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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Praktische Philosophie und Didaktik der Philosophie

Roland Hesse

 

Roland Hesse

Email: hessewol@cms.hu-berlin.de

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       Schwerpunkte

Normative Ethik, Metaethik
Zur Person Studium Philosophy & Economics an der Universität Bayreuth (B.A.), Studium der Philosophie an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und an der Universität Cambridge, UK (MPhil). Seit Oktober 2012 Promotionsstudent an der HU Berlin. Von Oktober 2012 bis Juli 2013 Pro-Doc-Stipendiat der Carl-und-Max-Schneider Stiftung Berlin. Von August bis Dezember 2013 Promotionsstipendiat der Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft. Seit Januar 2014 Promotionsstipendiat der Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes.
Vorträge

"Consequentialism and the Good", 3rd Humboldt-Princeton Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Berlin (05.08.2013)

"Consequentialism and the Good", 2nd Humboldt-King's College Graduate Workshop, London (04.05.2013)

Aktuelle Projekte

Consequentialist vs. Non-Consequentialist Moral Theories (PhD Project)

My projected is located in normative ethics with a pull to more abstract, meta-ethical questions. My working hypothesis is that if one assumes a conceptual or other intimate and yet to be specified nexus between normative reasons and the good, some version of consequentialism follows. The so called paradox of deontic constraints serves as a starting point for the inquiry which then mainly circulates around questions about reasons, the good, and reasons and the good.

 

John Taurek and the Debate on Interpersonal Aggregation

John Taurek’s 1977 paper „Should the Numbers Count“ is probably one of the few philosophical papers that truly deserve the label ‚seminal‘. Its publication has sparked an ongoing debate about its title question and on the notion of aggregationism. I believe that once we carefully distinguish between different positions that could plausibly lay claim to the label 'aggregationism', the debate will become much clearer - and many arguments against consequentialism that allegedly rest on some form or other of anti-aggregationism will loose much of their appeal.