turns out neither Kantian nor Spinozist, but more distinctively his own. Finally, we can still learn a great deal from Hegel about ongoing philosophical debates concerning everything from metaphysics, to the philosophy of science, and all the way to the nature of philosophy itself.